There's a reason the Santorum campaign didn't mention West Virginia in its delegate conference call last week

If you listened in on or followed the parallel twitter conversation around the Santorum campaign conference call last week on the delegate math, you heard that...

1. ...the April contests were hardly mentioned and/or...
2. ...the campaign views May as much friendlier -- delegate-wise -- territory.

To expand on the second point, the Santorum campaign revealed that it is looking ahead/emphasizing contests like North Carolina, Arkansas, Kentucky and Texas. All of those are southern/border states where the Santorum candidacy can or could conceivably resonate with voters. Given the geography/demography of where/who the former Pennsylvania senator has done will in/with, this makes sense.

But do you know which state is missing from the list? West Virginia.

Why?

The Mountain state is obviously a state where one could see if not Santorum doing well, then Romney not faring so well (...with Santorum or another candidate doing well by default). [See, for example, below the national average statistics for income and education.] If that happens to be the case, then why is the Santorum campaign not targeting West Virginia. The argument could be made that West Virginia does not represent that big of a delegate haul and with only 28 contested delegates at stake, that's fair. It is not as delegate-rich as any of the above target states.

The main factor hurting Santorum, however, is the same problem his campaign has had elsewhere: ballot access. That is, ballot access not so much for him, but for him both statewide and in each of the congressional districts or with getting delegates on the ballot. In West Virginia, the problem is a combination of the two. Santorum is on the ballot, but like Illinois, that vote is meaningless. Primary voters in West Virginia on May 8 will also directly elect delegates -- both at-large and by congressional district. There are 19 at-large delegate slots in West Virginia. Romney has filed 24 delegates, Gingrich 23 and Paul 19. Santorum has three delegates who his campaign has filed or have both filed and are committed to his candidacy.

Additionally, there are three delegate slots per each of the three West Virginia congressional districts. Romney has filed at least seven delegates in each of the districts, Gingrich has filed at least three delegates in each district (with double that number in one district and over triple the minimum in another), and Paul has filed the minimum full slate of three in each district. Santorum? Well, the former senator filed two delegates in the first congressional district and that is it. He will not have Santorum delegates on the ballot for the congressional district spots in either the second or third congressional district.

Now, to be fair that isn't all she wrote. There are other options at the disposal of Santorum/not Romney supporters. Again, both Ron Paul and Newt Gingrich have full slates of delegates filed. But there are also a host of uncommitted delegates who have filed as well. There are 42 uncommitted at-large delegates filed statewide and there are seven, 10 and 11 uncommitted delegates filed in the first, second and third congressional districts, respectively. Voters also have the option of writing in names on the West Virginia ballot. The catch with coordinating either uncommitted slate voting and/or a write-in campaign is that that will take campaign organization and discipline to pull off.¹

That may be organization/discipline that is more efficiently expended elsewhere -- in more delegate-rich states, for instance -- than in West Virginia. That said, the Mountain state is another one of those potential missed opportunities for Santorum; a place where he could do well, but may have to hope for Gingrich or Paul to exceed expectations to prevent Romney from getting any or many of the delegates from that loophole primary because he -- Santorum -- is not on the ballot. Once again, in an overall sense, this speaks to the difficulty in running an ad hoc campaign organization against a well-organized, well-funded frontrunner; even if it is a nominal frontrunner.

It is tough to play catch up on the fly.

--
¹ Of course, to the extent that uncommitted delegates emerge from these elections, those are free agents that any of the campaigns, Santorum included, can go after.


Recent Posts:
Race to 1144: Louisiana Primary

The Myth of Proportionality's Impact is Dead

2012 Republican Delegate Allocation: Louisiana

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Race to 1144: Louisiana Primary

Source:
Contest Delegates (via contest results and rules, and RNC, Georgia Secretary of State)
Automatic Delegates (Democratic Convention Watch)

Delegate breakdown (post-Louisiana):


Changes since Illinois (3/21/12):
Romney: +7 delegates (Louisiana: +5, Georgia: +1, New Hampshire: +1¹)
Santorum: +10 delegates (Louisiana: +10)
Gingrich: -1 delegate (Georgia: -1)

Notes:
1) Those who have been following these updates closely will notice that the "Uncommitted" column in the spreadsheet above has been made primary red (unbound/unpledged) instead of maroon (bound/pledged) as it has been in previous publications. This brings up an interesting quirk in the delegate classification. While those delegates -- one each in the Virgin Islands and Wyoming and 10 now from Louisiana -- have been allocated, they are no more bound/pledged to any candidate than the unallocated/unbound/unpledged delegates that Santorum would have been entitled to in, say, Ohio (if he had been on the ballot across all of the Buckeye state) or the automatic delegates. So while these uncommitted delegates have been allocated, they are unbound according to the RNC count. FHQ will treat them as such as well. NOTE: The two uncommitted delegates -- before Louisiana -- were not included in the bar chart previously. Those are now included in the "Unbound" total both on the chart and in the spreadsheet.

2) There was a very interesting discussion Saturday night as the Louisiana returns were coming in as to the true nature of the delegate allocation in the state. FHQ's reading of the allocation was that the Louisiana Republican method is set up in such a way as to push "extra" delegates -- those not claimed by candidates under the threshold -- into the uncommitted category as opposed to being reallocated to the candidates above the threshold. The Green Papers, however, persuasively argued from a legalistic standpoint, that the language and order of the allocation rules embedded rule 20(b) indicated that those delegates would in reality be allocated to Santorum and Romney. Instead of a 10 (Santorum)-5 (Romney)-5 (uncommitted) distribution, the count would have been or should be 13 (Santorum)-7 (Romney). FHQ doesn't have a dog is this "fight". We are willing to defer to the RNC or LAGOP on the matter. And in a press release put out by LAGOP on Sunday, it appears that the 10-5-5 allocation is their interpretation of the allocation rules:

Based upon the unofficial election results from the Secretary of State, Rick Santorum has won 10 delegates with 49.07% of the vote.  Mitt Romney came in second with 5 delegates with 26.62% of the vote. Both Newt Gingrich and Ron Paul did not meet the threshold of 25% of voters required in order to garner delegates. As a result, neither Gingrich or Paul will be allocated delegates and five of the twenty delegates will go uncommitted to the National Convention.  

