What's the Baseline for 2024 Republican Rules Changes at the State Level?

The Washington Post reported last week that the Trump campaign has been doing its due diligence of late, attempting to get a jump start on an often hidden aspect of the invisible primary: the battle over delegates. Or in this case, the battle over the state-level rules that will define the ways in which candidates will receive delegates based on primary and caucus results across the country in 2024. 

While Trump running for a second term after losing a previous bid is unusual in the post-reform era, it is not out of the ordinary for a candidate and his or her campaign to flex its muscle early like this. After all, this is a candidate and a campaign that have done this before. And this is a campaign that may not be as dominant as it was four years ago, but is leaps and bounds ahead of where it was eight years ago. And tending the garden on the state level in an attempt to reap a harvest of delegates down the road is clear evidence of that. 

Moreover, that touches on a theme Jeff Greenfield highlighted late last year in a piece at Politico:

But if you really want to know whether Donald Trump is ascendant or in free fall, you might do better to focus on what might seem like a recipe for narcolepsy: the Republican Party’s delegate-selection process across the 50-plus states, territories and commonwealths. Over the next year and a half, there will be no better clue to the strength and weaknesses of Trump and his competitors. Why? Well, for one thing, the way that delegates are chosen by state primaries, conventions and caucuses are far more important than a dozen debates and tens of millions of campaign dollars. And how the GOP state parties decide how their convention delegates are selected may also tell you whether these state parties are out to hobble the former president — or put him on a glide path to another nomination.

Look, as a rules person, the expectation is that FHQ is going to agree with that assessment. I do. ...in part. The rules are important, but they are just a piece of a larger matrix of variables -- polls, endorsements, fundraising, etc. -- that provide observers with a sense of the former president's strength during the 2024 invisible primary. And again, the early signs are that Trump is behind where he was in 2019 but ahead across the board on each of the above metrics compared to where he was in 2015. The Party Decides showed that endorsements matter. They demonstrate a measure of institutional support for a candidate. But if the bulk of elected officials and other elites within the Republican Party network waver in making 2024 endorsements of any candidate as they did during the 2016 cycle, then this rules tinkering in 2023 may serve as a proxy of that institutional support. 

But the thing about both the Washington Post article and Greenfield's opinion piece is that they lack context. The Post reports that the Trump campaign is attempting to make inroads and Greenfield speculates that Trump-aligned and Trump-opposed forces may make rules changes to aid their specific candidate or candidates. But from where are the states starting? What moves might they make? How common -- or uncommon -- is such tinkering on the state level in the first place? 

In other words, what is the baseline? 

The story of where states begin 2024 starts in 2019

To the extent there was any discussion in 2019 about efforts on the Republican side to craft rules for Trump's reelection, it mostly revolved around the canceling of a handful of primaries and caucuses. But that belies the bulk of what went on behind the scenes in the 2020 Republican invisible primary. Yes, the cancelations got spun as efforts to protect Trump against a challenge. However, Trump got from Bill Weld and Joe Walsh and March Sanford the sort of challenge that President Biden will get from Marianne Williamson in 2024: a token challenge. Trump's grip on the 2020 Republican nomination was never threatened, so the cancelations were less about protecting the nomination and more about protecting his dominance in winning the nomination. 

But the state-level contest cancelations were just the tip of the iceberg and that has implications for 2024.

The Trump team was unusually active in nudging state parties toward changes for 2020 that 1) made it easier for Trump to gobble up delegates as the nomination process moved through the calendar of contests and 2) made it much more difficult for multiple candidates to win delegates. Bear in mind that there were minimal changes to the 2020 rules at the national level and that trend has largely held as 2020 transitions into 2024. There have been national rules changes, but they were aimed at cleaning up small problems from the past or to accommodate a July convention. Or to add a debates committee back into the rules. 

However, in 2019, there were changes made in 30 states and territories (out of 56 total). And it was not just the cancelations of a primary in South Carolina or of a preference vote at caucuses in Alaska. Take the Massachusetts example WaPo provided:

For his 2020 reelection campaign, Trump advisers Justin Clark and Bill Stepien worked for more than a year to change party rules to ensure he would not face a challenger at the nominating convention. In Massachusetts, for example, the Trump campaign changed the delegate selection plan to winner-take-all based on the primary result to prevent moderate Gov. Bill Weld (R) from being able to seat potential allies at the convention.

