Delegate Selection is Never Easy in Nevada

Why is it that it often appears as if the political parties in Nevada are on the verge of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory concerning the matter of national convention delegate selection?

It mostly has to do with the scrutiny attendant to having the state's caucuses thrust into the early, pre-window portion of the presidential primary for 2008. Hillary Clinton brought suit against casino caucuses, won the 2008 Nevada Democratic caucuses anyway, but due to the construction of the state party delegate selection rules lost out in the delegate count to then-Senator Barack Obama.

On the Republican side, Mitt Romney won the 2008 Nevada Republican caucuses while almost every other campaign was focused on the South Carolina primary on the same day. The January caucuses were on the up and up, but that a candidate overwhelmingly won them and then withdrew from the race ultimately had the effect of throwing subsequent steps in the delegate selection process into chaos. The void created allowed Ron Paul supporters -- and leftover Romney supporters aligned with them -- to overtake the process, leading to the cancelation of the state convention and later selection of national convention delegates by the Nevada Republican Party State Central Committee.

In each case, the legitimacy of the overall processes was called into question by at least some faction within each party. And by all indications the Nevada Republican Party may be heading down that very same road -- but for slightly different reasons -- in 2012.

FHQ was less concerned than most in February with the molasses-slow count of just less than 35,000 precinct caucus votes on February 4,¹ but it looks like that may have been an omen of things to come. If that wasn't, then the Paul efforts to overrun the special -- and later-than-the-rest caucus -- set up for Jewish caucusgoers observing the Sabbath should have served as a signal. Of course, unlike the 2008 experience, the Nevada Republican Party had at least laid the groundwork for a more orderly process in 2012 by making the vote in the precinct caucuses binding on the ultimate allocation of delegates. The winner of the caucuses, also unlike 2008, stayed in the race. Undeterred by either of those changes, however, Paul supporters pressed on; striving to -- like 2008 -- win as many delegate slots to the county and state conventions as possible.

And that has the Nevada Republican delegate selection process at a crossroads heading into the state convention this coming weekend. On the one hand, Paul forces are well-positioned to affect a repeat of the 2008 state convention (...albeit, the campaign would hope without the cancelation and selection of delegates by the state central committee). But on the other hand, the Republican National Committee Legal Counsel's Office has intervened,²  threatening the state party with just that: ensure that the delegate selection rules laid out carry the day or run the risk of a challenge to the delegation at the national convention in Tampa.

In sum, this is a recipe -- a match and a canister of gasoline -- for an interesting state convention. The first test case of this will occur early on Saturday (10:30a-12:15p) at the state convention when there is a vote scheduled to adopt the proposed rules. If onlookers are attempted to game where the potential points of derailment are, this is the first. Recall that the RNC legal counsel pointed out that it would find any attempt to alter any of the rules "improper". But it is just that sort of thing that the faction of Paul delegates at the state conventions to be held thus far have attempted.

Overall, both sides, I would argue, have pretty good arguments no matter how this progresses, but arguments not without flaws.

The RNC is making the case that rules are in place and that the delegate selection and allocation should reflect those guidelines. The proportional allocation of the state's 28 delegates, in the RNC's view, should allot Romney 20 and Paul the remaining 8.³ Of course, the reallocation of delegate positions bound to Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum is potentially premature. Both candidates have suspended their campaigns but the Nevada Republican Party rules call for a withdrawal from the race for delegates to be released. That is debatable, but the RNC seems to be assuming a withdrawal nonetheless. The key on this point is if there are any Santorum or Gingrich delegates at the state convention who are willing to fight for those spots. Additionally, it should be noted that the withdrawal scenario described in the rules fits in a different window of time: a withdrawal after the state convention but before the national convention. There is seemingly no pre-state convention withdrawal scenario accounted for in the NVGOP rules.

Expect to hear this from Paul-aligned delegates on Saturday. They will make the case that those Santorum and Gingrich bound-delegates are fair game and should not be redistributed based on a reallocation of the total number of delegates according to the collective Romney-Paul share and division of the precinct caucus vote. Instead, Romney should have his base 14 delegates allotted to him and Paul, his 5 with the nine other delegates still bound to Gingrich (6 delegates) and Santorum (3 delegates). If there are Gingrich and Santorum delegates there, then they can claim those slots. Otherwise, the remaining top vote-getting delegates -- be they Paul or Romney supporters -- claim those spots. If the Paul forces involved in Nevada are as strong as some are indicating, that would allow them to pick off all or most of those nine delegates. That would in turn equalize the delegate count between Paul and Romney in the state.

Granted, this all assumes that there is a relatively tame fight over the small segment of the rules discussing but not completely specifying the withdrawal of candidates. The Paul campaign could settle for a 14-14 delegate count out of Nevada, but it could also attempt to completely overwrite the proposed rules for the convention during that adoption vote, swinging even more -- or all -- of the delegation Paul's way.

Strategically, the split is probably a more reasonable route -- as opposed to completely rewriting the rules -- simply because attempting to bite off more than Paul state convention delegates can chew may force the Nevada GOP's hand. And by that, I mean, pulling the plug on the convention, as was the case in 2008. That would throw the delegate selection decision to the state central committee again. [The committee is slated to meet the Sunday after the convention is set to adjourn.]

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One other note (or perhaps notes): The national committeeman and national committeewoman posts are up for election at the state convention as well. Those are obviously two of the three automatic delegates (who are also proportionally allocated -- but bound to the candidate of their preference) from Nevada. The catch is that their term of service does not begin until they are ratified by the Republican National Convention. It isn't clear what would happen if there is a snag in that ratification process -- whether the current members would cast votes during the roll call or what. But a roadblock seems more likely if committee-people-elect come from what is viewed as an illegitimate state convention. Much, it seems, would depend on when that ratification vote took place relative to the roll call vote (likely before it as it has some bearing on the credentialing process).

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Buckle up, folks. This convention promises to be a fun one.

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¹ As I've argued, following the 2008 experience and what had happened just a month earlier in Iowa, the Nevada GOP was probably right to take their time counting ballots (...even if the outcome was not nearly as uncertain as had been the case in the Iowa caucuses).

