Part One: Setting Expectations for the Next Round
Part Three: A Reflection on Delegate Incentives
Part Four: A Caucus-to-Primary Incentive?
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And what is the Republican Temporary Committee on the Presidential Nominating Process looking at potentially changing for 2020?
At the most recent RNC meeting -- the 2018 Winter meeting in Washington -- the Temporary Committee on the Presidential Nominating Process (TCPNP) reconvened, and the chatter coming out of that meeting was muted compared to the often Clinton-Sanders-themed talk that emerged from the periodic Democratic Unity Reform Commission meetings. But the points of emphasis in the Republican discussion fit expectations. The discussed changes were minimal, incremental, and tailored to the president's experiences/problems with the 2016 process.
The headliner change proposal coming out of the Winter meeting was an incentive structure intended to promote primaries over caucuses as the mode of delegate allocation. Under the proposal, states using a primary election would stand to gain additional delegates to the national convention while caucus states would not.
Now, the change was framed in the article as a move to prevent future candidates, whether they face off against Trump in 2020 or run in subsequent cycles, from replicating the caucus strategy the Ted Cruz campaign utilized in 2016. But that is just one interpretation of the impetus behind this particular proposal. Again, it stands to reason that overall changes would be minimal and intended to fix any (perceived) problems from the vantage point of the president/his team/the RNC. And attempting to minimize the role of caucuses reads like something out of the score-settling handbook. In other words, Cruz did well in caucuses, then "let's do something about caucuses" is the response.
But there are flaws in framing this proposal in that manner. The first problem is the RNC is not in the same position the DNC is in. Trump versus Cruz is not the dominant feature of these discussions, not in the way that the Clinton-Sanders divide animated the Unity Reform Commission process on the Democratic side anyway.
Additionally, it should be noted that the caucus issue runs deeper than Trump-Cruz for Republican rules makers. For starters, the Cruz campaign really only replicated a strategy that Ron Paul beta tested in 2012 in those caucus states with a cache of unbound delegates.1 That was less a Trump-Cruz issue than an RNC-state parties phenomenon that Cruz later exploited in Colorado, North Dakota and Wyoming in particular in 2016.
Dating to the post-2012 environment, the RNC sought to deal with the Paul loophole by adding to Rule 16 a binding mechanism that locked delegates in based the results of preference votes in either primaries or caucuses. The problem was that some states -- the three above and a number of territories -- wanted to maintain their traditions of keeping delegates unbound heading into the national convention. Those states accomplished that by not holding a preference vote at all in precinct caucuses. Instead, those caucuses progressed -- electing delegates to the next step(s) in the process -- without regard to any presidential preference. Put simply, no preference vote, no bound delegates.
Of course, it went beyond unbound delegates for the Cruz camp to be sure. They also sought to elect delegates in the selection process who, while bound through the allocation process to another candidate (often Trump), were Cruz supporters at heart. That bond only lasted through, in most cases, the first ballot vote on the nomination at the convention. But the hope from the Cruz campaign perspective was that 1) if enough Cruz-sympathetic delegates were selected they could vote to unbind the themselves or 2) as a last resort, those delegates would be free on subsequent votes should no candidate achieve a majority of support among the convention delegates during the first round.
Those hopes were dashed when the Convention Rules Committee removed all questions about the enforcement of the binding mechanism called for in the rules and later when the full convention adopted those rules for the 2016 convention. But the RNC dealt with that particular Cruz activity at the convention.
The proposal to dangle a carrot in front of a small number of caucus states is aimed, FHQ would argue, at bringing the remaining few holdouts -- those that avoided a preference vote in order to maintain unbound delegations -- into the fold. To repeat, that is not exactly a Trump-Cruz story or even a Cruz story. It is an RNC finishing up the work it started in and after 2012 story. As evidence look at the number of unbound caucus states from 2012. There were nine then, but just three in 2016.2 Two-thirds of the unbound states, then, complied with the rules change.
Under a narrow interpretation, this proposed incentive regime -- bonus delegates for a primary (and a preference vote) -- is aimed squarely at those three states, Colorado, North Dakota and Wyoming. It is designed to give them just a bit more incentive to opt into a primary. And it may not take too much in a couple of those cases. Colorado adopted a presidential primary through ballot measure in 2016 general election and the resulting law uses national party rules to box the state parties into the primary to some extent. Just north in Wyoming, the subject of an establishment of a presidential primary was broached in the legislature there in 2017, but the state parties and county clerks (election administrators) balked at the plan over funding and procedural issues, respectively.
A small incentive may be enough to bring those states/state parties on board. And if such a proposal brought along other caucus states beyond those targeted, all the better, perhaps, from the perspective of the RNC. Utah, for example, passed legislation in 2017 to fund a presidential primary for 2020. That state-level funding plus the potential promise of additional delegates may be enough to entice Beehive state Republicans into using the primary option as they did in 2000, 2008, and 2012. Granted, the exception -- the last time before 2016 that Utah Republicans used a caucus -- in that window of contests was 2004, the last time the Republican presidential nomination was uncontested.
But delegate incentive plans in the past have not necessarily proven effective at reining in state level activity. The record is mixed and the plans often untested. Part three will examine the history or national party incentives.
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Part One: Setting Expectations for the Next Round
Part Three: A Reflection on Delegate Incentives
Part Four: A Caucus-to-Primary Incentive?
--
1 And truth be told, the 2012 Paul campaign beta testing mimicked a strategy employed a generation before it in 1988 by Christian conservatives who sought to fill unbound delegate spots with their supporters during the delegate selection process.
2 And even then, the way the RNC legal counsel interpreted the rules, delegates candidates who filed to run as affiliated with a particular candidate were treated as bound in states with no preference vote. Most delegates candidates who were selected to fill slots in Colorado and Wyoming were affiliated with a particular candidate and thus bound. Only a small subset of Colorado and Wyoming filed as unaffiliated and thus remained unbound. That left only North Dakota as a state with a completely unbound delegation. There was no affiliation requirement there in filing to run as a delegate candidate.
Showing posts with label nomination rules. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nomination rules. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 6, 2018
Monday, March 5, 2018
2020 Republican Rules Changes, Part One: Setting Expectations for the Next Round
Part Two: Early Proposals
Part Three: A Reflection on Delegate Incentives
Part Four: A Caucus-to-Primary Incentive?
--
On the occasion last month of the 2018 Republican National Committee winter meeting in Washington, DC, the Temporary Committee on the Presidential Nominating Process (TCPNP) reconvened to discuss potential rules changes for the 2020 cycle. From a comparative standpoint, the chatter on rules tweaking for 2020 on the Republican side has been far quieter than the open discussions the Democratic Unity Reform Commission had throughout 2017.
However, that near silence should not necessarily be read as inactivity. Rather, it is a function of a party that 1) remains new to tinkering on its presidential nominating rules outside of a convention setting, 2) tends to conduct its temporary committee functions largely outside of the public eye, and 3) currently holds the White House. The first two factors are unique to the RNC while the third is not.
It was not, for instance, until the 2008 Republican National Convention empowered the Temporary Delegate Selection Committee that the party allowed for rules-making outside of the convention.1 The rules change recommendations the committee made were passed onto the RNC Rules Committee, then the full RNC before being added to and enacted in the rules that governed the 2012 process. This was streamlined further with the codification of external rules-making powers through Rule 12, adopted at the 2012 convention for the 2016 cycle. It was Rule 12 that allowed the RNC through the Rules Committee to make rules changes on the nomination subset of the Rules of the Republican Party as long as those changes were made well enough in advance -- end of summer of the midterm election year -- of the contestation of the next presidential nomination process.
Rule 12 has carried over to the 2020 cycle, but so, too, has a temporary committee structure with a specific mission. But in the three cycles now since 2008, the RNC has had a slightly different method for dealing with alterations to the rules outside of the convention.
Of note also is that, regardless of which party, the party in the White House tends to leave well enough alone with its rules. The rationale has been simple enough: At least something went right with the preceding nominating process if the person nominated went on to win the White House. Through a different lens the same rationale could be framed as a president -- as the head of a party -- has a preference for the rules that got him or her nominated and elected in the first place. In other words, there is at least something of a structural explanation for a why parties currently occupying the White House tend to mostly sit on their laurels with respect to nomination rules.
But while the RNC and the Temporary Committee for the Presidential Nominating Process have been mostly quiet, neither is exactly poised to stand pat with the 2016 rules that led to Trump's nomination, even if the historical combination of motivations/tendencies to maintain the status quo exists.
--
So where are the Republicans in the 2020 rules-making process?
As is the case on the Democratic side the clock is ticking down to the time when both national parties have tended to finalize their rules for an upcoming presidential nomination process. Typically, the national party input in the process is complete by around the end of the summer of the midterm election year. That allows both the nascent campaigns and the states -- state governments and state parties -- enough lead time to ensure their ability to respond to any changes made at the national level before the process begins toward the beginning of the presidential election year.
Although the RNC structure for dealing with rules changes outside the convention has evolved as described above, the timing of the structure in place for 2020 rules changes mimics how the DNC has more often than not handled its rules-making process. That is to say, an external committee/commission examines the rules and their collective effectiveness in the previous cycle(s) during the year after a presidential election, and makes recommendations for rules changes to the respective Rules committees to consider during the midterm election year. That leads to a vote by the full national party on whatever recommendations have filtered through the Rules committees.
In the end, there are a couple of main structural differences between the parties with respect to the formation of rules for 2020. First, the Republicans are operating on a lag compared to the Democrats. Under the conditions of the amendment passed at the 2016 Democratic National Convention, the Unity Reform Commission was to be named and in place within 60 days of the early 2017 election of the new national party chair. And the URC was additionally to have made its recommendations to the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee by January 1, 2018.
By comparison, the Temporary Committee on the Presidential Nominating Process -- via Rule 10(a)(11) -- was not to have been solidified until the end of June 2017 with recommendations due no later than the end of May 2018.