3) Speaking of thresholds, can someone explain to FHQ how the 25% threshold that the Louisiana Republican Party is using is within the RNC rules? My reading of the rules -- certainly subject to being incorrect -- is that the highest that threshold can be is 20%. Though this is curious, a challenge is futile on at least one front: Dropping the eligibility line for delegates to 20% would not alter the delegate allocation described above. Yet, it is still a violation of the rules and though it does not alter the delegate allocation, it could open the state up to the 50% delegate penalty for violating the rules. Imagine a scenario -- Yes, for the love of all that is holy, this is VERY far-fetched, but bear with me here for the sake of the exercise. -- where Romney is close enough to the 1144 1132 delegates necessary to clinch the nomination that losing two or three delegates in a penalized Louisiana delegation would keep the former Massachusetts governor under 1144 1132.² That would have Santorum, well, taking one for the team, and taking a greater delegate hit from the challenge in an effort to keep Romney under 1144 1132.  Is Romney likely to be that close to 1144 1132 that just a handful of delegates could make a difference? Probably not, but a penalized Louisiana along with proportionally allocated Arizona and Florida delegates might provide the Santorum camp with a little more ammunition in keeping Romney under 1144 1132. Will that happen? No.

...but it is a fun scenario to think about.

4) The allocation of the delegates in Georgia is based on the most recent vote returns published online by the office of the Georgia Secretary of State. The allocation here differs from the RNC allocation in Georgia. The above grants Gingrich one additional delegate (which has been taken from Romney's total). ***UPDATE*** Due to the way the Georgia Republican Party rounds fractional delegates, the FHQ count was off by one delegate (+Romney/-Gingrich). The congressional district count is unaffected (Gingrich 31, Romney, 8 and Santorum 3), but the way the at-large delegates are allocated to Gingrich and Romney -- the only candidates over 20% statewide -- is a bit quirky. Gingrich's portion of the vote would have entitled him to 14.6 delegates and Romney's 8.0. Under Georgia Republican rules, Gingrich is given 14 delegates and Romney 8. That leaves nine delegates unclaimed because the remaining candidates did not clear the 20% threshold. The candidate with the highest "remainder" is awarded the first delegate and the candidates over 20% trade turns until all of those delegates are allocated. Remember, Gingrich did not round up to 15 delegates (14.6), but that 0.6 gives him a larger "remainder" than Romney. The former speaker, then, is allocated the first of nine delegates. With an odd number of delegates leftover, Gingrich would have a fifth turn after Romney's fourth and that would end the allocation of those "extra" delegates. Gingrich would claim five to Romney's four. Of the 31 at-large delegates, Gingrich is allocated 19 and Romney 12. Please note that for winning the statewide vote, Gingrich is allocated the three automatic delegates. That makes the final allocation Gingrich 53, Romney 20 and Santorum 3.

5) The Alabama primary results by congressional district have not been released by the Alabama Republican Party. The allocation above is based on the RNC interpretation of the allocation. The same is true in Tennessee

6)  Iowa Republican Party Chairman Spiker was a part of the Paul campaign in Iowa and resigned his position upon taking up the post of party chair. While he has expressed his intent to side with whomever the Republican nominee will be, Spiker has not also directly signaled any neutrality in the race. The door is open for his support of Paul at a potential contested convention. While FHQ includes Spiker in Paul's delegate total, it is necessary to make note of the possible future subtraction of one delegate that would bring the Texas congressman's total to 26.

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¹ Romney picked up the support of one of the two now-unbound Jon Huntsman delegates from New Hampshire. The RNC has considered those delegates unbound.

² If Louisiana lost half of their delegation for a violation of the RNC delegate selection rules, that would reduce Louisiana's delegates to 23. That would, in turn, reduce the overall total number of delegates to 2263. A simple majority of 2263 is 1132 delegates. A hat tip to Sam G for bringing this back to my attention in the comments.

Recent Posts:
The Myth of Proportionality's Impact is Dead

2012 Republican Delegate Allocation: Louisiana

August Presidential Primary Resurrected in Kentucky Legislation

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The Myth of Proportionality's Impact is Dead

FHQ and John Sides put together a short op-ed piece for Bloomberg View over the last couple of weeks. The premise was pretty simple: Much is being made of the changes to the Republican delegate selection rules in 2012, but what impact are those changes truly having on the race? FHQ has argued since the summer of 2011 that the true measure of change would be felt through the more evenly dispersed calendar of primaries and caucuses and that the new proportionality requirement would have minimal effects on the accrual of delegates throughout that calendar.

To test this John and I took the 2008 delegate selection rules -- a mix of proportional, winner-take-all, and other hybrid rules in between -- from the states that have held primaries or caucuses thus far in 2012 and simulated a reallocation of the delegates under those rules.  The results were revealing in the face of so many complaints from within some Republican circles that the new proportionality requirement is drawing out the current nomination process (...with the implication that the protracted fight is not helpful to the Republican Party or its standard bearer in the fall). Through the same point in the process -- post-Illinois -- Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich and Ron Paul would all have lost delegates and Rick Santorum would have gained a handful. The net change to the current delegate margin between Romney and Santorum would  have been to have tightened it by 65 delegates. Instead of accelerating the process -- pushing Romney closer to the 1144 delegates necessary to clinch the nomination -- the 2008 delegate rules would actually have slowed things down (...while still providing Romney with a better than two to one delegate advantage over his nearest competitor).