Now, Michael Scherer, Josh Dawsey and Maeve Reston mischaracterized the nature of the change, but it is indicative of the moves made by Trump's reelection effort. Massachusetts Republicans retained their previous proportional manner of allocating delegates based on the results of the presidential primary in the Bay state, but upped the qualifying threshold from 5 percent in 2016 to 20 percent in 2020. That meant that for a candidate to have received any delegates, he or she would have needed to clear 20 percent of the vote statewide, the maximum qualifying threshold allowed under Republican National Committee (RNC) rules. 

Furthermore, the state Republican Party in Massachusetts added a winner-take-all threshold in 2020. If a candidate cleared 50 percent of the vote statewide -- a level that a largely unopposed incumbent president should easily clear under most circumstances -- then that candidate would win all of the delegates from Massachusetts. That is not winner-take-all. Functionally, it is in a cycle with a popular incumbent. But in reality, it is the same proportional plan Massachusetts Republicans have used for years with the knobs turned toward "protect the incumbent's dominance." And those two thresholds are the keys. The qualifying threshold was set to its maximum and the winner-take-all threshold was set to its minimum (50 percent under RNC rules). 

And the moves in Massachusetts were indicative of the changes other state Republican parties made for 2020. Of the 26 states in 2020 that could have a qualifying threshold -- those with some form of proportional rules -- 18 of them set it to the maximum 20 percent. Just ten states of the 31 that could have a qualifying threshold had the maximum in 2016. The 20 percent maximum was by far the modal qualifying threshold for states in the 2020 cycle. 

Of course, that was just one type of tinkering that took place. Among his speculative allocation changes for 2024, Greenfield describes another:

By contrast, suppose New York Republicans are firmly in Trump’s corner. Trump might be confident he can win a significant portion of voters — but not a majority. So in a state like New York, his campaign might press to drop the 50 percent threshold and fight for a winner-take-all by plurality standard.

Well, New York Republicans already did that. The legislation that the New York State Assembly passed in 2019, codifying the delegate selection process for both state parties for 2020, shifted the Republican delegate allocation method back to winner-take-all in the Empire state for the first time since 2008. New York was not alone in adopting truly winner-take-all rules -- rules where a plurality winner statewide wins all of the delegates at stake -- for the 2020 cycle. There is a prohibition on truly winner-take-all allocation in the Republican process for states with contests before March 15, but of those states with contests after that point in 2016, just nine were truly winner-take-all. Collectively, those nine states accounted for 391 total delegates (or nearly 16 percent of the total number of delegates at stake in the process). 

The number of truly winner-take-all contests in 2020 ballooned to 19 states, more than double the number of that type of contests from four years prior. And those states represented 764 delegates, almost 30 percent of the total 2550 delegates at stake in 2020.

Finally, there were other moves that were also beneficial to an incumbent president seeking to portray a certain dominance in the nomination process. The number of states that pooled their delegates, combining the separate pools of at-large and congressional district delegates, increased from 25 in 2016 to 37 in 2020. The above shift toward truly winner-take-all methods explains a lot but not all of that. The subset of states that pooled their delegates and had a winner-take-all trigger -- as was the case in the Massachusetts example above -- doubled from six in 2016 to 12 in 2020. Those contests became functionally winner-take-all no matter where they were on the calendar, whether in the winner-take-all window or before it in the prohibited zone. That is a subtle change, but a meaningful one. 

And in total, all of that can be neatly filed into one category: incumbent defense, or this case, incumbent domination. Trump got that, and in the process, set the baseline from which any changes will be made for 2024. 

How common is rules tinkering on the state level in the Republican process anyway?

That depends.

Rarely does a cycle go by where some state party does not make some change, however small, to its delegate selection and allocation process. Although, often it is less about delegate allocation and more about positioning contests on the primary calendar. And that is a change that is initiated not by the state party but in the state government, the state legislature to be more precise. That entails quite a bit more wrangling on a playing field that potentially involves partisan division if not partisan roadblocks.

And some of those same obstacles seep into the delegate allocation process as well. At least that is the case in states where state law defines delegate allocation stemming from a state-run presidential primary. The 10 percent qualifying threshold New Hampshire Republicans use, for example, is one defined in state law. 

But on the whole, most of that is set by state parties. And more often than not, state parties are loath to change delegate allocation rules. They are averse to straying from traditional methods because it is difficult to game out the impact those possible changes will have a year or so into the future when conditions may be completely different. It is one thing to project what a shift toward winner-take-most or winner-take-all rules will have in a cycle when an incumbent president is running for renomination as Trump was in 2020. Those rules are intended to and often do help incumbents. But in a competitive cycle with some measure of uncertainty, that is a more difficult call. 