² To follow up on the post from yesterday on Paul's leverage moving forward, take the RNC's letter as at least some evidence of the national party/the Romney campaign attempting to engage in this process to avert any chaos at the national convention.

³ Fabulous Las Vegas Sun reporter Jon Ralston cited the 20 Romney delegates in his write-up of the letter from the RNC last night and confirmed with FHQ that that is based on the reallocation of Gingrich and Santorum delegates from the first round.


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Massachusetts Republican Caucuses: Sigh and Questions that Need to Be Asked/Answered


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Massachusetts Republican Caucuses: Sigh and Questions that Need to Be Asked/Answered

This is one of those things where if folks -- and by folks I mean the press -- had been following along with both the Paul campaign/the efforts of Paul's supporters and the rules of the game in states across the county, the situation in Massachusetts this weekend likely would not have come across as that much of a shock.

The reality is that the Paul supporters, as they are doing throughout the country, are striving to elect as many Paul-aligned delegates to the national convention in Tampa as possible -- bound to Paul or whomever (more on this later in a separate post). Such was the case in caucuses across the Bay state on Saturday. Outside of the surprise/symbolism of the Romney slate not emerging victorious in the former governor's home state, there really is little else to the story. The 38 at-large and congressional district delegates are still bound to the winner of the March 6 Massachusetts primary through the first ballot at the national convention. And that is that.

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The other interesting aspect of this is that the reporting thus far is emphasizing the fact that former Lieutenant Governor Kerry Healey (R) lost in her race to become a delegate. This is strange because Healey is already a delegate having been selected by the Massachusetts Republican State Committee as the Republican National Committeewoman from the state earlier this month. In that role, Healey is already an automatic delegate to the convention. Viewed from that perspective, it is odd that Healey was even running. The position of national committeewoman is one voted on, according to Massachusetts Republican Party bylaws, by the State Committee. The State Committee members were elected through the primary on March 6 -- not in the caucuses over the weekend. That eliminates the possibility of State Committee members being elected and then turning around and selecting national committeepeople or state party chairs. The elections of those officials are outlined in Article III, Section 2 of the state party bylaws. If anyone can get through to the Romney campaign, it may perhaps be worth asking why Healey was running for a position (delegate) she could not occupy.

...since she is already a delegate.


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Hey Hey, Ho Ho. This Romney Protest's Got to Go?

...or something like that.

FHQ will take the bait and fan the smoldering embers of the fire that is the 2012 Republican presidential primary race. First Read's Michael O'Brien actually brings up a fairly interesting question about the factors surrounding/likelihood of a protest vote against Mitt Romney throughout the rest of the primary calendar. No, I'm not going to dwell on the question of whether there will be a protest vote -- there will be¹ -- but FHQ will look at the factors that will likely play into Romney meeting or surpassing the mostly arbitrary 70% mark in the remaining primaries and caucuses. Let's look at the factors that may keep Romney under that particular share of the vote:

[...you know, before those inevitable stories about how weak Romney is because there are still voters voting against him.]

1. Opposition by numbers: Simply put, the number of active candidates still in the race matters in this instance. The more candidates involved, the higher the collective vote share. Ron Paul will get his share of the vote. If anything proved that, it was the Texas congressman's performance against John McCain in 2008. Paul's voters were never going to jump ship to Romney anyway. Gingrich is another matter. The former speaker will likely pull in some of the displaced Santorum vote, but so too will Romney. And Santorum is still on the ballot in most states. Some of those Santorum votes will stay home. Well, they may actually stay home or stay home by voting for Santorum -- their preferred candidate.
2. Open primaries: Now that the race is effectively over -- Eh, who am I kidding? It's over. -- Democrats are even less likely to cross over to vote in the Republican primary. However, Paul will continue to pull in both Libertarian-minded Republicans and independents in some of the more open primary states (see O'Brien's example of Idaho in 2008, Paul's high water mark in terms of vote share). 
3. Geography/evangelism: Yeah, it still matters.

The combination of these factors makes North Carolina, Indiana, West Virginia, Arkansas and Texas states to most closely watch for that 70% mark that other recent Republican nominees have been able to garner against only token opposition.²

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¹ And to be clear, this will have no impact on the outcome of the Republican nomination. Romney will be the Republican nominee.

² Throw Rhode Island in for good measure, too. The Ocean state allows independents to participate. [Thanks to the Green Papers for the data on primary participation across states.]

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Santorum Suspends: A Nomination Race in Context

Well, FHQ will add its two cents. And not surprisingly, we'll look at Rick Santorum's decision to suspend his presidential campaign through the lens of the delegate count.

All too often delegate counts don't matter in the grand scheme of things in most presidential nomination races. To the extent that they do, it is fleeting. Counting up delegates is only consequential and/or necessary in a couple of instances:

1. After the race has progressed far enough that one candidate has effectively taken all/most of the momentum -- or continued riding it from the invisible primary portion of the campaign -- and thus stretched out to a large enough lead to make a comeback unlikely if not impossible.
2. If the race has progressed to a point where two or more candidates are trading primary and caucus wins and staying within range of each other in terms of the delegate count. 

These are the extremes and throughout much of the post-reform era the process has moved ever closer to the former rather than the latter. A constantly frontloading calendar gave, for much of that period, frontrunning candidates a greater and better opportunity to effectively wrap up the nomination early if they had established themselves as the clear frontrunner heading into the contest portion of the race. The nomination races in both parties in 2000 and for the Democrats in 2004 are good examples. But if 2008 demonstrated anything it was that if the invisible primary (fundraising, poll position and endorsement) has proven inconclusive, then true delegate counting may ensue. Certainly, this was more the case on the Democratic side in 2008 than among the Republican candidates.

One easy way of describing the 2012 Republican nomination race is to say that despite all the rules changes and all the calendar movement, it still played out pretty much like 2008. Super Tuesday came and went with one candidate well ahead of the others in the delegate count and a month later it was over. Of course, John McCain was way out in front of his rivals in 2008 after the February 5 Super Tuesday series of contests, but a month later -- after wins in Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas and Vermont -- the Arizona senator wrapped up the nomination. And that's just as it was in 2012. Romney emerged from Super Tuesday on March 6 with a sizable enough delegate lead and eliminated his final viable opponent a month later after wins in Maryland, Washington, DC and Wisconsin.