Motivated by the tendencies described above, the Republicans are also operating with less urgency than their Democratic counterparts. No, urgency is not structural, per se, but it could be argued the presence or lack of urgency in rules-making has had an impact on the structural parameters of the process for 2020. There may yet be a challenge to Trump for the Republican presidential nomination, but the party -- at the organizational and mass levels -- remains behind the president and is behaving as if he will be, even if facing some opposition, the 2020 nominee. The process and its direction (more on this in subsequent posts) reflect that. The TCPNP has met twice and in both instances it has been in conjunction with national party meetings; the summer 2017 meeting and the winter 2018 meeting.
By contrast, the DNC Unity Reform Commission planned to convene four times, but tacked a fifth meeting onto the agenda to finalize recommendations. Of those five meetings between May and December 2017, only one coincided with a seasonal DNC meeting; the October fall meeting in Las Vegas.
A portion of that is just differences across the parties, but part is also the conditions facing the parties and the differing motivations they create.
Part two of this series will look at what proposals the TCPNP has discussed and how they stem as incremental progress from the rules tinkering the RNC has undertaken in recent cycles. In part three, FHQ will look at the history of incentives programs intended motivate state action in some area of the delegate selection process. And finally, the fourth part in the series will examine the lessons to be gleaned from that history of national party experimentation with incentives-based regimes and how effective they may be in 2020.
--
Part Two: Early Proposals
Part Three: A Reflection on Delegate Incentives
Part Four: A Caucus-to-Primary Incentive?
--
1 As a point of clarification, rules had been discussed and tinkered with outside of the Republican convention before 2008, but as part of a process leading up to a convention that would adopt changes for the next cycle. An inter-cycle discussion between 1992 and 1996, for example, would have been precursor to changes adopted at the 1996 convention for the 2000 process. A post-1992 version of the Temporary Delegate Selection Committee, on the other hand, would have made recommendations on the rules for the 1996 process. But the process was more drawn out during that era and the convention was the only forum in which rules could officially be changed. That changed after 2008.
Part Three: A Reflection on Delegate Incentives
Part Four: A Caucus-to-Primary Incentive?
--
On the occasion last month of the 2018 Republican National Committee winter meeting in Washington, DC, the Temporary Committee on the Presidential Nominating Process (TCPNP) reconvened to discuss potential rules changes for the 2020 cycle. From a comparative standpoint, the chatter on rules tweaking for 2020 on the Republican side has been far quieter than the open discussions the Democratic Unity Reform Commission had throughout 2017.
However, that near silence should not necessarily be read as inactivity. Rather, it is a function of a party that 1) remains new to tinkering on its presidential nominating rules outside of a convention setting, 2) tends to conduct its temporary committee functions largely outside of the public eye, and 3) currently holds the White House. The first two factors are unique to the RNC while the third is not.
It was not, for instance, until the 2008 Republican National Convention empowered the Temporary Delegate Selection Committee that the party allowed for rules-making outside of the convention.1 The rules change recommendations the committee made were passed onto the RNC Rules Committee, then the full RNC before being added to and enacted in the rules that governed the 2012 process. This was streamlined further with the codification of external rules-making powers through Rule 12, adopted at the 2012 convention for the 2016 cycle. It was Rule 12 that allowed the RNC through the Rules Committee to make rules changes on the nomination subset of the Rules of the Republican Party as long as those changes were made well enough in advance -- end of summer of the midterm election year -- of the contestation of the next presidential nomination process.
Rule 12 has carried over to the 2020 cycle, but so, too, has a temporary committee structure with a specific mission. But in the three cycles now since 2008, the RNC has had a slightly different method for dealing with alterations to the rules outside of the convention.
Of note also is that, regardless of which party, the party in the White House tends to leave well enough alone with its rules. The rationale has been simple enough: At least something went right with the preceding nominating process if the person nominated went on to win the White House. Through a different lens the same rationale could be framed as a president -- as the head of a party -- has a preference for the rules that got him or her nominated and elected in the first place. In other words, there is at least something of a structural explanation for a why parties currently occupying the White House tend to mostly sit on their laurels with respect to nomination rules.
But while the RNC and the Temporary Committee for the Presidential Nominating Process have been mostly quiet, neither is exactly poised to stand pat with the 2016 rules that led to Trump's nomination, even if the historical combination of motivations/tendencies to maintain the status quo exists.
--
So where are the Republicans in the 2020 rules-making process?
As is the case on the Democratic side the clock is ticking down to the time when both national parties have tended to finalize their rules for an upcoming presidential nomination process. Typically, the national party input in the process is complete by around the end of the summer of the midterm election year. That allows both the nascent campaigns and the states -- state governments and state parties -- enough lead time to ensure their ability to respond to any changes made at the national level before the process begins toward the beginning of the presidential election year.
Although the RNC structure for dealing with rules changes outside the convention has evolved as described above, the timing of the structure in place for 2020 rules changes mimics how the DNC has more often than not handled its rules-making process. That is to say, an external committee/commission examines the rules and their collective effectiveness in the previous cycle(s) during the year after a presidential election, and makes recommendations for rules changes to the respective Rules committees to consider during the midterm election year. That leads to a vote by the full national party on whatever recommendations have filtered through the Rules committees.
In the end, there are a couple of main structural differences between the parties with respect to the formation of rules for 2020. First, the Republicans are operating on a lag compared to the Democrats. Under the conditions of the amendment passed at the 2016 Democratic National Convention, the Unity Reform Commission was to be named and in place within 60 days of the early 2017 election of the new national party chair. And the URC was additionally to have made its recommendations to the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee by January 1, 2018.
By comparison, the Temporary Committee on the Presidential Nominating Process -- via Rule 10(a)(11) -- was not to have been solidified until the end of June 2017 with recommendations due no later than the end of May 2018.
Motivated by the tendencies described above, the Republicans are also operating with less urgency than their Democratic counterparts. No, urgency is not structural, per se, but it could be argued the presence or lack of urgency in rules-making has had an impact on the structural parameters of the process for 2020. There may yet be a challenge to Trump for the Republican presidential nomination, but the party -- at the organizational and mass levels -- remains behind the president and is behaving as if he will be, even if facing some opposition, the 2020 nominee. The process and its direction (more on this in subsequent posts) reflect that. The TCPNP has met twice and in both instances it has been in conjunction with national party meetings; the summer 2017 meeting and the winter 2018 meeting.
By contrast, the DNC Unity Reform Commission planned to convene four times, but tacked a fifth meeting onto the agenda to finalize recommendations. Of those five meetings between May and December 2017, only one coincided with a seasonal DNC meeting; the October fall meeting in Las Vegas.
A portion of that is just differences across the parties, but part is also the conditions facing the parties and the differing motivations they create.
Part two of this series will look at what proposals the TCPNP has discussed and how they stem as incremental progress from the rules tinkering the RNC has undertaken in recent cycles. In part three, FHQ will look at the history of incentives programs intended motivate state action in some area of the delegate selection process. And finally, the fourth part in the series will examine the lessons to be gleaned from that history of national party experimentation with incentives-based regimes and how effective they may be in 2020.
--
Part Two: Early Proposals
Part Three: A Reflection on Delegate Incentives
Part Four: A Caucus-to-Primary Incentive?
--
1 As a point of clarification, rules had been discussed and tinkered with outside of the Republican convention before 2008, but as part of a process leading up to a convention that would adopt changes for the next cycle. An inter-cycle discussion between 1992 and 1996, for example, would have been precursor to changes adopted at the 1996 convention for the 2000 process. A post-1992 version of the Temporary Delegate Selection Committee, on the other hand, would have made recommendations on the rules for the 1996 process. But the process was more drawn out during that era and the convention was the only forum in which rules could officially be changed. That changed after 2008.
Monday, April 20, 2015
Ability to Pick Winners Is Not the Best Way to Determine Presidential Caucuses Are Bad
FHQ just cannot buy the contention that presidential primaries are better than caucuses because the former is better at picking eventual nominees than the latter. Philip Bump makes that argument at The Fix today, but come on. First, there are way better arguments that can be made against caucuses. [FHQ remains agnostic. Parties control these nominations and some state parties simply prefer caucuses to a primary.]
Secondly, however, there is a very good institutional reason that primaries are "better" at picking winners/eventual nominees than caucuses. Well, actually there are two related factors. For starters, there are about triple the number of presidential primaries as there are caucuses. And a pretty significant number of those primary states occupy the very end of the primary calendar. That tends to be the point in the process when either the field has been winnowed down to two viable candidates or one very nearly presumptive nominee and a protest candidate (see Ron Paul's routine ~20% of the vote in May and June contests in 2012). That makes it a lot easier to pick a winner. Actually that make it a lot easier to pick the winner when voters in a late primary state already know who that nominee will be.
Well, aren't there later caucuses?
No, not really. From a logistical standpoint, caucuses have to be early in the process. The precinct caucuses are but the first step in a caucuses/convention process that plays out -- with some variation -- across states. In some caucuses states like Iowa, the process is ongoing the entire primary season. In others, like North Dakota, the steps from caucuses to state convention have taken as little as approximately a month.
But if all the caucuses states are regularly occurring in (February sometimes and) March and April (in the 1976-2012 period), then they would have a wider field of candidates from which to choose. Meanwhile, the straggling primaries in May and June (like Oregon) help bring up the winning percentage for primaries overall.
Remove those and FHQ will bet that the "winning percentage" for primaries drops to around the same level as caucuses or at least to a pretty negligible difference.
Lower turnout, time commitments. Those are good criticisms of caucuses. Ability to pick a nominee is not.
Secondly, however, there is a very good institutional reason that primaries are "better" at picking winners/eventual nominees than caucuses. Well, actually there are two related factors. For starters, there are about triple the number of presidential primaries as there are caucuses. And a pretty significant number of those primary states occupy the very end of the primary calendar. That tends to be the point in the process when either the field has been winnowed down to two viable candidates or one very nearly presumptive nominee and a protest candidate (see Ron Paul's routine ~20% of the vote in May and June contests in 2012). That makes it a lot easier to pick a winner. Actually that make it a lot easier to pick the winner when voters in a late primary state already know who that nominee will be.
Well, aren't there later caucuses?
No, not really. From a logistical standpoint, caucuses have to be early in the process. The precinct caucuses are but the first step in a caucuses/convention process that plays out -- with some variation -- across states. In some caucuses states like Iowa, the process is ongoing the entire primary season. In others, like North Dakota, the steps from caucuses to state convention have taken as little as approximately a month.