--
From this came a rather strange series of critiques from Dana Houle (via Twitter). I'm not entirely sure what Mr. Houle was reading into or in our op-ed. But he did at one point seemingly attempt to make the piece about inserting the full 2008 Republican rules -- hyper-frontloaded calendar and all -- into the 2012 context as opposed to the intended isolation of the new proportionality requirement. [And FHQ has taken issue with Mr. Houle's interpretation of the Republican delegate selection rules in the past.] Again, FHQ has argued that the rules-based changes in how the process has progressed are almost solely due to the calendar.¹

But Mr. Houle stretched this out into a discussion of the impact the new proportionality requirement has had, contending that changes to delegate allocation rules begets changes to candidate strategy or campaign tactics. Has the proportionality requirement changed how candidates have amassed delegates in 2012? It has, but that impact is minimal; negligible even.² Has this had an impact on candidate strategy/campaign tactics? Perhaps, but FHQ would argue that the nature of that change, too, has been or would have been minimal as compared to a 2012 race under 2008 delegate selection rules.

Particularly interesting was Mr. Houle's contention that Ron Paul would have been "irrelevant" and that Rick Santorum and Newt Gingrich would have been apt to "blow off a state rather than try to get some delegates here and there". Let's examine this. I enjoy the criticism, and the chance to clarify the bottom line here is a good thing.

January
3
Iowa:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
Strategic change: none

10
New Hampshire:
2008: proportional primary
2012: proportional primary
Strategic change: none

21
South Carolina:
2008: winner-take-all primary statewide and by congressional district
2012: winner-take-all primary statewide and by congressional district
Strategic change: none

31
Florida:
2008: winner-take-all primary
2012: winner-take-all primary
Strategic change: none

February
4
Nevada:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: binding, proportional caucuses
Strategic change: Ah, well here's something. If Nevada had been non-binding in 2012 -- as the 2008 rules outlined -- perhaps the candidates would have "blown off" the Silver state and simply ceded it to Romney as was the case in 2008.³ It could also have been the case that "irrelevant" Ron Paul would have contested the caucuses in an effort to influence actual delegate selection process rather than focus on the non-binding straw poll as he has attempted in other similar 2012 contests. As for Gingrich and Santorum, maybe they skip ahead to Colorado or Minnesota, or maybe they treat Nevada as a non-binding caucus on par with those next contests and see no harm in the potential momentum a surprise win (or performing better than expected) would bring.

7
Colorado:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
Strategic change: The presidential nomination process is sequential, so changes at one point create changes at subsequent sequential events. FHQ will grant Mr. Houle that. But that was never anything that we were arguing. The likely strategic change would have been minimal. Do I know? ...for sure? No, but I invite comments on how things -- outcomes -- would have changed.

Minnesota:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
Strategic change: See Colorado

Missouri:
2008: winner-take-all primary
2012: non-binding primary/binding caucuses (in March)
Strategic change: This is a tough one. The process that produced the switch to a caucus system in Missouri was a chaotic one; rife with legislative division over what to do and a general misunderstanding of the primary system. One thing that drove the division was the threat of losing half of the delegation for holding a primary too early. That is a function of the calendar rule change (not the proportionality requirement) and was not what we were testing. We withheld Missouri from the reallocation simulation, or treated it as similarly unbound (as it was in 2012 -- unbound until the delegates are bound at the congressional district conventions and the state convention). But if we want to play of the game of Missouri holds a binding, winner-take-all primary on February 7, we can. Missouri would have lost half of the party's delegation -- cutting it to 26 total delegates -- and the winner-take-all allocation would have been under a similar level of threat of challenge (on par with Florida above). That would have added 26 delegates to Santorum's total. Would Santorum or even Gingrich have known that Missouri was going to be a good state for one or both of them beforehand? That is dubious. It would have been unclear ahead of time -- just as it was in reality in 2012 -- that was the case. One of the patterns that we have come to recognize as predictable -- evangelicals for Santorum -- had yet to emerge.

Now, I don't think that the Missouri GOP would have challenged the RNC rules and held a binding primary even in the absence of the proportionality requirement. However, if it had, that delegate boost would have helped Santorum push back on the chorus of "He won, but didn't win any delegates" charge that was lobbed at his campaign in the time after his February 7 sweep. And that may have put some additional pressure on Gingrich to drop out of the race.⁴ Whether that would have actually moved Gingrich, well...

11
Maine:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
Strategic change: There is an issue of timing with the Maine caucuses in 2008 compared to 2012. Four years ago Maine Republicans held their caucuses across one weekend, but in 2012 the bulk of the caucuses stretched across two weekends. Most of the attention paid to Maine in 2012 occurred in the time after the February 7 contests and that likely would not have changed under 2008 rules. Attention would not have increased nor would other strategy have changed much in regard to the non-binding caucuses in the Pine Tree state.

28
Arizona:
2008: winner-take-all primary
2012: winner-take-all primary
Strategic change: none

Michigan:
2008: winner-take-all by congressional district/proportional statewide primary
2012: winner-take-all primary statewide and by congressional district
Strategic change: This is another tricky one. The Michigan GOP apportioned 1 delegate per each district in 2008 and let the remainder be proportionally allocated at-large delegates (based on the statewide result). In 2012, however, the state party opted to apportion two delegates per congressional district with just two leftover delegates to be at-large. The bottom line is that candidates would have had opportunities to win delegates in each plan whether by congressional districts in the 2012 plan or by proportional allocation of bigger pool of at-large delegates in 2008. Given the that the difference is just one delegate in the true allocation (16-14 in favor of Romney) versus the simulated allocation of delegates under 2008 rules (15-15 tie), the change was small. Again, there were opportunities in both plans for the same candidates who did well in that contest in 2012. Very little would have changed, particularly with Michigan sharing the spotlight with Arizona.