Now, the explanation is more complex than that. After all McCain surpassed the 1191 delegate mark to officially clinch the nomination a month after Super Tuesday, whereas Romney will continue to march toward 1144 in a semi-contested to uncontested way for the rest of the calendar. The point here is not to minimize that distinction. Rather, the intent is to point out that while delegate counting is fun -- more so for some of us than others -- often these contests for a party's nomination are more a process of elimination. Presumptive nominees don't often have to concern themselves with the sorts of gain-deficit ratios and other delegate calculations Barbara Norrander (2000) so eloquently describes in discussing the end game of nomination contests. No, more often than not, it is simply a matter of a frontrunner eliminating his or her final viable opponent (Norrander 1996).

We counted delegates for a while in 2012, but this one ended like so many other presidential nomination races of the post-reform era ended: with the runner-up withdrawing. In this case, Mitt Romney had established enough of a delegate lead that a Santorum comeback was unlikely if not impossible.


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These things are over sooner rather than later.

The history of the presidential primary process -- the trajectory of it throughout the post-reform era anyway -- has shown that some candidate clinches the nomination sooner rather than later. The logic of this has been thrown on its head to some extent over the last two cycles with... 1) Democratic voters in 2008 having an either/or proposition in the choice between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton while remaining with some exceptions high on both options and 2) 2012 Republican voters being torn between yielding to a plurality candidate who doesn't necessarily have the backing of the full party or opting to vote (for the best, viable candidate) in protest.

It is on that latter scenario that I would like to focus, though. We know where later is on the sooner--later spectrum: the convention. But we are in the process of determining where sooner is. The 2012 Republican presidential nomination race is at a point where Mitt Romney is in control and his nomination is a when not if proposition. But that is not necessarily readily apparent.

...at least not where it counts: with the main opposition campaign (Santorum).

If the Romney nomination is a when not if proposition, then the race is in a position of negotiating Santorum's withdrawal. Now, FHQ doesn't mean that as either the RNC and/or Romney campaign incentivizing in some way Santorum's exit.¹ Against the backdrop of a likely steady stream of endorsements for, not to mention primary victories by, Romney throughout April will be a decision-making calculus within Santorum campaign as to the utility of continuing in the race.

...of the campaign coming to the realization that either Santorum cannot become the nominee (at the convention²) or he cannot keep Romney from reaching the 1144 delegates necessary to wrap up the nomination. Another angle to consider is that the Santorum camp comes to the realization that continuing on is in no way helpful to their/the party's cause. For the Santorum campaign, they have to concern themselves with the optics of persisting in a cause that will be hard to keep together during April (see above). The longer they keep at it, the worse the outlook is for getting a VP or cabinet nod from a presumptive Romney-as-nominee. And no, that may not be the goal here. Alternatively, it also hurts Santorum's efforts with the very people that would help him in any future run at the nomination: the establishment of the party. If the perception is -- among that group -- that Santorum has, is or does hurt(ing) Romney in terms of the former Massachusetts governor's chances against Obama in the fall. If that is the conventional wisdom, then the party establishment is much less likely to rally around Santorum in the future. That is an iffy proposition anyway. That assumes that there is not a "better" candidate out there four or eight years from now that occupies a similar ideological space among the field of candidates. [After all, the 2012 field is viewed as relatively weak.] If that is the conclusion that is reached within the Santorum campaign -- that there are no incentives forthcoming from the Romney camp and/or the future outlook is bleak -- then they have nothing to lose by continuing in the race.

...at least until the money dries up and the sort of retrenchment witnessed in the Gingrich campaign this week hits the Santorum camp.

That is the self-interested side of this. But there are also party-centered, altruistic notions at play here. We can call those "taking one for the team" notions; that stepping aside is for the good of the party's fortunes in the general election campaign. Even this comes back to the self-interested angle above. If the feeling is that they/the campaign has nothing to lose by continuing on, then this is likely to play out in a rather slow, but obvious manner. In that scenario, if we follow history in the post-reform era as a guide, the Santorum campaign will likely die a slow death during primary season. But that has yet to play out.

...so, we know where later is, but we're still trying to determine where, or more appropriately when, sooner is.

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¹ This is a dynamic process, but the RNC and Romney campaigns, independent of each other, seem to be taking more of a hands-off instead of hands-on approach to this. If an argument can be made for either one intervening, it would be for the RNC (...as measured by the steady stream of endorsements coming in for Romney). And even that argument is tenuous at best. It is more a matter of a collective will -- independent of national party coordination -- that folks like Marco Rubio or Jeb Bush or George HW Bush are coming out in favor of Mitt Romney or endorsing the idea that the process should come to a close.

² I think that, barring a significant shake up to the current dynamics of this race as they currently exist, we can all agree that Santorum cannot get to 1144 or surpass Romney in the delegate count during primary season. It is his campaigns only play to keep Romney under 1144 heading into the convention and rolling the dice there.


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Divining the Meaning of Illinois

Meh.

Count FHQ among the chorus of voices out there that was not overly moved by Mitt Romney's victory in the Illinois primary Tuesday night. Was it a foregone conclusion? Not necessarily. Did Rick Santorum have a chance? Sure, I suppose so. But more importantly, was it a surprise? No. No, it was not.

And for a race that badly needs a surprise -- if you are one of the many out there hoping for a continually chaotic march to 1144 -- Illinois did not stray too terribly far from the demographic voting pattern that has emerged in this race. Santorum wins evangelical, rural and working class voters while Romney takes well-educated, upper income and moderate voters. Illinois was a Romney state in the same way that Louisiana is shaping up to be a Santorum state this coming weekend.

Yet, that has not prevented some from stating that Illinois feels like a turning point. From the psychological standpoint that may be true. Illinois was billed as another last best chance for Santorum to crack the hold Romney has had on the midwest/Rust Belt states to have held contests thus far. By that metric, Santorum failed once again. Is Illinois different than Michigan or Ohio? FHQ won't hazard a guess.