But if all the caucuses states are regularly occurring in (February sometimes and) March and April (in the 1976-2012 period), then they would have a wider field of candidates from which to choose. Meanwhile, the straggling primaries in May and June (like Oregon) help bring up the winning percentage for primaries overall.
Remove those and FHQ will bet that the "winning percentage" for primaries drops to around the same level as caucuses or at least to a pretty negligible difference.
Lower turnout, time commitments. Those are good criticisms of caucuses. Ability to pick a nominee is not.
Tuesday, March 26, 2013
Iowa/New Hampshire, Part ∞
Harry Enten has a nice piece up today in reaction to Richard Cohen's rather run-of-the-mill "Why are Iowa and New Hampshire still first when..." post at the Washington Post on Monday.
Look, Enten is right. First, look at Iowa and New Hampshire for what they truly are -- winnowing contests in the presidential nomination process. [This is a point that Jon Bernstein expands on in a post that popped up while FHQ was in the midst of writing this.] And second, if one is to attack the privileged status of the nation's first two contests, at least bother tease out the differences between the two. It really is poor form to say that Iowa and New Hampshire collectively push the Republican Party in a more conservative direction.
On structural grounds alone, the two are very different. Iowa is a closed caucuses state in which only registered Democrats or Republicans can participate in their party's contest.1 Also, compared to the New Hampshire primary, a lower percentage of voting eligible turnout in Iowa. The Granite state process is more open. The primary permits the participation of independents which would tend to moderate the results depending on the dynamics of a given race.2
Cohen's point, then, that the two contests push, in this case, the Republican nomination process off in a rightward extreme direction is wrong. That may be true of Iowa (again, see Bernstein), but not for New Hampshire.
--
Both Enten and Bernstein are absolutely right to point that out. But FHQ wishes to offer a concurring opinion.
Sure, FHQ was struck by how off base the above Cohen argument was, but I also take issue with some of the second order questions that were implied in his piece. Namely...
That is another mistake. Neither regional primaries nor a "fix" to the Iowa/New Hampshire issue is going to occur without coordinated (near unified) action on the part of both parties. Pointing the finger at the Republicans, then, is an exercise in futility without also pointing it at the Democrats. Even then it may remain an exercise in futility.
But why?
The fact that the Democrats have yet to weigh in on 2016 rules, much less react to the actions that the Republican National Committee may or may not take in regard to the Growth and Opportunity Project report, does not change the fact that the report -- a platform for the RNC to discuss its nomination rules -- mentioned regional primaries while continuing to protect Iowa, New Hampshire and the other two carve-out states. If coordinated action is required for both, then why not address both?
Well, as Bernstein points out in his post, the whole Iowa/New Hampshire "problem" has been overblown. But, beyond that, at its most basic, the answer is the parties cannot address both. As FHQ pointed out last week, without Democratic Party buy-in, the RNC will have a difficult time with the regional primary concept. Even unified action on the part of both parties does not change the fact that some states would have some difficulty in shifting their contests around because the presidential primary is coupled with primaries for other offices. That problem stands a better chance of being resolved than the Iowa/New Hampshire issue.
For better or worse, the parties have given up on the idea of toppling Iowa and New Hampshire. Neither party made any kind of concerted effort to address the issue in the lead up to 2012. It came up, but nothing was ever done in terms of resolutions to alter the rules.
Instead of solving the "problem" the parties have opted to manage it. In my research, I talk about the willingness and ability of states to move their delegate selection events. There may be some willingness on the part of a state legislator or some state party officials or a governor to move a state's primary or caucus to an advantageous position on the primary calendar, but the contest will not budge unless there is some consensus to overcome any number of structural, budgetary or partisan hurdles. The national parties can more often than not count that -- those hurdles -- among their advantages in keeping states in line. In most instances, where that does not work, the parties have penalties associated with violations.
But Iowa and New Hampshire are interesting cases. First, each has an abundance of both willingness and ability to retain their first in the nation status. The ability has been made clear for over a generation now. New Hampshire Secretary of State Bill Gardner has the power to set the date of the presidential primary in the Granite state and basically has the state operating like a mobile voting unit on perpetual red alert. [That is only a slight exaggeration.] The caucuses in Iowa are a bit more unwieldy terms of the lead time required to adequately lay the groundwork for precinct caucus night.
That is one issue for the national parties, but the real Iowa/New Hampshire conundrum manifests itself in terms of the willingness each state has to stay on top. From the national parties' perspective, there is likely no penalty that likely alters the willingness in Iowa and New Hampshire to go first. Now, sure, both national parties -- and it would have to be both -- could go nuclear and strip both states of all of their delegates. That might work. Might. But that is not likely to deter either state. Instead, that creates a situation where both states hold their contests early anyway and then crow about the unfair penalties from the beginning of primary season until the convention. Neither party wants that kind of headache in any form (and it is a headache that could range from barely perceptibly minor to migraine of epic proportion).
The parties have learned. They have opted not to solve the Iowa/New Hampshire issue, but to manage it. Part of the negative perception of Iowa/New Hampshire was their collective lack of representativeness (on regional and racial grounds). The Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee managed that question prior to the 2008 cycle by adding Nevada and South Carolina to the mix. The RNC followed suit in 2012. South Carolina was already a mainstay and Nevada Republicans had moved their caucuses up to coincide with the Democratic caucuses in the Silver state in 2008. That may not be a solution, but codifying and protecting the status of those four states manages the representativeness issue.
That also points out an additional shared value across the two national parties: a desire to provide an "on ramp" to the process for the candidates. That small state start emphasizes the retail politics that theoretically levels the playing the for underdog candidates. In practice, it allows for an alternative to an ads air war that would potentially tilt the environment toward a well-funded and/or establishment candidate. [Cohen mocks the "on ramp" but again this is a goal of the process that both parties share.]
The problem, then, in the eyes of the national parties is not the exaggerated Iowa/New Hampshire issue. No, rather it is the tiny group of states that have the willingness and increasingly the ability to challenge the early states' status. The national parties have moved toward managing the Floridas (willingness and ability), Michigans (willingness and an early consolidated primary), Arizonas (willingness and ability) and even Georgias (ability but no as of yet demonstrated willingness) over the last two cycles.
Kick Iowa and New Hampshire (and Republicans, Richard Cohen!) all you want. The parties have moved on to managing other issues.
...and in some cases issuing hard to implement remedies.
--
1 A prospective caucusgoer in either party can also go to and register for a given party at the precinct caucuses level. See Section I.A.1 of the Iowa Democratic Party Delegate Selection Plan and Article IX.2 of the Republican Party of Iowa Constitution for the specifics of same-day registration.
2 In particular, if both parties have a contested nomination race, New Hampshire independents have a choice of the primary in which to participate. That would tend to muddle the moderating impact (see for instance, 2000 and 2008). Yet, when there is an incumbent in the White House and the out-party is the only party with a competitive nomination contest, those independents only have one option and would have a greater -- theoretically moderating -- impact on the outcome.
Recent Posts:
Thoughts on the Growth and Opportunity Project Recommendations
Montana Bill to Consolidate Presidential Primary & School Elections Probably Dead
Bill Would Push Texas Primary to Saturday
Look, Enten is right. First, look at Iowa and New Hampshire for what they truly are -- winnowing contests in the presidential nomination process. [This is a point that Jon Bernstein expands on in a post that popped up while FHQ was in the midst of writing this.] And second, if one is to attack the privileged status of the nation's first two contests, at least bother tease out the differences between the two. It really is poor form to say that Iowa and New Hampshire collectively push the Republican Party in a more conservative direction.
On structural grounds alone, the two are very different. Iowa is a closed caucuses state in which only registered Democrats or Republicans can participate in their party's contest.1 Also, compared to the New Hampshire primary, a lower percentage of voting eligible turnout in Iowa. The Granite state process is more open. The primary permits the participation of independents which would tend to moderate the results depending on the dynamics of a given race.2
Cohen's point, then, that the two contests push, in this case, the Republican nomination process off in a rightward extreme direction is wrong. That may be true of Iowa (again, see Bernstein), but not for New Hampshire.
--
Both Enten and Bernstein are absolutely right to point that out. But FHQ wishes to offer a concurring opinion.
Sure, FHQ was struck by how off base the above Cohen argument was, but I also take issue with some of the second order questions that were implied in his piece. Namely...
"The report confronts this problem by denying that it exists. While the authors want regional primaries and a truncated nominating process — so as to have an earlier nominating convention — they bow before what they call the “carve-out” states that have individual and early elections."First of all, Cohen understandably focuses on the Republican side of the equation. It was the RNC after all that sanctioned the "autopsy" that produced the the regional primary recommendation (and not one solving the Iowa/New Hampshire "problem"). The Democratic Party was only mentioned in the final paragraph, and only then in the context of a hypothetically properly functioning Republican process that produces a nominee that can "keep the Democrats honest".
That is another mistake. Neither regional primaries nor a "fix" to the Iowa/New Hampshire issue is going to occur without coordinated (near unified) action on the part of both parties. Pointing the finger at the Republicans, then, is an exercise in futility without also pointing it at the Democrats. Even then it may remain an exercise in futility.
But why?
The fact that the Democrats have yet to weigh in on 2016 rules, much less react to the actions that the Republican National Committee may or may not take in regard to the Growth and Opportunity Project report, does not change the fact that the report -- a platform for the RNC to discuss its nomination rules -- mentioned regional primaries while continuing to protect Iowa, New Hampshire and the other two carve-out states. If coordinated action is required for both, then why not address both?
Well, as Bernstein points out in his post, the whole Iowa/New Hampshire "problem" has been overblown. But, beyond that, at its most basic, the answer is the parties cannot address both. As FHQ pointed out last week, without Democratic Party buy-in, the RNC will have a difficult time with the regional primary concept. Even unified action on the part of both parties does not change the fact that some states would have some difficulty in shifting their contests around because the presidential primary is coupled with primaries for other offices. That problem stands a better chance of being resolved than the Iowa/New Hampshire issue.
For better or worse, the parties have given up on the idea of toppling Iowa and New Hampshire. Neither party made any kind of concerted effort to address the issue in the lead up to 2012. It came up, but nothing was ever done in terms of resolutions to alter the rules.