March
3
Washington:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates) & winner-take-all by congressional district/proportional statewide primary
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
Strategic change: We could not simulate a primary that did not/does not exist in Washington in 2012. Since the Washington legislature eliminated it anyway, it would be impossible to include it in the simulation. The assumption, then, is that Washington would have held the same non-binding caucus under 2008 or 2012 rules and that there would have been no change in tactics as result.

6
Alaska:
2008: proportional caucuses
2012: proportional caucuses
Strategic change: none

Georgia:
2008: winner-take-all primary statewide and by congressional district
2012: proportional primary statewide, top two by congressional district (or winner-take-all if majority winner in district)
Strategic change: It would still have been a Gingrich state, but Romney and Santorum would have had opportunities in congressional districts. Would they have "blown off" Georgia to focus elsewhere? Maybe, but the Romney/Santorum's focus was mainly on Ohio anyway. Gingrich would have ended up with a greater number of delegates under the 2008 rules.

Idaho:
2008: proportional primary
2012: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional caucuses
Strategic change: There were larger delegate prizes on Super Tuesday that would have drawn the candidates away from Idaho regardless of the rules in a state that favored Mitt Romney anyway. Though it should be noted that Romney would have lost delegates in the Gem state under different rules due to the proportional primary in 2008. Ron Paul, perhaps, would not have gone to Idaho as it would not have been a caucus state under the 2008 rules.

Massachusetts:
2008: proportional primary
2012: proportional primary
Strategic change: None. The rules didn't change and neither did the fact that Romney was the former Bay state governor.

North Dakota:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
Strategic change: none

Ohio:
2008: winner-take-all primary statewide and by congressional district
2012: winner-take-all primary by congressional district with conditionally winner-take-all/proportional allocation (majority winner takes all at-large delegates)
Strategic change: There are two ways of thinking about a change in the rules in Ohio. First of all, if the 2008 rules had been in place, Santorum still would have had opportunities to win delegates in congressional districts. Second, that race was competitive enough that proportional or winner-take-all, it would have brought the candidates' attention. Romney would have come out of Ohio with many more delegates under the 2008 rules.

Oklahoma:
2008: winner-take-all primary statewide and by congressional district
2012: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional primary statewide, top two/three in congressional districts
Strategic change: Like Ohio above for Romney, Santorum would have been the beneficiary in the Sooner state. The two states largely offset each other.

Tennessee:
2008: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional primary statewide, top two or proportional in congressional districts
2012: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional primary statewide, top two or proportional in congressional districts
Strategic change: none

Vermont:
2008: winner-take-all primary
2012: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional primary, winner-take-all by congressional district
Strategic change: There were too many other large prizes on Super Tuesday for things to have changed much from the campaigns' perspectives in Vermont. Romney would have gained delegates under the 2008 rules.

Virginia:
2008: winner-take-all primary
2012: conditionally winner-take-all primary statewide and winner-take-all by congressional district
Strategic change: Very little would have changed in Virginia due to the ballot situation. Romney would have gained three delegates and the automatic delegates under the 2008 rules, but little else would have changed.

10
Guam
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)⁵
Strategic change: none

Kansas:
2008: winner-take-all caucuses statewide and by congressional district
2012: proportional caucuses statewide and winner-take-all by congressional district
Strategic change: Likely none. With Alabama and Mississippi on the horizon -- good states demographically by this point in the race for Santorum and/or Gingrich -- the focus was there already and would have been under the 2008 rules. Romney was also focused on those states. That would not have changed.

Northern Mariana Islands:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)⁵
Strategic change: none

Virgin Islands:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)⁵
Strategic change: none

Wyoming:
2008: non-binding county conventions
2012: non-binding county conventions
Strategic change: none

13
Alabama:
2008: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional primary statewide, conditionally winner-take-all/top two by congressional district
2012: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional primary statewide, conditionally winner-take-all/top two by congressional district
Strategic change: none

American Samoa:
2008: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)
2012: non-binding caucuses (unbound delegates)⁵
Strategic change: none

Hawaii:
2008: convention (unbound delegates)
2012: proportional caucuses
Strategic change: The big change here -- as was the case with Nevada above -- is that under the 2008 rules, the Hawaii delegates would have been unbound instead of proportionally allocated. That may have affected the (Paul, Romney and Santorum) campaigns' decisions to send one of their children each on a vacation/campaigning trip. But that's probably about it.

Mississippi:
2008: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional statewide and winner-take-all by congressional district
2012: proportional primary statewide and conditionally winner-take-all/top two or three by congressional district
Strategic change: With no change in Alabama rules-wise from 2008 to 2012, there may have been some shift in the focus to Mississippi under 2008 rules with the potential for a wider delegate margin from the state. Santorum would have gained from the switch to 2008 rules.

17
Missouri:
2008: winner-take-all primary
2012: non-binding primary/binding caucuses (in March)
Strategic change: See Missouri entry above. A non-binding caucus with no reporting of results is difficult to plan for. But if a winner-take-all primary had been scheduled for this date instead of a non-compliant February date, Missouri Republicans would have had a full apportionment of delegates. That would have changed the strategy around the contest, but the proportionality rule was not what led to switch to the caucuses.

18
Puerto Rico:
2008: conditionally winner-take-all/top two or three caucuses
2012: conditionally winner-take-all/proportional primary
Strategic change: The 2008 to 2012 change would have perhaps altered Santorum's decision to spend any time in Puerto Rico, but that depends upon whether you think the trip down there was vacation or not. The reality is that Romney won by enough to win all of the delegates under either delegate selection plan.