However, there is an easy way to test this "Illinois as turning point" theory. The problem is that we won't be able to use until May. I am in complete agreement with Ryan Lizza's take (linked above) that we can in a rudimentary way chart how well candidates will do in upcoming states.¹ By that measure, Romney is in for a good month in April. But will that performance be impacted by Illinois? Perhaps, but that impact will more than likely be very well masked by the demographics of those states carrying Romney to victory.² That is the reason that the Santorum campaign conference call earlier in the week was light on the details of an April strategy and comparatively heavy on the role May states play in the former Pennsylvania senator's efforts to keep Romney under 1144 during primary season.

If in May, then, we begin to notice Romney either winning or noticeably closing the gap on Santorum in projected Santorum states -- Arkansas, North Carolina, Kentucky and Texas -- then we may look back to Illinois as a turning point. But it could be that we look back to even earlier contests -- to Florida or South Carolina -- as those turning points as well. Any protracted delegate battle can traced back to opportunities rival (and underdog) campaigns squandered in their efforts to stunt the growth an emerging delegate margin for the frontrunner. Florida and South Carolina were those opportunities for Gingrich/Santorum. Gingrich did lead in the contest delegate count -- never mind those pesky automatic delegates -- between South Carolina and Florida.

...but that was for a mere ten days.

For Illinois, though, it was just another in a long line of opportunities missed for the not Romneys.

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¹ And this may or may not help Mr. Lizza, but I have been working on the next step of his process -- the delegate count through that demographic -- myself. The problem is that allocating delegates in future states is a tricky, messy business that is made all the more problematic by redistricting. The data may be out there to construct Obama/McCain vote shares in new districts or to ascertain the correlation between that incomplete dataset and say the most recent PVI numbers from the Cook Political Report to potentially fill in the blanks. One could even use the 2008 Republican primary data as a means of mapping this onto the current race. The problem there of course is that one would have to reconstruct the data from the precinct level up to the new congressional districts. Those are hard enough options to come by, but finding numbers on evangelicals in the new districts is tougher still. Believe me, I'm trying.

² Yes this assumes that Romney does well. But recall that if Illinois is to tell us anything about the future contests it would have to tell us a Romney story (Romney won there.). Disruptions/surprises in the other direction are not a part of that calculus, but may (but likely won't) occur and throw this theory on its head.


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Santorum Has Rule #40 Problems, Too

The folks at NBC News have dug down into the 2008 Rules of the Republican Party -- the rules governing the 2012 presidential nomination process -- and have found that Rule #40 may stand in the way of Newt Gingrich having his named placed into nomination at the convention in Tampa this summer.

Here's the pertinent text of Rule 40.b:

Each candidate for nomination for President of the United States and Vice President of the United States shall demonstrate the support of a plurality of the delegates from each of five (5) or more states, severally, prior to the presentation of the name of that candidate for nomination.

Read that closely. That isn't -- as the NBC piece emphasizes -- five wins. The rule states that a candidate is required to control pluralities of the delegates in at least five states. By that metric, as of now, Rick Santorum is not really out of the woods yet either. The former Pennsylvania senator has won nine contests -- ten if you count the non-binding Missouri primary -- but only half of those states have actually allocated delegates as of March 21, 2012. Further, Santorum only has clear delegate pluralities in three of those states: Alabama, Kansas and Tennessee. In Mississippi and Oklahoma, both Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich are within a couple of automatic delegate endorsements of controlling a plurality of the delegation.

Now, more than likely one of a couple of scenarios is likely to play out. Either:

1. Santorum ends up winning the plurality of delegates in Iowa, Colorado, Minnesota, Missouri and North Dakota, controls those delegations and has no problems being nominated -- if it comes to that.
2. The delegate math will have become so impossible and the pressure from within the party will have grown so high that Santorum will exit the race and delegates in those non-binding/unbound caucus states will end up supporting the inevitable nominee (Romney) anyway, seeing that there will not be a contested convention. 

Rules, rules, rules...


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Why Santorum's Delegate Math Isn't So Bad But the Explanation Is

The Santorum campaign held a twisting and turning conference call on the delegate math as the campaign sees it today. FHQ does not mean twisting and turning as in "twisting the math" so much as I mean seemingly making a rather easy argument more difficult than it needs to be. Here is the Santorum campaign delegate estimation:

Romney: 435
Santorum: 311
Gingrich: 158
Paul: 91

Forgive me Gingrich and Paul supporters, but FHQ will focus on how the Romney and Santorum numbers got to where they are in the Santorum estimation. Let's assume the baseline for the Romney number is his current allocation according to the FHQ (454 delegates¹). To get to 435, then, we would have to subtract the delegates that would be lost if Florida and Arizona were reallocated under proportional rules (-42 delegates -- -27 in Florida and -15 in Arizona) plus the Santorum campaign estimation of the how many delegates Romney has won in the congressional district conventions held thus far (+23 delegates, approximately) in non-binding/unbound caucus states.

The Santorum number is trickier and for similar reasons. We don't know the baseline number of delegates from which they are starting. FHQ has that number pegged at 172 (170 bound delegates plus 2 automatic delegates). That means that we have to find 139 additional delegates somewhere. 15 come from the reallocation of delegates from Florida and Arizona. That leaves us with a surplus of 124 delegates.

Now, the Santorum math is predicated on overperforming in the steps of the caucus/convention process beyond the precinct phase in the non-binding/unbound caucus states. In those states -- Iowa, Colorado, Minnesota, Maine, Washington and North Dakota -- there are 230 delegates at stake.² One way of thinking about this is that Santorum would need to receive about 54% of those delegates for 124.

That may not be that far-fetched. If we take the AP delegate projections in these states -- a projection that is proportionally based with the exception of Minnesota -- then Santorum is already starting out with 85 delegates in those states. That would mean that to get to that magic 124 number, Santorum would either have to win 39 of the 49 delegates in Missouri or scale down that Missouri number and add in numbers that overperform Santorum's showings in the various precinct caucus straw polls. Again, it isn't all that far-fetched.