As Greenfield noted, Ohio Republicans shifted toward a truly winner-take-all plan in 2016 with Governor John Kasich (R) in mind. And Kasich did win the primary in the Buckeye state six months later. The change panned out. But with a favorite son involved, there was perhaps a bit more certainty among state party decision makers in how the move would play out once primary season went live. The less a sure thing it is, the more likely it will be that the status quo delegate allocation method will persist into the next cycle. 

That is an important point. If decision makers in state parties across the country cannot see a clear advantage to an allocation change one way or the other, then it is more likely that the 2020 baseline method survives into 2024. That theoretically helps Trump. ...if he is the frontrunner. But if Trump is not the frontrunner once primary season kicks off, then any shift away from the 2020 baseline -- a baseline with the knobs turned toward incumbent defense (or frontrunner defense) -- may end up helping a candidate other than the one intended. 

Another factor adding to this uncertainty is how decision makers view a change playing with rank and file members of the party. If elected officials or other elites in the party are wary of endorsing one Republican candidate or another, then they may also be less willing to make an allocation change for fear that it would be viewed as helping or hurting Trump. In other words, it looks like they are putting their thumb on the scale one way or the other. That is the sort of view that augurs against change. And again, the status quo likely helps Trump (if current conditions persist). 

Basically, the bottom line is this. Allocation changes are tough. They are tough to make because there is uncertainty in the impact those changes will have. It is much easier to see the potential impact of moving a primary to an early date for example. It could help a favorite son or daughter candidate. But an earlier primary or caucus definitely better insures that the state influences the course of the nomination race. If a contest falls too late -- after a presumptive nominee has emerged and clinched the nomination -- then that contest has literally no impact. Some impact, no matter how small, is better than literally zero impact. The same is true with respect to the decision to conduct a primary election or caucuses. There are definite turnout effects that come with holding a primary rather than caucuses. And greater participation in primaries typically means a more diverse -- less ideologically homogenous or extreme -- electorate.

Things are less clear with allocation rules changes. 

Look at the last four cycles -- 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020. In particular, take note of the doughnut graphic in the corner of each map charting the distribution of delegates by allocation type. Those are four different cycles run under different conditions and with different rules. But look at the combined share of the distribution that the hybrid and proportional with winner-take-all trigger states comprise.¹ Despite the differing conditions and despite the differing rules, somewhere between 51-53 percent of the total number of delegates were allocated in one of those two hybrid fashions. The states changed some at the margins, but the percentage of delegates allocated in that manner remained virtually unchanged. 

And the only reason for the spike in proportional states in 2012 was the RNC's institution of the (truly) winner-take-all ban for the first time that cycle. States overreacted in response and were more proportional than necessary under the 2012 rules. But states parties adapted over time, learning the nuances of the winner-take-all ban and moving over the 2016 and 2020 cycles toward methods that conditionally triggered a winner-take-all allocation.

What changes might state parties make for 2024?

The above exploration of the minefield that state party decision makers wade into when considering allocation rules changes is a cautionary tale. It suggests that, while there may be some changes, there are reasons to think that they will be minimal. And the Washington Post story buttresses that view. If Team Trump is having powwows with state party officials and sending envoys out to them, then that is most likely to preserve what they have in place. As of right now, the 2020 baseline rules help Trump. That could change but such a shift may not occur until after a decision on the rules has already been made (before October 1). 

But just as in the legislative process, uncertainty breeds conflict. Conflict leads to indecisiveness. And indecisiveness yields to the status quo. The same is true in rules changes. Actors, therefore, are going to be more inclined to move toward certainty; changes that yield more certain impacts. Trump opponents are reportedly playing catch up on these matters and may not hit the ground running either effectively and/or quickly enough to make a dent in allocation rules changes. 

But if Trump and Trump allies are looking to shore up their defenses, it may not be in the realm of delegate allocation rules. Instead, they may train their sights on the primary versus caucus decision. And there are some unique opportunities on that front. For the most part, state parties may balk at transitioning out of a state-run primary for a party-run contest of some type. The latter is funded out of state party coffers and that money may be better spent elsewhere. 

Still, some states may be conflicted. Take Michigan. The WaPo story notes how the Michigan Republican Party is stuck between a rock and a hard place. And they really are. Democrats in control of state government moved the primary to a spot on the primary calendar that is sanctioned under new DNC rules but is noncompliant under RNC rules. One logical alternative is for Michigan Republicans to schedule caucuses at a compliant point on the calendar. That is a potentially messy route. But it could be done. And that smaller, more extreme electorate is likely to tip more toward Trump than to his opponents. 