20
Illinois:
2008: loophole primary
2012: loophole primary
Strategic change: none

--
Would there have been strategic/tactical changes if the 2008 delegate allocation rules had been in place in 2012 instead of the current rules? Of course there would have been changes. Would those changes have affected where this race is now or the outcome of certain races? Probably not or at least I am hard pressed to think of a primary or caucus that would have changed or how the course of the race would have changed (...other than, say, at the margins). Over time, it may have caused the campaigns to shift more focus onto states that would have been favorable to one candidate or another, but that would have a canceling out effect. Santorum would have focused more on the South/prairie and won more delegates there while Romney would have focused minmal effort there and more in his areas of strength. The effect in the aggregate is very similar to the delegate situation the race is in at the moment.

What this exercise does shed even more light on is that the new proportionality requirement has had very little influence over the course of the 2012 Republican nomination race and minimal effects on the resultant strategy. The myth is dead. If the attempt is to pinpoint a rules change that is drawing the process out, then the finger should be pointed at the calendar rules changes (and state-level reactions to them) that produced the 2012 primary calendar.

FHQ gets the point Mr. Houle is trying to make. There are factors that cannot be accounted for in all of this. I won't argue that point because it is true. However, there is very little evidence that the presence/absence of the proportionality requirement would have fundamentally altered this race (or even altered it at the margins in ways that add up to even a small change in the course of the race). If anything, the delegate picture would look largely the same while the candidates would have potentially more greatly emphasize areas/regions/states of strength. And that would tend to reinforce the current (demographic to delegate) dynamics while ever so slightly closing the delegate gap.

[NOTE: FHQ will have more on this data throughout the weekend and into next week.]

--
¹ There are obviously much different dynamics (outside of the rules) in this race than in 2008 or any other cycle. That is the nature of the presidential nomination process. You never know what you're going to get. Others will point to the impact Super PAC spending has had on the 2012 race as well. Both have more of an impact on all of this than the proportionality requirement.

² Does the switch alter the delegate count? Yes. Does it change the state of the race as it is now? No, it doesn't. Romney would still have a healthy lead in the delegate count; just not quite as healthy.

³ Of course, Nevada shared the same date in 2008 as the South Carolina primary and that dynamic was what drove Romney's victory in the state. Had the Nevada caucuses been the only event on its caucus date in 2008 -- binding or not -- the candidates likely all would have been there.

⁴ And IF Missouri was binding and winner-take-all that may have caused the candidates to focus more of their efforts there instead of in either Minnesota or Colorado. But again, Missouri VERY likely would not have gone in that direction; opting instead to shift to a later caucus. The Missouri GOP was very wary of losing delegates and would have made the move regardless.

⁵ The island territories held conventions that both started and completed the delegate selection process. In each case, decisions were made to pledge/bind those delegates (in contrast with the other non-binding caucus states where the delegate allocation has yet to take place).


Recent Posts:
2012 Republican Delegate Allocation: Louisiana

August Presidential Primary Resurrected in Kentucky Legislation

Divining the Meaning of Illinois

Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.

2012 Republican Delegate Allocation: Louisiana

This is the twenty-sixth in a multipart series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation by state.¹ The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2012 -- especially relative to 2008 -- in order to gauge the impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. As FHQ has argued in the past, this has often been cast as a black and white change. That the RNC has winner-take-all rules and the Democrats have proportional rules. Beyond that, the changes have been wrongly interpreted in a great many cases as having made a 180º change from straight winner-take-all to straight proportional rules in all pre-April 1 primary and caucus states. That is not the case. 

The new requirement has been adopted in a number of different ways across the states. Some have moved to a conditional system where winner-take-all allocation is dependent upon one candidate receiving 50% or more of the vote and others have responded by making just the usually small sliver of a state's delegate apportionment from the national party -- at-large delegates -- proportional as mandated by the party. Those are just two examples. There are other variations in between that also allow state parties to comply with the rules. FHQ has long argued that the effect of this change would be to lengthen the process. However, the extent of the changes from four years ago is not as great as has been interpreted and points to the spacing of the 2012 primary calendar -- and how that interacts with the ongoing campaign -- being a much larger factor in the accumulation of delegates (Again, especially relative to the 2008 calendar).

For links to the other states' plans see the Republican Delegate Selection Plans by State section in the left sidebar under the calendar.


LOUISIANA

In Louisiana on Saturday we will finally have a state in the 2012 cycle that is allocating delegates based in part on a primary, but also in part on a caucus. We saw this in Texas on the Democratic side in 2008, but also in Washington and West Virginia four years ago on the Republican side. The two portions of the process operate independent of each other in terms of how the delegates are allocated. The pool of voters in the Saturday primary in Louisiana will not be the same group of congressional district caucusgoers (and state convention attendees) selecting the remaining delegates beginning in April (...but finalized in June at the state convention).

In any event the primary in Louisiana on Saturday kicks off the delegate selection process for Pelican state Republicans.

Louisiana delegate breakdown:

• 46 total delegates
• 25 at-large delegates
• 18 congressional district delegates
• 3 automatic delegates

At-large allocation: Right off the bat, the delegate selection process is a little quirky. At stake in the primary on Saturday are the at-large delegates. Well, a portion of the at-large delegates are a stake anyway. Of the 25 at-large delegates, five are already slated as uncommitted. All that Romney, Santorum, Gingrich and Paul are fighting over on Saturday, then, is 20 delegates. Those 20 delegates will be bound based on the vote in the primary. If one and only one candidate receives a greater than 25% share of the vote, then that candidate is entitled to his proportional share of those delegates while the rest remain uncommitted. If, however, no candidate is able to surpass the 25% threshold then all 20 delegates remain -- or become -- uncommitted.