Of course, none of this comes problem-free. And what I mean by that is that this is all based on the perspective of the Santorum campaign. If they are adding in delegates as they come in from congressional district caucuses, then the above analysis can be thrown out the window. Their count, in that instance, would be a count and not a projection (outside of the whole Florida/Arizona thing). That implies that they have some room to grow -- to gain on Romney. If, however, they are using a combination of projection and counting as they go along, then the Santorum campaign has a lot less wiggle room. They are in essence already accounting for the discrepancy in the various delegate projections and the RNC delegate count. And that was a discrepancy driven by how various outlets ar dealing with the unbound caucus state delegates.

FHQ has pushed those delegates to the side in our models for the most part. Our estimates of future delegate allocation based on our 50% model get Romney over 1144 without those delegates.

...but with very few delegates to spare.

Basically, all of this delegate talk from the Santorum campaign amounts to nothing. Their plan may help them to gain a little on Romney, but doesn't really affect the bottom line that Romney is likely to get to 1144. Certainly, if Romney does not get to that majority threshold, then if things go according to the Santorum plan, the former Pennsylvania senator heads into a contested convention with a very slightly larger delegation (but one that would still need assistance from either or both of the Gingrich and Paul campaigns).

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¹ That is 423 bound delegates and 31 pledged delegates. The alternative is to take the curious RNC view that the 12 automatic delegates from the territories (not counting Puerto Rico) are bound, which would in the Santorum calculation move the Romney number to 435, thus making the remaining 19 automatic delegates free agents that the Santorum campaign can attempt to woo. I think I just convinced myself that the latter is the Santorum view.

² That total does not include the three automatic delegates from each state.


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On the State of the Republican Nomination Race, Post-AL/MS

A few lingering thoughts from the aftermath of Tuesday night's/Wednesday morning's contests in Alabama, American Samoa, Hawaii and Mississippi:

1. Any day Santorum doesn't cut into Romney's delegate lead is an opportunity lost. 
2. Any day Romney doesn't grow his delegate lead is an opportunity lost.
3. Momentum is dead. ...until it isn't.
4. In-or-out Newt?

The story on Wednesday was the same story as the Wednesday following Super Tuesday. Delegates were on the line and no one cut into Mitt Romney's delegate advantage, but Romney also failed to break through once again in the South. FHQ has not pulled any punches in saying that Santorum has no mathematical shot at 1144 if the current dynamic in this race is extended through the rest of the race. None. But as I have also pointed out, that fact alone does not mean that Romney is a shoo in to get to a delegate majority himself.

I won't belabor the point in #1 above anymore as it is fairly obvious, but #2 deserves some attention.  Any series of contests that passes where Mitt Romney does not significantly increase his delegate lead -- inching closer to 1144 -- removes from the former Massachusetts governor another passel of delegates that a larger portion of which would serve as cushion for a solid frontrunner. Put another way, any time Romney is not hitting that seemingly magic number of 48% of the delegates, his campaign's job of getting him to the requisite number of delegates necessary to clinch the nomination gets slightly more difficult.

So, on Tuesday, Romney gained but he didn't gain. He added to his lead in the delegate count but did not necessarily help his chances of getting to the goal of 1144.

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What we all witnessed Tuesday night was not momentum. There is no momentum in this race. Deep South voters did not exactly reject the notion of a Gingrich candidacy and they didn't exactly fully embrace Santorum (or Romney for that matter) either. The two candidates who would be expected to do well in the South did so well in the South. The presidential primary process in 2012 has progressed far enough now that we have a fair amount of data at our disposal. This is oversimplifying matters, but Mitt Romney is likely to do well in the west and in the northeast, Santorum has carved out a stronghold in the prairie states and stretching into the South and Newt Gingrich has been reduced to a niche southern candidate who is trying to play delegate spoiler.

No, Romney has still not answered the "Southern question" and he isn't likely to (at least not until maybe North Carolina at the earliest¹). But the take home here is that this is all rather predictable based on the regional alignment described above. We can kind of eyeball it and say that Santorum is likely to do well in Missouri and Louisiana later in March and that Maryland, DC, Delaware, New York, Rhode Island and Connecticut are states where Mitt Romney would be expected to do well. And that is the way the race has been. The volatile "swings" have not been all that volatile. Heck, they haven't really been swings so much as the establishment of a pattern in this race. There will only be momentum in this race when and if someone wins, and probably wins consistently thereafter, on another candidate's turf.

--
If you read closely enough, you will have already noted that FHQ made no mention of either the Rust Belt or the midwest. That is because that is the only area where the predictable is not all that predictable. Santorum has come close twice now to beating Romney on Romney turf, but failed to break through in either Michigan or Ohio. Illinois (March 20), Wisconsin (April 3) and Pennsylvania (April 24) offer Santorum an opportunity to change that.²

What potentially shakes all of this up is the presence or absence of Newt Gingrich in the race. If Gingrich is not in the game in Michigan or Ohio, it is not a stretch to see the overall balance shifting toward Santorum in those states. [I know. The Santorum campaign has been making this claim for weeks.] And that could be an issue again in Illinois or Wisconsin, where something like a second conservative candidate not being on the ballot could benefit the other conservative candidate if that candidate (Santorum) is close again against Romney in the popular vote.

The Gingrich impact is more black and white in states that look to be close, but outside of the Rust Belt, the former speaker's influence is more nuanced. Does that help/hurt Romney or Santorum? Well, that all depends on what the delegate selection rules are on the state level. To the extent that Gingrich is able to clear the necessary threshold in the popular vote to qualify for delegates, he is likely to hurt Romney/help Santorum (by hurting Romney) by peeling off delegates in proportional states. But in the few remaining (strictly) winner-take-all states and the winner-take-all by congressional district states, Gingrich's presence is likely to help Romney/hurt Santorum. Coming in third over and over again does nothing for Gingrich in those states. It nets him no delegates. But coming in third siphons off votes and potentially delegates from Santorum, helping Romney to gain delegates at a healthier clip.

...if Romney is presumably the one in the lead in that three candidate scenario.