Instead of solving the "problem" the parties have opted to manage it. In my research, I talk about the willingness and ability of states to move their delegate selection events. There may be some willingness on the part of a state legislator or some state party officials or a governor to move a state's primary or caucus to an advantageous position on the primary calendar, but the contest will not budge unless there is some consensus to overcome any number of structural, budgetary or partisan hurdles. The national parties can more often than not count that -- those hurdles -- among their advantages in keeping states in line. In most instances, where that does not work, the parties have penalties associated with violations.
But Iowa and New Hampshire are interesting cases. First, each has an abundance of both willingness and ability to retain their first in the nation status. The ability has been made clear for over a generation now. New Hampshire Secretary of State Bill Gardner has the power to set the date of the presidential primary in the Granite state and basically has the state operating like a mobile voting unit on perpetual red alert. [That is only a slight exaggeration.] The caucuses in Iowa are a bit more unwieldy terms of the lead time required to adequately lay the groundwork for precinct caucus night.
That is one issue for the national parties, but the real Iowa/New Hampshire conundrum manifests itself in terms of the willingness each state has to stay on top. From the national parties' perspective, there is likely no penalty that likely alters the willingness in Iowa and New Hampshire to go first. Now, sure, both national parties -- and it would have to be both -- could go nuclear and strip both states of all of their delegates. That might work. Might. But that is not likely to deter either state. Instead, that creates a situation where both states hold their contests early anyway and then crow about the unfair penalties from the beginning of primary season until the convention. Neither party wants that kind of headache in any form (and it is a headache that could range from barely perceptibly minor to migraine of epic proportion).
The parties have learned. They have opted not to solve the Iowa/New Hampshire issue, but to manage it. Part of the negative perception of Iowa/New Hampshire was their collective lack of representativeness (on regional and racial grounds). The Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee managed that question prior to the 2008 cycle by adding Nevada and South Carolina to the mix. The RNC followed suit in 2012. South Carolina was already a mainstay and Nevada Republicans had moved their caucuses up to coincide with the Democratic caucuses in the Silver state in 2008. That may not be a solution, but codifying and protecting the status of those four states manages the representativeness issue.
That also points out an additional shared value across the two national parties: a desire to provide an "on ramp" to the process for the candidates. That small state start emphasizes the retail politics that theoretically levels the playing the for underdog candidates. In practice, it allows for an alternative to an ads air war that would potentially tilt the environment toward a well-funded and/or establishment candidate. [Cohen mocks the "on ramp" but again this is a goal of the process that both parties share.]
The problem, then, in the eyes of the national parties is not the exaggerated Iowa/New Hampshire issue. No, rather it is the tiny group of states that have the willingness and increasingly the ability to challenge the early states' status. The national parties have moved toward managing the Floridas (willingness and ability), Michigans (willingness and an early consolidated primary), Arizonas (willingness and ability) and even Georgias (ability but no as of yet demonstrated willingness) over the last two cycles.
Kick Iowa and New Hampshire (and Republicans, Richard Cohen!) all you want. The parties have moved on to managing other issues.
...and in some cases issuing hard to implement remedies.
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1 A prospective caucusgoer in either party can also go to and register for a given party at the precinct caucuses level. See Section I.A.1 of the Iowa Democratic Party Delegate Selection Plan and Article IX.2 of the Republican Party of Iowa Constitution for the specifics of same-day registration.
2 In particular, if both parties have a contested nomination race, New Hampshire independents have a choice of the primary in which to participate. That would tend to muddle the moderating impact (see for instance, 2000 and 2008). Yet, when there is an incumbent in the White House and the out-party is the only party with a competitive nomination contest, those independents only have one option and would have a greater -- theoretically moderating -- impact on the outcome.
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Thursday, March 7, 2013
More on the RNC Rules and Presidential Primary Debates
RNC Chair Reince Priebus was on with Hugh Hewitt yesterday and the rules of the presidential primary process were among the topics of discussion. The biggest news out of the interview is that the RNC Growth and Opportunity Project -- the five person group charged with examining the whys and hows of the GOP's 2012 electoral fortunes -- is set to roll out some of its findings and some recommendations on March 18.
Part of those recommendations clearly seems to be how the RNC will deal with presidential primary debates in the 2016 cycle. FHQ has already weighed in on this to some extent. But that was more a discussion of the party attempting to regulate the competition among state parties for and resultant number of debates. What Priebus and Hewitt talk about in their interview is something altogether different. Hewitt even goes as far as framing the process as "mold[ing] the debates".
That is a much different proposition.
That is almost scripting debates, and truth be told, that is an even tougher goal to manufacture and regulate. The presidential election process already has scripted debates during the general election. No, those debates are not expressly scripted, but the candidates usually have a pretty good idea about what's coming in terms of the questions and have prepared for them. And still "accidents" happen. Ask Obama about Denver or McCain about his "that one" comment in 2008 or go on down the line about debate gaffes in the television era.
But the thing is, those moments really don't seem to drive the outcome of presidential elections.
And now the RNC appears to be proffering a series of hypotheses along these lines:
The nomination process is a tough nut to crack for the national parties. There are a lot of moving parts involved (Debates are just one.), and the parties are constantly trying to define and regulate the best possible conditions ahead of time. Never an easy task. As I said above, the Democrats will likely examine this debates issue as well. I am hard-pressed to envision a scenario where it does not come up in the Rules and Bylaws Committee discussions. But the debates a factor that, while there is some hope for control (from the parties' perspectives), may not actually yield all that much benefit if the party is already divided.
FHQ is not saying that the RNC should not look into this issue; only that the benefits are not exactly clear. That said, the best way to test this is to change the rules and see how the process is impacted. But if the Obama presidency follows any kind of downward trajectory and/or the economy takes a turn for the worse over the next two to three years, the number and scope of Republican (or Democratic) primary debates won't matter a whole lot in 2016. That may even be true if the current conditions remain static in the interim.
Hat tip to David Drucker at Roll Call for passing this along.
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Part of those recommendations clearly seems to be how the RNC will deal with presidential primary debates in the 2016 cycle. FHQ has already weighed in on this to some extent. But that was more a discussion of the party attempting to regulate the competition among state parties for and resultant number of debates. What Priebus and Hewitt talk about in their interview is something altogether different. Hewitt even goes as far as framing the process as "mold[ing] the debates".
That is a much different proposition.
That is almost scripting debates, and truth be told, that is an even tougher goal to manufacture and regulate. The presidential election process already has scripted debates during the general election. No, those debates are not expressly scripted, but the candidates usually have a pretty good idea about what's coming in terms of the questions and have prepared for them. And still "accidents" happen. Ask Obama about Denver or McCain about his "that one" comment in 2008 or go on down the line about debate gaffes in the television era.
But the thing is, those moments really don't seem to drive the outcome of presidential elections.
And now the RNC appears to be proffering a series of hypotheses along these lines:
H1: Presidential primary debates create/drive up intra-party divisiveness.All of these are reasonable hypotheses. They certainly merit some exploration. [And, mind you, the Democratic Party will also have to consider this very same issue in some way.] But they strike FHQ as incomplete if not ill-formed. All of this seems to hinge on the notion that these primary debates are creating an atmosphere that is not helpful to the national party's goal of nominating a candidate who can in turn win the general election. Perhaps they are not helpful in that regard. Again, that is reasonable. But that also seems to gloss over several additional points or questions that are hugely important in all of this:
H2: The media amplifies intra-party divisiveness.
H3: Intra-party divisiveness negatively affects that party's candidate in the general election.
Q1: What if the intra-party divisiveness already exists?FHQ gets the intent of the media amplification hypotheses. But it seems to me that those things are going to come out (the media is going to amplify) anyway if they exist. Ron Paul supporters would have raised hell over the perception that a number of caucuses were handled unfairly, not to mention the treatment of their delegates in Tampa with or without debates. Rick Santorum and Newt Gingrich would have attacked Mitt Romney the very same way with or without those occasional national television platforms. And the media following along and reporting on the process would continue to have had the incentive to talk about those same divisions in the party -- divisions that also exist in the Republican caucuses on the Hill -- to the extent they were represented by voices (candidates) involved in the race. And they were represented. There were establishment/Tea Party/libertarian fault lines in the Republican Party before there were debates and there were always candidates who represented those constituencies.
Q2: What if it is not or has not been dormant or latent, but present all along?
Q3: Further, what if the very nature of the entire presidential primary process -- the battle to win contests, delegates and media attention -- is going to bring that divisiveness out with or without presidential primary debates?
The nomination process is a tough nut to crack for the national parties. There are a lot of moving parts involved (Debates are just one.), and the parties are constantly trying to define and regulate the best possible conditions ahead of time. Never an easy task. As I said above, the Democrats will likely examine this debates issue as well. I am hard-pressed to envision a scenario where it does not come up in the Rules and Bylaws Committee discussions. But the debates a factor that, while there is some hope for control (from the parties' perspectives), may not actually yield all that much benefit if the party is already divided.
FHQ is not saying that the RNC should not look into this issue; only that the benefits are not exactly clear. That said, the best way to test this is to change the rules and see how the process is impacted. But if the Obama presidency follows any kind of downward trajectory and/or the economy takes a turn for the worse over the next two to three years, the number and scope of Republican (or Democratic) primary debates won't matter a whole lot in 2016. That may even be true if the current conditions remain static in the interim.
Hat tip to David Drucker at Roll Call for passing this along.
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Tuesday, February 26, 2013
2016 Rules: Penalizing Candidates for Participating in Unsanctioned Debates?
This idea has been floating around since the RNC Chairman Reince Priebus mentioned it to reporters during the RNC Winter Meetings in Charlotte in January. But now the idea of penalizing presidential candidates delegates for participating in primary debates not sanctioned by the Republican National Committee is making the rounds again in an item by Ramesh Ponnuru over at the National Review.
In my discussions with folks involved in the rules-making process in the RNC this debates/delegate penalty never came up. That is not to suggest that it has not come up or will not be pushed in some form at future RNC meetings. There is some sincere frustration over the perceived impact those primary debates had on the process within the party, but this seems more like an idea that is being floated more than a directive for change from the chairman.