Where the delegates allocation is likely to end up, though, is somewhere in between those two ends of the spectrum; with more than one candidate over the 25% threshold. If that is the case, then the candidates over the threshold will be allocated the delegates proportionally. But those candidates won't be allocated all 20 delegates between them. In some states we have witnessed rules that reallocate delegates that would have been bound to candidates under the threshold in a given state to the candidates who met or passed the barrier. For instance, Rick Santorum did not meet the 20% threshold statewide in Georgia to be eligible to receive any delegates. The delegates he would have been entitled to under strictly proportional rules were "reallocated" among Romney and Gingrich instead. Such as system is not obviously strictly proportional. [And mind you, this happens on the Democratic side as well.] This is in stark contrast to the proportional rules in Alaska where each candidate received a share of the delegates roughly proportional to his share of the presidential preference vote in the Alaska caucuses.

But Louisiana is different. Let's look at an example as a means of illustrating the point:

Assume Santorum receives 52% of the vote, Romney 26% and Gingrich and Paul split the remaining 22% evenly. That means that only Santorum and Romney are eligible for any of the 20 delegates at stake on Saturday. That would bind 10 delegates to Santorum and five delegates to Romney. Here is where the difference lies. Under a system like the one in Georgia described above, the other five (of 20) delegates would be allocated to Santorum and Romney; pushing Santorum to 13 delegates and Romney to 7. In an Alaska context, Gingrich and Paul would split those five delegates. However, in Louisiana, those five delegates go not to Romney and Santorum or Gingrich and Paul, but become uncommitted instead (see Rule 20.b of the Louisiana Republican Party Rules).² That would mean -- given the vote breakdown above -- that Santorum would claim 10 delegates, Romney 5 and the remaining five would be uncommitted. And remember, Louisiana has a total of 25 at-large delegates. Five started out uncommitted. 

Translation? If Romney and Santorum are the only candidates over 25%, they need to maximize their collective vote share to insure that the base 5 uncommitted delegates does not grow (by much). The higher their collective vote share, the lower the number of uncommitted at-large delegates.

Congressional district allocation: On April 28 will hold congressional district caucuses to begin the process of actually selecting the delegates who will be bound (or unbound) to candidates based on the primary vote. All delegates -- at-large and congressional district -- will be selected at the state convention in Shreveport on June 2, including the 18 congressional district delegates.

Automatic delegate allocation: The three Louisiana automatic delegates are unbound and free to endorse/pledge themselves to any candidate they prefer (at any time).

The only portion of the full 46 member delegation that will be bound to any candidate or candidates will be determined by the primary vote this weekend.

--
¹ FHQ would say 50 part, but that doesn't count the territories and Washington, DC.

² Louisiana Republican Party delegate selection rules:
LAGOP 2012 Caucus and Convention Rules

Recent Posts:
August Presidential Primary Resurrected in Kentucky Legislation

Divining the Meaning of Illinois

Santorum Has Rule #40 Problems, Too

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August Presidential Primary Resurrected in Kentucky Legislation

FHQ dealt with this in great detail last year when a bill to move the Kentucky presidential primary to August passed the Republican-controlled state Senate. The experience of having that legislation die in the Democratic-controlled House has not dissuaded Senate Republicans from pursuing the idea again though.  Senate President David Williams (R-16th) has introduced SB 7 -- legislation similar to the bill last year -- which would shift the Kentucky presidential primary (and those for state and local offices not elected in off-years) from the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May to the first Tuesday after the first Monday in August.

Section 8 of SB 7:

(1)       Subject to KRS 118.555, on the first Tuesday after the first[third] Monday in August[May], in each presidential election year, the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall conduct presidential preference primaries[primary elections] within each political party.

As FHQ said of the bill last year:

The stated intent of the bill is to free up the legislature to focus on their work -- at least the controversial work -- without fear of being challenged in a primary by an opponent who entered the race because of a vote on a contentious piece of legislation. The filing deadline is in January for the May primary and many Kentucky legislators apparently wait until after the filing deadline and know who, if anyone, they will be facing off against in May before addressing potentially divisive legislation. And with the legislative session ending in March, the overall efficiency of activity in the legislature can be negatively affected.

See "Kentucky Moving to August" for much more than you would otherwise want to know about the implications of such a move.

...and no, this bill is not any more likely to get through the Democratic-controlled House or be signed into law by the Democratic governor than its predecessor.


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Divining the Meaning of Illinois

Santorum Has Rule #40 Problems, Too

Race to 1144: Illinois Primary

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Divining the Meaning of Illinois

Meh.

Count FHQ among the chorus of voices out there that was not overly moved by Mitt Romney's victory in the Illinois primary Tuesday night. Was it a foregone conclusion? Not necessarily. Did Rick Santorum have a chance? Sure, I suppose so. But more importantly, was it a surprise? No. No, it was not.

And for a race that badly needs a surprise -- if you are one of the many out there hoping for a continually chaotic march to 1144 -- Illinois did not stray too terribly far from the demographic voting pattern that has emerged in this race. Santorum wins evangelical, rural and working class voters while Romney takes well-educated, upper income and moderate voters. Illinois was a Romney state in the same way that Louisiana is shaping up to be a Santorum state this coming weekend.

Yet, that has not prevented some from stating that Illinois feels like a turning point. From the psychological standpoint that may be true. Illinois was billed as another last best chance for Santorum to crack the hold Romney has had on the midwest/Rust Belt states to have held contests thus far. By that metric, Santorum failed once again. Is Illinois different than Michigan or Ohio? FHQ won't hazard a guess.

However, there is an easy way to test this "Illinois as turning point" theory. The problem is that we won't be able to use until May. I am in complete agreement with Ryan Lizza's take (linked above) that we can in a rudimentary way chart how well candidates will do in upcoming states.¹ By that measure, Romney is in for a good month in April. But will that performance be impacted by Illinois? Perhaps, but that impact will more than likely be very well masked by the demographics of those states carrying Romney to victory.² That is the reason that the Santorum campaign conference call earlier in the week was light on the details of an April strategy and comparatively heavy on the role May states play in the former Pennsylvania senator's efforts to keep Romney under 1144 during primary season.