Now, if Gingrich is out of the race, it does not necessarily reverse those trends above, but may in some cases. If Gingrich is out then the proportional state delegates are allocated among just two candidates. That is a plus for Romney and Santorum. It gets Romney closer to 1144 and Santorum closer to Romney if he is the beneficiary of a consolidation of the conservative vote and thus the delegate winner. You can see this more in a state like North Carolina than in a state like Rhode Island though; both of which are strictly proportional. In the winner-take-all by congressional district states, Santorum is again potentially able to take advantage of that consolidation to win some or more districts in states like Maryland or Wisconsin, but while still facing the possibility of losing the statewide vote and the at-large delegates in the process. [The bonus there is that quite a few of these winner-take-all by congressional district states are fairly blue and thus have a limited number of at-large delegates. Losing them, then, is not a killer if you are Rick Santorum.]

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The bottom line is that this race is clearer now. We know where the candidates' strengths are now and where the true battlegrounds lie. We know that to settle this even further is going to take candidates winning on the others' turf. [This is more necessary for Santorum/Gingrich than for Romney.] We know that, right now, the only strategy Santorum and Gingrich have -- absent the sort of "winning on the other guy's turf" shake up described above -- is to keep Romney under 1144, sending this to the convention. We know that "keep Romney under 1144" is a suitable strategy when the candidate promoting it is winning, but is bound to be much less effective if they are not (and by extension someone is moving toward 1144). We know that Missouri and Louisiana are good targets for Santorum. We know that much of April shapes up well for Mitt Romney. We know that absent any shake up Romney is on track to get not only the most delegates but to get at or around the 1144 mark.

What we don't know is if Santorum can break through on Romney's turf. Illinois would be a good place to start. Otherwise time is -- and delegates are -- running out.

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¹ North Carolina represents the last best hope more than likely for Romney to break through and avoid being the only potential Republican nominee to have been swept in the South during the primaries.

² Yes, the homestate advantage Santorum has in Pennsylvania might offset -- or more than offset -- what might be a slight Romney advantage in a state like the Keystone state.


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Romney Sweeps Northern Mariana Islands 9 Delegates

FHQ will not belabor the point here. After all, the story is much the same as the one out of Guam in the early hours of Saturday morning. But Mitt Romney won the caucuses/convention in the Northern Mariana Islands today and with it the nine delegates apportioned it by the Republican National Committee.

One thing that should be noted in all of this -- before the inevitable uproar over why these places have delegates -- is that neither Guam nor the Northern Mariana Islands are winner-take-all contests. It just looks that way now that Romney has claimed the entire 18 delegate cache from both. No, as FHQ mention earlier in the Guam post, the RNC considers these unbound delegates and will likely continue to do so in its delegate count. However, in both cases the newly chosen delegations have opted to endorse the former Massachusetts governor.

I know, I know. But Romney won all of the delegates; that's winner-take-all. He did and it is, but according to the rules these contests (and the caucuses in the Virgin Islands later today and in American Samoa on Tuesday) are producing unbound delegates. From the perspective of the rules, then, these contests are not winner-take-all, but procedurally they have been.

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The delegation in the Northern Marianas breaks down in a similar fashion to Guam. There are three automatic delegates (party chair, national committeeman and national committeewoman) and six additional delegates. The automatic delegates were already in place, but the the caucuses in Saipan on Saturday selected the remaining six delegates in the delegation from a pool of 16 candidates.


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The (Delegate) Keys to Super Tuesday

FHQ had the honor of giving a brief talk on the 2012 presidential primary process at the Microsoft campus in Charlotte this afternoon. Even though I didn't really follow my notes -- yielding to the more fun Q&A session -- I thought I would share.¹

Here are the things FHQ will be looking for tomorrow night:

1. Ohio, meh. After talking up the importance of the Ohio primary in the wake of Michigan last week, it has become apparent to me that Ohio is no longer the "new hotness". FHQ can't get all that jazzed up about a non-fight. Look, Romney can't lose. If he wins the statewide race, Romney wins the most delegates. Unless Romney gets blown out there -- something the polls are not showing -- he will likely win or fairly evenly split the delegates. Again, meh. I know, I know. If he loses the statewide vote it looks bad. Eh, big deal. The Romney campaign will point toward the fact that it is a delegate race and that they have more delegates. As they said in their Saturday conference call chiding -- fairly or not -- the Santorum campaign for not being organized enough to fully get on the ballot, they -- the Romney campaign -- are more organized.  
2. Delegate margins. I know Ohio is a unique contest tomorrow; the only state without regional company or contest-type camaraderie, but it just will not offer much in the way of a delegate margin for any of the candidates. You know which states will? Virginia and maybe Idaho. Virginia is a no-brainer. That Gingrich and Santorum on the ballot there means that Romney will be able to emerge from the Old Dominion with, as I've said previously, a delegate margin that likely offsets the likely losses in the South. And if -- big IF -- Romney is able to get over 50% in the madhouse that is the new Idaho caucuses (more on that later today), then Idaho is likely going to provide the former Massachusetts governor with even more relief. So the next time Newt Gingrich says that Georgia is the biggest delegate prize on Super Tuesday, shout back that delegate margins are more important and Virginia and again, maybe, Idaho are much bigger on that score than a diluted Georgia primary that will likely allocate delegates to three candidates tomorrow. 
3. Tennessee, now there's the new hotness. Way back after the South Carolina primary (I know. Doesn't that seem like a hundred years ago?), I said that the fundamental question that had emerged was "Can Romney win in the South?" FHQ said then that Romney's ability to answer the "Southern question"would go a long way toward determining how long this fight for the Republican nomination would be. More importantly, I emphasized that it would determine how able Gingrich was to stay in the race. Well, Romney has not had another chance to revisit his loss in South Carolina -- or at least return to similar ground to quell any doubts. Tomorrow is the first chance and Tennessee looks to be Romney's best bet of answering the "Southern question". Romney will get delegates out of Tennessee but a symbolic win in the South would be a backbreaker in a lot of respects for the Gingrich and Santorum causes.
4. Thresholds, thresholds, thresholds. These 15% and 20% thresholds for receiving delegates in many of the states tomorrow is a big deal. Let me repeat that: It is a big deal. No, I don't think it affects anything other than at the margins, but if we are moving into the delegate counting terrain -- even if for a short period of time -- then the ways in which the delegate leader can use those rules to his advantage are noteworthy. The greater the number of candidates over that threshold, the smaller the delegate margins/piece of the delegate pie will be. If, for example, Romney is first or second but no worse, but it is only him and another candidate over 15% or 20% then Romney is only padding his delegate total. And while the margins may not increase greatly, it pushes the former Massachusetts governor closer to 1144.
5. Will it end tomorrow? No. But we are likely to surpass a significant hurdle tomorrow night and into Wednesday. FHQ will have more on that later. 