That is the FHQ interpretation of it anyway. Here's why:
This is a tough [TOUGH] penalty to enforce. Again, that is not to say that it cannot be enforced, but it is something that is difficult to achieve. Functionally, it works more as a threat than an actual penalty. The Democratic Party had something similar on the books in 2008 (and 2012). The rule did not apply to debates. Rather, it was a penalty put in place to dissuade candidates from campaigning in states that violated the rules on timing. In 2008, that meant that none of the candidates could campaign in Florida and Michigan until the day after the primary in the violating state. If the candidates had campaigned in either state they would have lost any and all pledged delegates won in that primary (Rule 20.C.1.b).
But no candidate violated that rule. And that was probably fortunate for the DNC and its Rules and Bylaws Committee. Imagine if that question had been layered into the Clinton-Obama delegate fight in the waning days of primary season in 2008. [That threat also worked (or mainly worked) because Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina were in on it. Each collectively and effectively threatened the support for and to any candidates who campaigned in any states jumping the queue.]
Again, as in that 2008 case, it is easy to threaten to take away delegates from candidates, but tough to enforce without also potentially hurting the state parties, not to mention individual delegates, in the process. How does the national party identify which delegates get the axe? What is the percentage? How does the party account for the varying penalties that will occur based on different methods of delegate allocation? Furthermore, does would the RNC ultimately care? [The standing, yet unofficial, rule on the Republican side has always been to just leave it up to the states. But there has been an evolution to that since 2008. In other words, instead of "do what you want states" it is "these are the rules, do what you want/can states".]
Ultimately, this really is not a penalty on the candidates. Yes, the proposal targets them, but the reality is that this but the first step in how the RNC likely sees this playing out. As was the case with the Democrats in 2008, the likely intent is to in some way curb the incentives state parties and other groups have in scheduling these debates in the first place. If the state parties are rational, they will not want to hold/sponsor a debate if it means the party will potentially not have a full slate of candidates -- or at least the main competitors -- participate.
But what is the mechanism by which state parties or other groups acquire the RNC's blessing for holding a debate? Is there a mechanism at all or will early states (or perhaps competitive general election states) have the upper hand in planning and orchestrating such debates?
All we really have in Chairman Priebus' comments is the wisp of a plan. It is not fully fleshed out and as such is rife with unintended consequences.
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Footnote:
FHQ should also mention one of the other talking points circulating in response to this already: That this is a rules change that seemingly advantages the supposed establishment candidate; something those in the grassroots and/or among the Tea Party would not necessarily be favorable toward. That response is apt, but focuses too heavily on the candidate-specific penalties instead of the state angle proffered above. Functionally, I think candidate angle is correct. A frontrunning establishment candidate is motivated to participate in as small a number of debates as possible. This just provides some institutional national party-based cover for that candidate or candidates. That, in turn, affects the calculus of those planning these debates in the first place. But again, that is the goal of this particular rule should it ever come to fruition.
In my discussions with folks involved in the rules-making process in the RNC this debates/delegate penalty never came up. That is not to suggest that it has not come up or will not be pushed in some form at future RNC meetings. There is some sincere frustration over the perceived impact those primary debates had on the process within the party, but this seems more like an idea that is being floated more than a directive for change from the chairman.
That is the FHQ interpretation of it anyway. Here's why:
This is a tough [TOUGH] penalty to enforce. Again, that is not to say that it cannot be enforced, but it is something that is difficult to achieve. Functionally, it works more as a threat than an actual penalty. The Democratic Party had something similar on the books in 2008 (and 2012). The rule did not apply to debates. Rather, it was a penalty put in place to dissuade candidates from campaigning in states that violated the rules on timing. In 2008, that meant that none of the candidates could campaign in Florida and Michigan until the day after the primary in the violating state. If the candidates had campaigned in either state they would have lost any and all pledged delegates won in that primary (Rule 20.C.1.b).
But no candidate violated that rule. And that was probably fortunate for the DNC and its Rules and Bylaws Committee. Imagine if that question had been layered into the Clinton-Obama delegate fight in the waning days of primary season in 2008. [That threat also worked (or mainly worked) because Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina were in on it. Each collectively and effectively threatened the support for and to any candidates who campaigned in any states jumping the queue.]
Again, as in that 2008 case, it is easy to threaten to take away delegates from candidates, but tough to enforce without also potentially hurting the state parties, not to mention individual delegates, in the process. How does the national party identify which delegates get the axe? What is the percentage? How does the party account for the varying penalties that will occur based on different methods of delegate allocation? Furthermore, does would the RNC ultimately care? [The standing, yet unofficial, rule on the Republican side has always been to just leave it up to the states. But there has been an evolution to that since 2008. In other words, instead of "do what you want states" it is "these are the rules, do what you want/can states".]
Ultimately, this really is not a penalty on the candidates. Yes, the proposal targets them, but the reality is that this but the first step in how the RNC likely sees this playing out. As was the case with the Democrats in 2008, the likely intent is to in some way curb the incentives state parties and other groups have in scheduling these debates in the first place. If the state parties are rational, they will not want to hold/sponsor a debate if it means the party will potentially not have a full slate of candidates -- or at least the main competitors -- participate.
But what is the mechanism by which state parties or other groups acquire the RNC's blessing for holding a debate? Is there a mechanism at all or will early states (or perhaps competitive general election states) have the upper hand in planning and orchestrating such debates?
All we really have in Chairman Priebus' comments is the wisp of a plan. It is not fully fleshed out and as such is rife with unintended consequences.
--
Footnote:
FHQ should also mention one of the other talking points circulating in response to this already: That this is a rules change that seemingly advantages the supposed establishment candidate; something those in the grassroots and/or among the Tea Party would not necessarily be favorable toward. That response is apt, but focuses too heavily on the candidate-specific penalties instead of the state angle proffered above. Functionally, I think candidate angle is correct. A frontrunning establishment candidate is motivated to participate in as small a number of debates as possible. This just provides some institutional national party-based cover for that candidate or candidates. That, in turn, affects the calculus of those planning these debates in the first place. But again, that is the goal of this particular rule should it ever come to fruition.
Monday, September 3, 2012
A Brief Note on 2016 Democratic Nomination Rules
Unlike Tampa, there is not much going on in Charlotte regarding the rules governing the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination. The Rules and Bylaws Committee met in Charlotte on Saturday, completed their business and will make their report presentation to the convention tomorrow. But the bottom line is that the real work on 2016 will take place on the Democratic side next year and into 2014. The RBC report will likely involve the creation of a commission to examine the rules procedures, which will in turn make any recommendations for changes to the system to the Rules and Bylaws Committee. That will happen in 2013 and the RBC will act -- if any changes are to be made -- the following year.
I was fortunate enough to have run into RBC co-chair Jim Roosevelt in the Charlotte Convention Center yesterday while picking up my media credentials for the convention. He confirmed that the RBC report was done and would be presented on Tuesday at the convention. I also asked him for his thoughts on the rules changes the Republican Party seems to have made. He, too, had not seen the final language on the rules that was passed in Tampa (thus limiting either his or my ability to do anything other than speculate on what has been reported), but agreed with me that the proposed stiffer penalties represented a hopeful step toward calendar order in 2016.
FHQ will have more on this from the convention tomorrow when the RBC gives its report.
I was fortunate enough to have run into RBC co-chair Jim Roosevelt in the Charlotte Convention Center yesterday while picking up my media credentials for the convention. He confirmed that the RBC report was done and would be presented on Tuesday at the convention. I also asked him for his thoughts on the rules changes the Republican Party seems to have made. He, too, had not seen the final language on the rules that was passed in Tampa (thus limiting either his or my ability to do anything other than speculate on what has been reported), but agreed with me that the proposed stiffer penalties represented a hopeful step toward calendar order in 2016.
FHQ will have more on this from the convention tomorrow when the RBC gives its report.
Tuesday, August 28, 2012
Some Thoughts on the Proposed RNC Rules Changes for 2016, Part One
It was just last week that the Republican Rules Committee proposed and passed a set of 2016 presidential primary rule reforms for approval at the Tampa convention this week. FHQ put off unpacking it all for several reasons not the least of which was preparing for the trip down to Tampa. Trips aside I wanted a chance to read the rules and watch whatever reaction there was. Recall that the 2010 changes to the rules for this most recent cycle were viewed as sweeping changes with a huge potential impact.
The reality? Well, the calendar informally coordinated with Democrats helped to spread the calendar out some. Of course, the lack of any new and significant penalties in the 2012 rules left the gate open for Florida to keep its primary in January, pushing the start point up to the cusp of new years and spreading the primary calendar out even further.
That slowed the nomination of Mitt Romney down. What did not was the new proportionality requirement which, though it was hyped as a mechanism to reduce the speed of the process and create the type of deliberative, competitive and energizing nomination process the Democratic Party had in 2008. Requiring states with contests scheduled prior to April 1 to allocate their share of delegates in a manner that had an element of proportionality actually helped quicken the pace of the 2012 Republican nomination race. Under the 2008 rules, Rick Santorum would have gained slightly more delegates than he actually did deep into March. That would have also slightly reduced the margin in the zero sum fight for delegates.1
FHQ, then, is a little wary of trying to gauge the sort of impact new rules would have four years in advance. It is a fool's errand rife with very likely unintended consequences. But let's get a head start dispelling any notions of broad sweeping changes embedded in the rules proposals that will go before the full convention on Tuesday. It's never too early.
First, the changes. The rule in question for much of this discussion is Rule 15 in the 2008 Rules of the Republican Party. Let's take this piece by piece:
Current Rule 15(a):
At its simplest, this change binds delegates to candidates based on the results of any statewide vote be it primary or precinct caucuses. The proposed rule does not allow for plans like those in Iowa or in some other Republican caucus states where delegates were unbound based on state rules. The change does not provide state parties with the same latitude those bodies had in 2012 and before.
But it also has the impact of opening up the method of allocation for all states (...based on this rule and the current Rule 15(b) that is on the chopping block).