If in May, then, we begin to notice Romney either winning or noticeably closing the gap on Santorum in projected Santorum states -- Arkansas, North Carolina, Kentucky and Texas -- then we may look back to Illinois as a turning point. But it could be that we look back to even earlier contests -- to Florida or South Carolina -- as those turning points as well. Any protracted delegate battle can traced back to opportunities rival (and underdog) campaigns squandered in their efforts to stunt the growth an emerging delegate margin for the frontrunner. Florida and South Carolina were those opportunities for Gingrich/Santorum. Gingrich did lead in the contest delegate count -- never mind those pesky automatic delegates -- between South Carolina and Florida.

...but that was for a mere ten days.

For Illinois, though, it was just another in a long line of opportunities missed for the not Romneys.

--
¹ And this may or may not help Mr. Lizza, but I have been working on the next step of his process -- the delegate count through that demographic -- myself. The problem is that allocating delegates in future states is a tricky, messy business that is made all the more problematic by redistricting. The data may be out there to construct Obama/McCain vote shares in new districts or to ascertain the correlation between that incomplete dataset and say the most recent PVI numbers from the Cook Political Report to potentially fill in the blanks. One could even use the 2008 Republican primary data as a means of mapping this onto the current race. The problem there of course is that one would have to reconstruct the data from the precinct level up to the new congressional districts. Those are hard enough options to come by, but finding numbers on evangelicals in the new districts is tougher still. Believe me, I'm trying.

² Yes this assumes that Romney does well. But recall that if Illinois is to tell us anything about the future contests it would have to tell us a Romney story (Romney won there.). Disruptions/surprises in the other direction are not a part of that calculus, but may (but likely won't) occur and throw this theory on its head.


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Santorum Has Rule #40 Problems, Too

Race to 1144: Illinois Primary

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Santorum Has Rule #40 Problems, Too

The folks at NBC News have dug down into the 2008 Rules of the Republican Party -- the rules governing the 2012 presidential nomination process -- and have found that Rule #40 may stand in the way of Newt Gingrich having his named placed into nomination at the convention in Tampa this summer.

Here's the pertinent text of Rule 40.b:

Each candidate for nomination for President of the United States and Vice President of the United States shall demonstrate the support of a plurality of the delegates from each of five (5) or more states, severally, prior to the presentation of the name of that candidate for nomination.

Read that closely. That isn't -- as the NBC piece emphasizes -- five wins. The rule states that a candidate is required to control pluralities of the delegates in at least five states. By that metric, as of now, Rick Santorum is not really out of the woods yet either. The former Pennsylvania senator has won nine contests -- ten if you count the non-binding Missouri primary -- but only half of those states have actually allocated delegates as of March 21, 2012. Further, Santorum only has clear delegate pluralities in three of those states: Alabama, Kansas and Tennessee. In Mississippi and Oklahoma, both Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich are within a couple of automatic delegate endorsements of controlling a plurality of the delegation.

Now, more than likely one of a couple of scenarios is likely to play out. Either:

1. Santorum ends up winning the plurality of delegates in Iowa, Colorado, Minnesota, Missouri and North Dakota, controls those delegations and has no problems being nominated -- if it comes to that.
2. The delegate math will have become so impossible and the pressure from within the party will have grown so high that Santorum will exit the race and delegates in those non-binding/unbound caucus states will end up supporting the inevitable nominee (Romney) anyway, seeing that there will not be a contested convention. 

Rules, rules, rules...


Recent Posts:
Race to 1144: Illinois Primary
Why Santorum's Delegate Math Isn't So Bad But the Explanation Is

On the Binding of Missouri Republican Delegates

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Race to 1144: Illinois Primary

Source:
Contest Delegates (via contest results and rules, and RNC, Georgia Secretary of State)
Automatic Delegates (Democratic Convention Watch)

Delegate breakdown (post-Illinois):


Changes since Puerto Rico (3/18/12):
Romney: +44 delegates (Illinois: +42, Puerto Rico: +1, Wyoming: +1)
Santorum: +12 delegates (Illinois: +12, Alaska: +1, Wyoming: -1)
Gingrich: -1 delegate (Alaska: -1)


Notes:
1) The allocation of the delegates in Georgia is based on the most recent vote returns published online by the office of the Georgia Secretary of State. The allocation here differs from the RNC allocation in Georgia. The above grants Gingrich two additional delegates (which have been taken from Romney's total).

2) The Alabama primary results by congressional district have not been released by the Alabama Republican Party. The allocation above is based on the RNC interpretation of the allocation. The same is true in Tennessee

3)  Iowa Republican Party Chairman Spiker was a part of the Paul campaign in Iowa and resigned his position upon taking up the post of party chair. While he has expressed his intent to side with whomever the Republican nominee will be, Spiker has not also directly signaled any neutrality in the race. The door is open for his support of Paul at a potential contested convention. While FHQ includes Spiker in Paul's delegate total, it is necessary to make note of the possible future subtraction of one delegate that would bring the Texas congressman's total to 26.

4) There are still three delegate races that have not been officially called in Illinois. Santorum leads for the final delegate in IL-18 and a split of the final two delegates in IL-16 between Romney and Santorum would result given returns available via AP as of 9:30am, Wednesday morning (3/21/12). Those delegates have been allocated above -- 42-12 for Romney -- but will be changed should the result reflect a different reality.