Ooh, cliffhanger.

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¹ Yeah, I know. These primers are a dime a dozen the day before any primary day.

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Visual Representation of the Argument from Non-Romneys, Post-Florida

1144 delegates needed to win.

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Newt's Challenge & Problem: Becoming Huckabee+

On the heels of the South Carolina primary, FHQ speculated that one of the main questions that emerged from the Gingrich win/Romney loss was the Southern question. Romney did not win the South Carolina primary and even if could win in Florida -- It is something of a foregone conclusion at this point that the former Massachusetts governor will win tonight in the Sunshine state. -- and use that as a springboard to wins in contests in hospitable areas in February, that Southern question remains. Romney will not have another opportunity to win in the South until March 6.

[Sidenote follow up to that Southern question:
The way that post seemed to be interpreted by those that built off it was that FHQ was saying Romney couldn't wrap things up until that point at the earliest. I suppose that is part of it, but it is deeper than that. What I meant was that Gingrich and Santorum could use that as a rallying point for voters and more importantly donors. But that has a shelf life. If Romney wins in the South -- and he's guaranteed at least one win in Virginia where only Paul is on the ballot opposite him ¹ -- then that argument disappears. Support and contributions to the campaign also likely disappear or at the very least begin to drop off at that point. And keep in mind, FHQ is discussing this without accounting for any intra-party pressure on the candidates to drop out. In the past, those three things -- waning support, lower fundraising totals and pressure from the party -- often happen nearly simultaneously. That may happen this time as well. But it isn't about Romney wrapping things up so much as the way in which the others start to drop out, or arguments to stay in begin to disappear.]

The Gingrich campaign is mindful of this Southern question. In fact, the memo the campaign circulated on Monday about how a protracted primary battle might look was very heavy on the former Speaker doing well in the upcoming March contests in the region. And therein lies the trouble for the Gingrich campaign. Their hope is that a series of wins across the South evens the delegate total heading out of the contests. That may happen, but if that is the case, the Gingrich folks are going to run full on in a stiff wind. How is that any different than the strategy Mike Huckabee had in 2008? The former Arkansas governor came close to sweeping the region in 2008 and that got him nowhere. It had him out of the race in early March when McCain won on Huckabee's turf in Texas and in the process crossed the 50% plus one delegate threshold to become the presumptive nominee.

Now sure, the Gingrich folks would counter that the calendar is vastly different in 2012 than it was in 2008. There is no mammoth Super Tuesday a week from today's Florida primary like there was four years ago. However, Gingrich is going to have to find a way to win in a Romney state to effectively brush off the Huckabee comparison. February's line up of contests does not seem to offer too many opportunities for Gingrich and if Romney sweeps them all, the pressure is going to increase on the non-Romneys in that scenario to consider bowing out (...in the face of the Southern question for Romney).

If we are trying to game this out moving forward look for Gingrich wins in Romney states (as a signal of a protracted battle) and Romney wins in the South (as a signal that the process is winding down). As it is, Romney is playing the McCain part from 2008 and if the South is the only thing standing in the way, it won't be enough to stop a Romney nomination. The goal for Gingrich is to become Huckabee, but Huckabee plus.

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¹ This will be an interesting test case of the Romney/not-Romney theory that has been floated around about this Republican nomination race. If there is a significant protest/anti-Romney movement within the Republican primary electorate, and the field has not winnowed anymore by that point, then that two-person Virginia primary becomes the best possible test.

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Musings on the Republican Nomination Race, Post-South Carolina

Where do we go from here?

Following the Gingrich victory in South Carolina, the race for the Republican presidential nomination has taken yet another turn. And this time, for the first time since probably early December, the contest is lodged in the gray area between being a momentum contest¹ and a delegate counting contest.² Truth be told, the line is often blurred between those two distinctions. Most nominations in the post-reform era have tended to be momentum contests with a frontrunner -- having been established in the invisible primary -- winning early and often and using those early wins as  springboard into a Super Tuesday series of contests to build a seemingly insurmountable lead (both in momentum and in delegates).

Due to the way the primary calendar is set up in 2012 and the current fits and starts nature of the dynamic in the race, however, this cycle is shaping up differently. The notion of Mitt Romney sweeping or nearly sweeping the January contests and putting the nomination race to rest are gone -- even with a Florida win. But the idea of a momentum contest -- one that will typically develop behind the frontrunner, no matter how nominal -- is not completely dead.  Romney remains the frontrunner. The former Massachusetts governor is viewed as the establishment choice and is the only candidate to this point to have placed in the top two in each of the first three contests. He is still the favorite to build a consensus around his candidacy -- just not as much as he was in the five days or so after the New Hampshire primary.

But the question remains just how will Romney, or any other candidate for that matter, build a consensus and win the nomination. There are two main avenues from FHQ's perspective; one narrow and one fairly broad. The narrow path to the nomination is that Mitt Romney bounces back from the South Carolina primary, wins Florida, uses his organizational advantage over Gingrich and Santorum in the February caucus states, and then wins in Arizona and Michigan. The broader path is one that devolves into a contest-by-contest struggle; a battle for delegates the end game of which is the point where one candidate has a wide enough delegate margin that cannot be overcome given the number of delegates to be allocated remaining. [See Norrander, 2000]

FHQ is conservative in how we approach these things. Our basic rules of thumb are: 1) No option is off the table until it is off the table. 2) Past precedent tells us that the frontrunner usually ends up the nominee. [See, Mayer 2003] Now, past is not necessarily prologue, especially when the dynamics, calendars and rules differ across such a comparatively small number of observations in the post-reform era. But in this case, FHQ sees the narrow path described above as the likely outcome; more likely than the delegate counting route.