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Current Rule 15(b):
This is the rule that has drawn so much backlash from Paul supporters, Santorum supporters and other state party officials and has threatened to throw the convention into a floor fight. Honestly, this change has the potential to be the proportionality requirement of of 2016: an overhyped rule with no real impact on the process. At the heart of the conflict is the notion that delegates being approved by candidates is a power grab at the expense of a state party's right to choose how it allocates its delegates. Further, it takes a grassroots activity meant to build the party and turns it over to the candidate or candidates. FHQ gets the rationale, but I struggle to see what fundamental impact the change will have.
Actually, I do see the impact it will have. Together with Rule 15(a) the candidate approval mechanism altogether ends the possibility that a statewide vote can be overturned in subsequent steps in a caucus process by enthusiastic and organized supporters of a candidate that did not comprise a majority or plurality of the statewide vote. We can call it the Ron Paul issue. It isn't a problem because the Paul folks and their supporters were behaving well within the confines of the rules laid out for the 2012 cycle. It is, however, perceived as a problem by the national party. It takes what has been an orderly process and leaves the order up to chance every cycle; opening the door to discord within the party and a less than cohesive national convention that could hurt the presumptive nominee for the party.
The counterargument is that this is still positive local and state party building, and it is good for the national party to broaden the tent to include passionate political actors. But you know who doesn't have a problem with party building in caucuses? The Democratic Party. Here is Rule 9.B.3 of the 2012 Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules:
This is obviously a struggle over the level of power the state party has in all of this. Those parties in Republican caucus states in particular do not want to cede that power to the national party or the candidates. But again, the Democratic Party has done this with little problem for years. Yes, I am aware that a "the Democrats do it this way" argument is going to do very little to win over the hearts and minds of Republicans trying to set much less operate under this particular rule, but still.
If the delegate slots are already bound to particular candidates based on the statewide vote, then all we are talking about is a candidate -- any candidate, Romney, Paul anyone -- approving of the delegates that fill their slots at the end of the caucus/convention process when typically the nominee is already known just not officially nominated yet. I can see state parties being up in arms over this, but if you are a supporter of a candidate what's wrong with receiving your fair share of delegates? Well, the problem is that there is a loophole in the current system that opens the door for those energized and organized supporters of a particular candidate. They don't want to lose that loophole and state parties don't want to lose the ability to, well, do whatever they want. That's a fertile environment for coalition formation.
Of course, there are reports tonight that a floor fight over this rule has been avoided and a compromise between the two sides has been reached. Now, the rule will prevent bound delegates from casting a vote for or nominating a candidate to whom they were not bound.3 This keeps the loophole for unbound delegates, but eliminates the oft-discussed loophole in the RNC rules that binds delegates supportive of another candidate to cast a vote for the bound-to candidate, but not necessarily to nominate that bound-to candidate. The real winner is the states in all of this. They keep exactly what they want, but Paul folks and the Romney/RNC contingent had to give something up.
We'll never know now, but I'll argue to my grave the point that this rule -- had it taken effect -- would not have had nearly the negative effect its detractors claimed after the amendment pass passed last week. The tone of the attacks is that the delegate decisions/approval will be preordained before the caucus rather than something that takes place at the end of the caucus convention process.
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Proposed Rule 15(e)(3) [NEW]:
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Stay tuned for Part Two where we will look at the impact of new sanctions and the heightened nomination requirements.
2 FHQ should also note that the Meinke, et al work focuses on the Democratic side of the equation. Those relationships are clearer in Democratic caucus states because those are states are typically Republican states. A more liberal party elite wants to guard against the more conservative candidates a more conservative primary electorate might select. The choice of a caucus or primary is an easy one in that regard. But there is no similar corollary on the Republican side. There are no Republican caucus states with conservative state party elites in an overwhelmingly liberal state. There was a lot of talk about how conservative the Iowa Republican caucus attendees would be in 2012 and the impact that would have on winnowing the field, but that is not the same issue as the ideological divergence Meinke, et al address.
3 The proposed alteration will strike the proposed Rule 15(b) above -- the approval mechanism -- and add a second part to Rule 16(a). The former would have been a new subrule to the section on electing or selecting delegates, whereas the latter is an enforcement mechanism that belongs in the Enforcement of the Rules (Rule 16). Here is the text of the proposed addition:
The reality? Well, the calendar informally coordinated with Democrats helped to spread the calendar out some. Of course, the lack of any new and significant penalties in the 2012 rules left the gate open for Florida to keep its primary in January, pushing the start point up to the cusp of new years and spreading the primary calendar out even further.
That slowed the nomination of Mitt Romney down. What did not was the new proportionality requirement which, though it was hyped as a mechanism to reduce the speed of the process and create the type of deliberative, competitive and energizing nomination process the Democratic Party had in 2008. Requiring states with contests scheduled prior to April 1 to allocate their share of delegates in a manner that had an element of proportionality actually helped quicken the pace of the 2012 Republican nomination race. Under the 2008 rules, Rick Santorum would have gained slightly more delegates than he actually did deep into March. That would have also slightly reduced the margin in the zero sum fight for delegates.1
FHQ, then, is a little wary of trying to gauge the sort of impact new rules would have four years in advance. It is a fool's errand rife with very likely unintended consequences. But let's get a head start dispelling any notions of broad sweeping changes embedded in the rules proposals that will go before the full convention on Tuesday. It's never too early.
First, the changes. The rule in question for much of this discussion is Rule 15 in the 2008 Rules of the Republican Party. Let's take this piece by piece:
Current Rule 15(a):
(a) Order of Precedence.Delegates at large and their alternate delegates and delegates from Congressional districts and their alternate delegates to the national convention shall be elected, selected, allocated, or bound in the following manner:(1) In accordance with any applicable Republican Party rules of a state, insofar as the same are not inconsistent with these rules; or(2) To the extent not provided for in the applicable Republican Party rules of a state, in accordance with any applicable laws of a state, insofar as the same are not inconsistent with these rules; or(3) By a combination of the methods set forth in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this rule; or(4) To the extent not provided by state law or party rules, as set forth in paragraph (d) of this rule.
Any statewide presidential preference vote that permits a choice among candidates for the Republican nomination for president of the United States in a primary, caucuses, or a state convention must be used to allocate and bind the state's delegation to the National Convention in either a proportional or winner-take-all manner, except for delegates and alternate delegates who appear on a ballot in a statewide election and are elected directly by primary voters.Analysis of Change:
At its simplest, this change binds delegates to candidates based on the results of any statewide vote be it primary or precinct caucuses. The proposed rule does not allow for plans like those in Iowa or in some other Republican caucus states where delegates were unbound based on state rules. The change does not provide state parties with the same latitude those bodies had in 2012 and before.
But it also has the impact of opening up the method of allocation for all states (...based on this rule and the current Rule 15(b) that is on the chopping block).
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Current Rule 15(b):
(b) Timing.* (Revised language was adopted by the Republican National Committee on August 6, 2010)(1) No primary, caucus, or convention to elect, select, allocate, or bind delegates to the national convention shall occur prior to the first Tuesday in March in the year in which a national convention is held. Except Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada may begin their processes at any time on or after February 1 in the year in which a national convention is held and shall not be subject to the provisions of paragraph (b)(2) of this rule.(2) Any presidential primary, caucus, convention, or other meeting held for the purpose of selecting delegates to the national convention which occurs prior to the first day of April in the year in which the national convention is held, shall provide for the allocation of delegates on a proportional basis.(3) If the Democratic National Committee fails to adhere to a presidential primary schedule with the dates set forth in Rule 15(b)(1) of these Rules (February 1 and first Tuesday in March), then Rule 15(b) shall revert to the Rules as adopted by the 2008 Republican National Convention.Proposed Rule 15(b):
For any manner of binding or allocating delegates permitted by these Rules, no delegate or alternate delegate who is bound or allocated to a particular presidential candidate may be certified under Rule 19 unless the presidential candidate to whom the delegate or alternate delegate is bound or allocated has pre-certified or approved the delegate or alternate delegate.Analysis of Change:
This is the rule that has drawn so much backlash from Paul supporters, Santorum supporters and other state party officials and has threatened to throw the convention into a floor fight. Honestly, this change has the potential to be the proportionality requirement of of 2016: an overhyped rule with no real impact on the process. At the heart of the conflict is the notion that delegates being approved by candidates is a power grab at the expense of a state party's right to choose how it allocates its delegates. Further, it takes a grassroots activity meant to build the party and turns it over to the candidate or candidates. FHQ gets the rationale, but I struggle to see what fundamental impact the change will have.
Actually, I do see the impact it will have. Together with Rule 15(a) the candidate approval mechanism altogether ends the possibility that a statewide vote can be overturned in subsequent steps in a caucus process by enthusiastic and organized supporters of a candidate that did not comprise a majority or plurality of the statewide vote. We can call it the Ron Paul issue. It isn't a problem because the Paul folks and their supporters were behaving well within the confines of the rules laid out for the 2012 cycle. It is, however, perceived as a problem by the national party. It takes what has been an orderly process and leaves the order up to chance every cycle; opening the door to discord within the party and a less than cohesive national convention that could hurt the presumptive nominee for the party.
The counterargument is that this is still positive local and state party building, and it is good for the national party to broaden the tent to include passionate political actors. But you know who doesn't have a problem with party building in caucuses? The Democratic Party. Here is Rule 9.B.3 of the 2012 Democratic Party Delegate Selection Rules:
3. If persons eligible for pledged party leader and elected official delegate positions have not made known their presidential preference under the procedures established by the state pursuant to Rule 12 for candidates for district-level and at-large delegate positions, their preferences shall be ascertained through alternative procedures established by the state party, which shall require a signed pledge of support for a presidential candidate. Such an alternative system shall have a final deadline for submitting a pledge of support after the selection of all district-level delegates has been completed and must provide an opportunity for disapproval by the presidential candidate or the candidate’s authorized representative.Notice that italicized and bolded section. The Democratic Party has had an approval system in place for years and it has not really had an impact on delegate selection or enthusiasm in caucus states.2 Truth be told, there is evidence to suggest that caucus states are caucus states for a reason: maximizing power over the process. States with a party elite that does not converge ideologically with rank and file members of the party within the state are much more likely to turn to a restrictive mode of delegate allocation. More diverse states where the ideological line is blurred between those two groups are more likely to have a primary -- even an open primary (Meinke, et al, 2006).