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Why Santorum's Delegate Math Isn't So Bad But the Explanation Is

The Santorum campaign held a twisting and turning conference call on the delegate math as the campaign sees it today. FHQ does not mean twisting and turning as in "twisting the math" so much as I mean seemingly making a rather easy argument more difficult than it needs to be. Here is the Santorum campaign delegate estimation:

Romney: 435
Santorum: 311
Gingrich: 158
Paul: 91

Forgive me Gingrich and Paul supporters, but FHQ will focus on how the Romney and Santorum numbers got to where they are in the Santorum estimation. Let's assume the baseline for the Romney number is his current allocation according to the FHQ (454 delegates¹). To get to 435, then, we would have to subtract the delegates that would be lost if Florida and Arizona were reallocated under proportional rules (-42 delegates -- -27 in Florida and -15 in Arizona) plus the Santorum campaign estimation of the how many delegates Romney has won in the congressional district conventions held thus far (+23 delegates, approximately) in non-binding/unbound caucus states.

The Santorum number is trickier and for similar reasons. We don't know the baseline number of delegates from which they are starting. FHQ has that number pegged at 172 (170 bound delegates plus 2 automatic delegates). That means that we have to find 139 additional delegates somewhere. 15 come from the reallocation of delegates from Florida and Arizona. That leaves us with a surplus of 124 delegates.

Now, the Santorum math is predicated on overperforming in the steps of the caucus/convention process beyond the precinct phase in the non-binding/unbound caucus states. In those states -- Iowa, Colorado, Minnesota, Maine, Washington and North Dakota -- there are 230 delegates at stake.² One way of thinking about this is that Santorum would need to receive about 54% of those delegates for 124.

That may not be that far-fetched. If we take the AP delegate projections in these states -- a projection that is proportionally based with the exception of Minnesota -- then Santorum is already starting out with 85 delegates in those states. That would mean that to get to that magic 124 number, Santorum would either have to win 39 of the 49 delegates in Missouri or scale down that Missouri number and add in numbers that overperform Santorum's showings in the various precinct caucus straw polls. Again, it isn't all that far-fetched.

Of course, none of this comes problem-free. And what I mean by that is that this is all based on the perspective of the Santorum campaign. If they are adding in delegates as they come in from congressional district caucuses, then the above analysis can be thrown out the window. Their count, in that instance, would be a count and not a projection (outside of the whole Florida/Arizona thing). That implies that they have some room to grow -- to gain on Romney. If, however, they are using a combination of projection and counting as they go along, then the Santorum campaign has a lot less wiggle room. They are in essence already accounting for the discrepancy in the various delegate projections and the RNC delegate count. And that was a discrepancy driven by how various outlets ar dealing with the unbound caucus state delegates.

FHQ has pushed those delegates to the side in our models for the most part. Our estimates of future delegate allocation based on our 50% model get Romney over 1144 without those delegates.

...but with very few delegates to spare.

Basically, all of this delegate talk from the Santorum campaign amounts to nothing. Their plan may help them to gain a little on Romney, but doesn't really affect the bottom line that Romney is likely to get to 1144. Certainly, if Romney does not get to that majority threshold, then if things go according to the Santorum plan, the former Pennsylvania senator heads into a contested convention with a very slightly larger delegation (but one that would still need assistance from either or both of the Gingrich and Paul campaigns).

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¹ That is 423 bound delegates and 31 pledged delegates. The alternative is to take the curious RNC view that the 12 automatic delegates from the territories (not counting Puerto Rico) are bound, which would in the Santorum calculation move the Romney number to 435, thus making the remaining 19 automatic delegates free agents that the Santorum campaign can attempt to woo. I think I just convinced myself that the latter is the Santorum view.

² That total does not include the three automatic delegates from each state.


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On the Binding of Missouri Republican Delegates

Over the weekend, FHQ had a few thoughts on the apparent binding of county-level delegates to the Republican congressional district and state conventions in Missouri. But that elicited one very interesting question from an anonymous reader/commenter:

"Does the RNC rule [15.b.1] prevent the State Convention to bind National Convention delegates to the results of the February primary?"

FHQ will put on its RNC thinking cap for this one. The easy answer is, well yeah, any attempt by Missouri Republicans to bind delegates to the national convention based on the results of the non-binding February 7 primary would open the Show Me state delegation to penalties from the RNC. But the key to this is that there is a discrepancy between that answer -- a rules-based answer -- and the question above.

The RNC rule only refers to the binding of national convention delegates; not state (or congressional district) delegates. There is nothing in the rules -- whether RNC rules or Missouri Republican Party rules -- about the binding of state or congressional district delegates based on the results of the February primary.  Now, of course, this would mean -- if every delegate to the state or congressional district convention was bound according to the results of the primary -- that the Missouri delegates to the national convention would be bound based on what would be a non-compliant contest.

...but only indirectly.

The entire Missouri delegation to the national convention in Tampa -- all 52 delegates -- is bound, but bound based on the decisions made at the state convention or the congressional district conventions; not the February primary. Now sure, logically, if the state and/or congressional district delegates are bound at the county-level caucuses based on the results of the primary, then any decision those bound delegates make during subsequent steps of the caucus/convention process is also bound based on the results of a non-compliant (too early) primary.

...but, again, only indirectly.

FHQ gets it. That is a bit of a cop out. But honestly, I think that is how this particular situation would be interpreted by the RNC. The catch here is that it isn't likely to be all that problematic anyway. Notice that I added that italicized "every" to the sentence about bound state/congressional district Missouri delegates above. From the look of it, the Santorum folks telegraphed their binding strategy during the Thursday night caucus in Brunswick County. Campaigns', and more importantly campaigns' strategic, decisions are not made in a vacuum. And that fact appears to have been highlighted by the reality that during the Saturday round of caucuses across Missouri (the day with the largest number of county-level meetings), Romney and Paul supporters prevented or attempted to prevent the passage of similar binding rules that would benefit the Santorum campaign.

What we are left with, then, is the potential for some delegates from the Missouri delegation to be indirectly bound according to the results of the non-binding -- and what would be a non-compliant -- primary. The RNC rules don't really address that, and unless a challenge to a handful of delegates is all that consequential within the context of this race, it probably isn't going to matter all that much.

But as always, there is a chance. It isn't impossible; just very, very improbable.


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