The hold that has on our thinking, though, is very tenuous indeed. It is not far-fetched to see Romney rebounding from South Carolina to win in Florida on January 31. It is not far-fetched to foresee the former governor parlay that win into wins in the remaining February contests -- though that mid-February gap in the calendar is a great unknown in terms of these calculations. Previously, FHQ has argued that that February period with no contests would put significant strain on candidates financially. That view was predicated on a Romney (near-)sweep in January forcing amped up pressure on the remaining candidates to drop out. Gingrich's South Carolina win alleviates some of that potential pressure. A win allows a non-frontrunner candidate in these early stages to get his or her foot in the door for arguing viability. Romney, then, would have a more difficult time shutting the door on Gingrich and to some extent Santorum (if he can survive that long). [Ron Paul is in it for the long haul. That is why this discussion is light on the Texas congressman.]

But even a February sweep -- if we are constraining our view to the narrow path to the nomination -- is  likely not enough to close this out for Romney or more to the point, to force the others from the race. There is one lingering question coming out of South Carolina that cannot be answered until Super Tuesday/March 6 at the earliest. Even if Romney wins all of the February contests he is still vulnerable to the charge that he has not won in the South; a core constituency within the Republican Party.³ Now, that is not to suggest that Romney as the Republican nominee would struggle in the South in the general election. Yet, not winning in the reddest region of the country in the primary phase does signal that the part of the core of the party is not on board with the former Massachusetts governor's nomination. That may or may not be enough to "veto" a Romney nomination, but it does provide his opponents with a solid argument for staying in -- particularly if it is the same candidate (presumably Gingrich) winning there.

The other layer to this -- the one about which FHQ has received the most inquiries since Saturday -- how the rules for delegate allocation begin to affect all of this. To reiterate an earlier point, the rules are the exact same as they were in 2008 in each of the states with contests prior to March. To the extent we witness differences, it will be due to the dynamics of the race and not the delegate allocation rules. The changes brought about because of the new "proportionality" requirement on the Republican side begin to kick in once the calendar flips to March. Now, it is still too early to tell what impact those rules will have. Mainly, that is due to the fact that we just don't know which candidates -- or how many candidates, really -- will still be alive at that point. The modal response from the states to the RNC proportionality rule was to make the allocation of delegates conditional on a certain threshold of the vote. If a candidate receives at least 50% of the vote, then the allocation is winner-take-all (or the at-large delegate allocation is winner-take-all). But if no candidate crosses that bar, the allocation is proportional (overall or for just the at-large delegates). The more candidates that survive, in other words, the more likely it is that the allocation is proportional. It would be more difficult for one candidate to receive 50% of the vote. The double-edged sword of proportional allocation is that while it may make it harder -- take longer -- for the leading candidate to reach 1144 delegates (if triggered), it also makes it more difficult for those attempting to catch the leader as well. The margin (of delegates) for the winners is often not that large.

Taken together, the South questions and the proportionality requirement jumble the outlook for this race. Romney may or may not be required to win in the South to win the nomination. But winning there would go a long way toward forcing other candidates from the race and preventing the nomination from falling into a delegate count. The problem is that those two things -- the race turning South again and the potential proportionality kicking in -- hit at the same point. And that leaves us with any number of permutations for directions in which the race could go, whether taking the narrow path or broad path.

Will the rules matter? They always do, but they will really matter when and if Romney is unable to rebound and run off a series of February wins. That is what we should be looking at now.

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¹ Defined by a candidate sweeping or nearly sweeping the early contests to overwhelm his or her opponents.

² Defined by a candidate at some point beyond the first handful of contests either crosses the 50% plus one delegate threshold or develops a big enough lead to force his or her opponents from the race at some point outside of the first handful of contests.

³ There are no southern primaries or caucuses after South Carolina until a series of contests on March 6.

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Of Course Rick Santorum Won Iowa...

...but Mitt Romney did, too.

Both were able to beat the medium term expectations that had developed around their campaigns relative to the Iowa caucuses.¹ Part of the story coming out of the Hawkeye state was the closeness of the top two, and while that is a fun footnote -- or will be in the history books -- to the caucuses, the main stories from FHQ's perspective were that Santorum was able to become the top not-Romney in the state and that Romney, despite the underlying demographics of caucusgoers, was able to finish in the top tier. Santorum exceeded expectations and Romney -- even in the worst case scenario -- either met, by being in the top tier, or exceeded expectations.

Whether the two flip flop their positions in the Iowa GOP-certified results this week will do little to change the dynamic that has developed in this race: Romney is the frontrunner and Santorum's name is on more lips and in more minds post-Iowa than they would have been if he had finished behind Newt Gingrich or Rick Perry on the night of January 3. Going back and trying to rewrite the story based on the shifting of less than 100 votes or so in the margin will have very little effect on what's going on now. Rick Santorum would still face the same sort of questions Mike Huckabee faced four years ago (Specifically, can insta-organization compete with the well-oiled machine of a well-financed frontrunner?), and Mitt Romney would still have -- at the very worst -- met expectations in the first two states while his rivals, with the exceptions of Paul in both Iowa and New Hampshire and Santorum in Iowa, underperformed.

This would have been a fun question -- the type Public Policy Polling likes to throw into their surveys from time to time -- to include in a South Carolina or Florida poll. My strong hunch is that it would make very little difference in vote choice in either the Palmetto or Sunshine state.² The only time that this might have mattered was in the early morning hours of January 4. Good luck constructing that counterfactual. If anyone is able to, please let me know. I want to check out your time machine.

"Stop the inevitability narrative in its tracks"? Eh, probably not. It may be a speed bump, but more like one of those varmints Mitt Romney once hunted than an elk or moose in the headlights.

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¹ By medium term I mean something akin to a rolling average of expectations over time; something that is not susceptible to an outlier survey's snapshot of the race.

² Granted, I think it would be difficult to determine whether that was actually part of a voter's decision-making calculus anyway. ...but that's a whole different can of worms from the political science/public opinion literature.

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