This is obviously a struggle over the level of power the state party has in all of this. Those parties in Republican caucus states in particular do not want to cede that power to the national party or the candidates. But again, the Democratic Party has done this with little problem for years. Yes, I am aware that a "the Democrats do it this way" argument is going to do very little to win over the hearts and minds of Republicans trying to set much less operate under this particular rule, but still.
If the delegate slots are already bound to particular candidates based on the statewide vote, then all we are talking about is a candidate -- any candidate, Romney, Paul anyone -- approving of the delegates that fill their slots at the end of the caucus/convention process when typically the nominee is already known just not officially nominated yet. I can see state parties being up in arms over this, but if you are a supporter of a candidate what's wrong with receiving your fair share of delegates? Well, the problem is that there is a loophole in the current system that opens the door for those energized and organized supporters of a particular candidate. They don't want to lose that loophole and state parties don't want to lose the ability to, well, do whatever they want. That's a fertile environment for coalition formation.
Of course, there are reports tonight that a floor fight over this rule has been avoided and a compromise between the two sides has been reached. Now, the rule will prevent bound delegates from casting a vote for or nominating a candidate to whom they were not bound.3 This keeps the loophole for unbound delegates, but eliminates the oft-discussed loophole in the RNC rules that binds delegates supportive of another candidate to cast a vote for the bound-to candidate, but not necessarily to nominate that bound-to candidate. The real winner is the states in all of this. They keep exactly what they want, but Paul folks and the Romney/RNC contingent had to give something up.
We'll never know now, but I'll argue to my grave the point that this rule -- had it taken effect -- would not have had nearly the negative effect its detractors claimed after the amendment pass passed last week. The tone of the attacks is that the delegate decisions/approval will be preordained before the caucus rather than something that takes place at the end of the caucus convention process.
--
Proposed Rule 15(e)(3) [NEW]:
The Republican National Committee may grant a waiver to a state Republican Party from the provisions of 15(a) and (b) where compliance is impossible, and the Republican National Committee determines that granting such waiver is in the best interests of the Republican Party.Look, this is another one of those "the Democrats do this already" sorts of things. There was no provision in the RNC rules to provide for a waiver and there will potentially be for 2016 pending approval by delegates on the floor on Tuesday. If a situation arose where a Democratic-controlled state moved a primary or caucus to a position out of compliance with the RNC rules, that state GOP would have no recourse without a formal waiver process in place (see Florida in 2008, but in reverse).
--
Stay tuned for Part Two where we will look at the impact of new sanctions and the heightened nomination requirements.
--
1 Where particular states moved their contests on the calendar and where they were regionally was also noteworthy. A different alignment of states would have affect the accumulation of delegates to the 2012 cast of candidates in the Republican race.
1 Where particular states moved their contests on the calendar and where they were regionally was also noteworthy. A different alignment of states would have affect the accumulation of delegates to the 2012 cast of candidates in the Republican race.
2 FHQ should also note that the Meinke, et al work focuses on the Democratic side of the equation. Those relationships are clearer in Democratic caucus states because those are states are typically Republican states. A more liberal party elite wants to guard against the more conservative candidates a more conservative primary electorate might select. The choice of a caucus or primary is an easy one in that regard. But there is no similar corollary on the Republican side. There are no Republican caucus states with conservative state party elites in an overwhelmingly liberal state. There was a lot of talk about how conservative the Iowa Republican caucus attendees would be in 2012 and the impact that would have on winnowing the field, but that is not the same issue as the ideological divergence Meinke, et al address.
3 The proposed alteration will strike the proposed Rule 15(b) above -- the approval mechanism -- and add a second part to Rule 16(a). The former would have been a new subrule to the section on electing or selecting delegates, whereas the latter is an enforcement mechanism that belongs in the Enforcement of the Rules (Rule 16). Here is the text of the proposed addition:
Rule 16(a)(2).
For any manner of binding or allocating delegates under these Rules, if a delegate
(i) casts a vote for a presidential candidate at the National Convention inconsistent with the delegate’s obligation under state law or state party rule,
(ii) nominates or demonstrates support under Rule 40 for a presidential candidate other than the one to whom the delegate is bound or allocated under state law or state party rule, or
(iii) fails in some other way to carry out the delegate’s affirmative duty under state law or state party rule to cast a vote at the National Convention for a particular presidential candidate,
the delegate shall be deemed to have concurrently resigned as a delegate and the delegate’s improper vote or nomination shall be null and void. Thereafter the Secretary of the Convention shall record the delegate’s vote or nomination in accordance with the delegate’s obligation under state law or state party rule. This subsection does not apply to delegates who are bound to a candidate who has withdrawn his or her candidacy, suspended or terminated his or her campaign, or publicly released his or her delegates.
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Thursday, August 16, 2012
2016 Starts in Tampa
Back in June FHQ gave a rundown of a bipartisan working group meeting of rules officials within both national parties concerning the 2016 delegate selection rules.1 The intent of the meeting was not necessarily to reform the system so much as bridge the gap across parties and discuss ways to streamline how Americans select their presidential nominees. As the current cycle heads into convention season, the 2016 cycles looms. That is because the RNC will vote on the rules governing the process of nominating the party's 2016 nominee in Tampa. In other words, if the parties are to do anything about the Florida/Michigan/Arizona problem it starts in less than two weeks.
Now, the word streamline above is a kind of catch-all phrase for what the group discussed at Harvard. Below is the declaration that emerged from that May meeting:
NPC 2016 Declaration
You can find more at the National Presidential Caucus blog.
--
1 See those previous posts describing the May meeting FHQ was asked to participate in at the Harvard Institute of Politics here and here.
Now, the word streamline above is a kind of catch-all phrase for what the group discussed at Harvard. Below is the declaration that emerged from that May meeting:
NPC 2016 Declaration
You can find more at the National Presidential Caucus blog.
--
1 See those previous posts describing the May meeting FHQ was asked to participate in at the Harvard Institute of Politics here and here.
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Do the RNC Rules Allow a VP Selection to Be Dumped by the Convention?
Tuesday, August 14, 2012
Do the RNC Rules Allow a VP Selection to Be Dumped by the Convention?
Sure they do.
But of course, that won't happen in Tampa. And FHQ is not suggesting that it is a possibility. Rather, this is in answer to Jonathan Bernstein's follow up to Seth Masket on the influence of party over the vice presidential selection.
First the rules:
In the 2008 Rules of the Republican Party -- the rules governing the 2012 nomination process and convention -- Rule 40 covers nominations. Yes, the same Rule 40 that came up back in March and was the basis for all the talk about Ron Paul controlling a plurality of delegates in at least five states. The same is true for vice presidential nominations, but the procedure there is less regulated than for presidential nominations. By that I mean that delegates are not bound on the vice presidential roll call votes in the same way that they are on presidential roll call votes for nomination (...something Jon Ward covers here). I am not suggesting that there will be any Ron Paul delegate mischief or any other efforts to second guess Romney and oust Paul Ryan from the ticket in Tampa. Instead, the point is to show that it is possible.
Now the implications:
Within the framework of the party -- writ large -- influencing the selection of a vice presidential nominee, this merely adds another layer. But that is certainly a layer that strengthens the party's hand. It really is not unlike a president's decision in selecting a nominee to fill a Supreme Court vacancy. There is a more than adequate supply of able jurists in the pool, but only a constrained number of them will ever be considered by any given president. There is a calculus to the decision and presidents can push the envelope -- ideologically speaking or in some other manner -- but the extent of said pushing goes only so far as the administration's perception of what/who is likely to get the requisite 60 votes in the US Senate for confirmation.
Similarly, Presumptive Nominee Romney wants/wanted to select a running mate that was palatable to members of the Republican Party. Any of the finalists -- Ryan, Portman, Pawlenty -- would have accomplished that. Additionally, there was a reason certain trial balloons failed: They weren't passable in a convention setting. FHQ has attempted to raise the issue of breaking from the script moments at the Republican convention in Tampa. Mostly that was within the context of the role of Ron Paul delegates. But the same rule applies in this case. Selecting, for example, a pro-choice running mate like Rice or Sandoval would have been vetoed -- in Bernsteinian? Berenstain? terms -- by the convention. It may not have been enough to derail the ultimate nomination of that type of candidate, but it definitely would ruin the harmonious party atmosphere with which the two national parties like to leave conventions.
The last thing any party or nominee wants is discord within the party before, during or after a convention. And that is the power of party in this particular political decision.
But of course, that won't happen in Tampa. And FHQ is not suggesting that it is a possibility. Rather, this is in answer to Jonathan Bernstein's follow up to Seth Masket on the influence of party over the vice presidential selection.
First the rules:
In the 2008 Rules of the Republican Party -- the rules governing the 2012 nomination process and convention -- Rule 40 covers nominations. Yes, the same Rule 40 that came up back in March and was the basis for all the talk about Ron Paul controlling a plurality of delegates in at least five states. The same is true for vice presidential nominations, but the procedure there is less regulated than for presidential nominations. By that I mean that delegates are not bound on the vice presidential roll call votes in the same way that they are on presidential roll call votes for nomination (...something Jon Ward covers here). I am not suggesting that there will be any Ron Paul delegate mischief or any other efforts to second guess Romney and oust Paul Ryan from the ticket in Tampa. Instead, the point is to show that it is possible.
Now the implications:
Within the framework of the party -- writ large -- influencing the selection of a vice presidential nominee, this merely adds another layer. But that is certainly a layer that strengthens the party's hand. It really is not unlike a president's decision in selecting a nominee to fill a Supreme Court vacancy. There is a more than adequate supply of able jurists in the pool, but only a constrained number of them will ever be considered by any given president. There is a calculus to the decision and presidents can push the envelope -- ideologically speaking or in some other manner -- but the extent of said pushing goes only so far as the administration's perception of what/who is likely to get the requisite 60 votes in the US Senate for confirmation.
Similarly, Presumptive Nominee Romney wants/wanted to select a running mate that was palatable to members of the Republican Party. Any of the finalists -- Ryan, Portman, Pawlenty -- would have accomplished that. Additionally, there was a reason certain trial balloons failed: They weren't passable in a convention setting. FHQ has attempted to raise the issue of breaking from the script moments at the Republican convention in Tampa. Mostly that was within the context of the role of Ron Paul delegates. But the same rule applies in this case. Selecting, for example, a pro-choice running mate like Rice or Sandoval would have been vetoed -- in Bernsteinian? Berenstain? terms -- by the convention. It may not have been enough to derail the ultimate nomination of that type of candidate, but it definitely would ruin the harmonious party atmosphere with which the two national parties like to leave conventions.
The last thing any party or nominee wants is discord within the party before, during or after a convention. And that is the power of party in this particular political decision.
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The Electoral College Map (8/10/12)
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Don't Bet on the Iowa Caucuses Going Anywhere in 2016
No, FHQ wouldn't even bet on it if Ron Paul won the caucuses on January 3.
Now, I won't go as far as to say that it won't happen, but the odds are against Iowa's caucuses being removed from its position at the front of the calendar. And in the end that will have very little to do with Iowans or campaign surrogates there saying the caucus process was "hijacked". Assuming Paul does win the caucuses and then fails to capture the Republican nomination, that really is no different than Iowa caucusgoers choosing wrong in the past in nomination races in both parties. As FHQ has said previously, Iowa's role isn't to predict the nominee, but rather to winnow the field. Iowa caucusgoers don't necessarily anoint the frontrunner, they usually pare the field down to either that candidate (if the invisible primary has been at all conclusive) or the frontrunner and another couple of candidates (if the invisible primary has been inconclusive). Iowa's success rate at picking the nominee isn't/wouldn't necessarily be any better or worse than any other state in that position.
But I don't want to defend Iowa's position on the calendar again.
...not that I am.
FHQ is just mindful of the reality of the process that produces a presidential primary calendar every four years. The decision of whether to keep Iowa and/or New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina up front is up to the national parties. If the parties want them there, then there those contests will be. If not, the delegate selection rules will be crafted in a way as to (attempt) to prevent that. And sure, that brings up a perfectly valid point: Why couldn't Iowa Republicans and Democrats just pull a Florida and ignore the national party rules if those rules didn't protect Iowa's spot at the head of the queue?
They could. But the problem is -- and Romney is demonstrating this to some extent this cycle -- that candidates can keep Iowa at arms length if they feel they can win the nomination without Iowa. No, FHQ doesn't mean skipping. No candidate would ever skip the first state, but they could choose to limit their time there, biding their time until the right point. That, however, takes a certain type of candidate; a frontrunner or a self-/well-financed challenger. Iowa Republicans are really worried about that -- those internal factors like candidate visits/spending -- instead of the RNC changing the rules and reshuffling the order at the beginning of the process -- an external factor.
Let's look at those externals first and then revisit the other end of the Iowa equation. First of all, if a Republican wins the White House next year -- regardless of whether the Iowa caucuses correctly predict the nominee -- then Iowa will not be an issue in 2016. It may be, but it isn't likely. Why? Parties in the White House rarely tinker with their rules; especially if the objective is to renominate/reelect the president (see Klinkner, 1994). If there is one thing the Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee said last year, it was that their main objective -- the party's really -- was to reelect President Obama. They were not going to discuss anything -- and certainly not a contentious "Iowa and New Hampshire shouldn't be first" debate -- that was going to rock the boat. Buttressing that issue, there is no evidence that the Democratic Party would push Iowa from its lofty perch. If anything gives a state party an argument for being in a particular position on the calendar (early, in other words), it is the other party in the state holding down an early position. And in Iowa's case, there is a tradition of the two parties holding caucuses on the same date.
It is slightly more likely that Iowa would be in danger if Obama is reelected. The Republican Party would potentially be willing to reexamine just about anything within their 2016 nomination process -- Iowa's position included -- if they lost in 2012. And the Democratic Party would be more willing to go along if there is some consensus -- intra-party and inter-party -- behind moving Iowa from the top or reforming the system in some small measure. [BIG ifs.]
No, I think what is most probable -- even if Ron Paul wins on January 3 -- is that Iowa is simply left alone. Neither party was particularly interested in opening up that Iowa/NewHampshire debate in the last round of delegate selection rule tweaking and it isn't clear that they would want to in the future. It's complicated as I think much of the writing on FHQ will attest. This whole thing -- the Iowa conundrum -- has more to do with the dynamics of this race and within the Republican Party right now. If there was a clear frontrunner right now and a win in Iowa was viewed as the first win in a string of fairly sure victories (think George W. Bush in 2000), then said frontrunner will be there and so will the other candidates. However, if you have no clear frontrunner and instead someone who is kind of sort of ahead in the polls (or at least consistent in them) and overspent and got burned in Iowa four years prior, then you have a recipe for an indecisive Iowa result. It really is as simple as that. The dynamics of the last two Republican races have hurt Iowa -- as it would have a great many other states that could have been at the front -- if the measure is defined as Iowa choosing the eventual nominee. But that isn't Iowa's role in this process and that is part of the reason they aren't likely to go anywhere anytime soon.
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Now, I won't go as far as to say that it won't happen, but the odds are against Iowa's caucuses being removed from its position at the front of the calendar. And in the end that will have very little to do with Iowans or campaign surrogates there saying the caucus process was "hijacked". Assuming Paul does win the caucuses and then fails to capture the Republican nomination, that really is no different than Iowa caucusgoers choosing wrong in the past in nomination races in both parties. As FHQ has said previously, Iowa's role isn't to predict the nominee, but rather to winnow the field. Iowa caucusgoers don't necessarily anoint the frontrunner, they usually pare the field down to either that candidate (if the invisible primary has been at all conclusive) or the frontrunner and another couple of candidates (if the invisible primary has been inconclusive). Iowa's success rate at picking the nominee isn't/wouldn't necessarily be any better or worse than any other state in that position.
But I don't want to defend Iowa's position on the calendar again.
...not that I am.
FHQ is just mindful of the reality of the process that produces a presidential primary calendar every four years. The decision of whether to keep Iowa and/or New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina up front is up to the national parties. If the parties want them there, then there those contests will be. If not, the delegate selection rules will be crafted in a way as to (attempt) to prevent that. And sure, that brings up a perfectly valid point: Why couldn't Iowa Republicans and Democrats just pull a Florida and ignore the national party rules if those rules didn't protect Iowa's spot at the head of the queue?
They could. But the problem is -- and Romney is demonstrating this to some extent this cycle -- that candidates can keep Iowa at arms length if they feel they can win the nomination without Iowa. No, FHQ doesn't mean skipping. No candidate would ever skip the first state, but they could choose to limit their time there, biding their time until the right point. That, however, takes a certain type of candidate; a frontrunner or a self-/well-financed challenger. Iowa Republicans are really worried about that -- those internal factors like candidate visits/spending -- instead of the RNC changing the rules and reshuffling the order at the beginning of the process -- an external factor.
Let's look at those externals first and then revisit the other end of the Iowa equation. First of all, if a Republican wins the White House next year -- regardless of whether the Iowa caucuses correctly predict the nominee -- then Iowa will not be an issue in 2016. It may be, but it isn't likely. Why? Parties in the White House rarely tinker with their rules; especially if the objective is to renominate/reelect the president (see Klinkner, 1994). If there is one thing the Democratic Rules and Bylaws Committee said last year, it was that their main objective -- the party's really -- was to reelect President Obama. They were not going to discuss anything -- and certainly not a contentious "Iowa and New Hampshire shouldn't be first" debate -- that was going to rock the boat. Buttressing that issue, there is no evidence that the Democratic Party would push Iowa from its lofty perch. If anything gives a state party an argument for being in a particular position on the calendar (early, in other words), it is the other party in the state holding down an early position. And in Iowa's case, there is a tradition of the two parties holding caucuses on the same date.
It is slightly more likely that Iowa would be in danger if Obama is reelected. The Republican Party would potentially be willing to reexamine just about anything within their 2016 nomination process -- Iowa's position included -- if they lost in 2012. And the Democratic Party would be more willing to go along if there is some consensus -- intra-party and inter-party -- behind moving Iowa from the top or reforming the system in some small measure. [BIG ifs.]
No, I think what is most probable -- even if Ron Paul wins on January 3 -- is that Iowa is simply left alone. Neither party was particularly interested in opening up that Iowa/NewHampshire debate in the last round of delegate selection rule tweaking and it isn't clear that they would want to in the future. It's complicated as I think much of the writing on FHQ will attest. This whole thing -- the Iowa conundrum -- has more to do with the dynamics of this race and within the Republican Party right now. If there was a clear frontrunner right now and a win in Iowa was viewed as the first win in a string of fairly sure victories (think George W. Bush in 2000), then said frontrunner will be there and so will the other candidates. However, if you have no clear frontrunner and instead someone who is kind of sort of ahead in the polls (or at least consistent in them) and overspent and got burned in Iowa four years prior, then you have a recipe for an indecisive Iowa result. It really is as simple as that. The dynamics of the last two Republican races have hurt Iowa -- as it would have a great many other states that could have been at the front -- if the measure is defined as Iowa choosing the eventual nominee. But that isn't Iowa's role in this process and that is part of the reason they aren't likely to go anywhere anytime soon.
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Texas Presidential Primary to Stay on March 6
The Texas House today passed SB 100, the amended version of which does not have the April presidential primary provision contained in it. The original, Senate-passed version did not call for the primary to be moved to April either. Together, that ends the April presidential primary talk in the Lone Star state.
[Click to Enlarge]
The move -- non-move really -- does put the Texas Republican Party in a bit of a bind, though. The party has typically used winner-take-all delegate allocation rules in the past, but the Republican National Committee will not allow that in 2012 before April 1. Texas Republicans are further constrained by the fact that the party's delegate allocation rules cannot be changed between now and the March 6 primary. Those sorts of changes can only be made at the state convention and the 2011 state convention has already come and gone. The party, then, is in the proportional window, but with winner-take-all rules, leaving Texas Republicans open to penalties (half the delegation or more) from the national party.
NOTE: Technically, HB 318, the bill to move the Texas primary to February, is still active. However, that legislation has been stuck in committee since February, and with the legislature set to adjourn next week, that is unlikely to change. FHQ, thus, feels comfortable in shifting Texas into the settled category on the calendar.
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