Likewise, there is no indication that any of the states at the end of the calendar are making any moves, not even the Republican-controlled states. And all of those June contests are noncompliant under RNC rules on timing. One alternative may be for the state parties to opt out of the late and noncompliant primaries in those states and conduct earlier caucuses. Similarly, the Trump campaign is reportedly not enamored with the possible shift to a later primary in Idaho. Seeing a pattern here? Shift to an earlier caucus. And Maryland is likely to change the date of its primary because it conflicts with Passover in 2024. If Democrats in control of state government move the contest too early (before March 15), then Old Line state Republicans would be unable to keep the winner-take-all allocation method the party adopted for 2020. And if winner-take-all allocation is that important to the party, then they, too, could opt to hold caucuses in a spot on the calendar that preserves it. 

And that offers a kind of double whammy. A switch to a caucus and a preservation of (or move to) winner-take-all rules in those states. Admittedly, those are paths with a lots of twists and turns. But they are all examples of states that because of one conflict or another may be forced into those decisions. There is still some path dependency there, but the likely impacts are more certain for decision makers. 

But to be able to look ahead, one needs a baseline. And as the 2024 invisible primary kicks into high gear and changes are considered in the coming months, this baseline is going to be important. 

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¹ In the 2008 and 2012 graphics, the hybrid and proportional with winner-take-all trigger states are rolled into one big category of states that were not truly winner-take-all nor truly proportional. 

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Rogue States Will Be the Norm as Long as the Parties Diverge on the Calendar

2024 is going to be different.

A look back to 2008

For the first time since the 2008 cycle, there will be a shake up to the beginning of the presidential primary calendar in 2024. And just as was the case fifteen years ago, it was the Democratic Party that instituted the changes. 

Then as now, the DNC sought to diversify the pre-window period on its calendar, augmenting the traditional Iowa/New Hampshire start with the addition of contests in two more states. Just as was the case during 2022, the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) invited state parties to pitch the panel in 2006 on why their state contest should be added to the early calendar in the upcoming primary season. Much of the focus centered on adding smaller states but also providing some balance in terms of region and demographics. And finally, part of the calculus also honed in on the idea of adding another caucus state in between Iowa and New Hampshire and another primary thereafter but before Super Tuesday. 

There are more than a few parallels between those criteria and the set used in 2022 by the current-day DNCRBC. But there are some differences as well. Democrats were the out-party in 2006, and parties in the White House tend to do less tinkering. Also, Democrats may have been a bit shrewder in their choices of additions for 2008. South Carolina was already a state that had carved out a spot in the early Republican calendar over the preceding quarter of a century. And Nevada was a caucus state at the time. Both featured state parties that made the primary/caucus scheduling decisions rather than state governments. Unlike in a situation where the state government sets a primary date, a move by national Democrats to add South Carolina and/or Nevada to their early calendar for 2008 did not necessarily drag Republicans in those states into the mix. 

Of course, Palmetto state Republicans already had a presidential primary that was an established part of the early Republican calendar. And Nevada Republicans joined the fun with January 2008 caucuses that skirted Republican National Committee (RNC) penalties. There was no RNC rule that required states in 2008 to bind national convention delegates based on a statewide presidential preference vote. Silver state Republicans and those in Iowa, for that matter, conducted a preference vote during precinct caucuses, but that had no direct bearing on the delegates chosen to attend the next stages of the caucus/convention process, nor ultimately those delegates who represented either state at the national convention. 

But it worked. Perhaps it was dumb luck, but it worked. Nevada and South Carolina, with minimal (although not nonexistent) implementation headaches, became not just established but institutionalized parts of the early calendar in both parties' processes. And that was despite the fact that both were flip-flopped in the other party's order; South Carolina third and Nevada fourth in the Republican process and the inverse on the Democratic side.

How 2024 is different and how that increases the odds of rogue states

That is a different story than the one that has played out in the lead up to when the latest primary calendar decisions were made in 2022-23. And it is different for a number of reasons. 

First, Democrats entered the review process for the 2024 rules and the primary calendar saying that no early calendar slots were guaranteed. All four (or five) were up for grabs. That meant that Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina had to make their cases before the DNCRBC just like every other interested state party. And for the first time since specific carve outs were added to the DNC rules for Iowa and New Hampshire for the 1984 cycle, Iowa, and likely New Hampshire, will have no waiver from the national party to be a part of the pre-window lineup. That necessarily creates two potential rogues states in one fell swoop.

Second, recall the background on the selection of South Carolina and Nevada in 2008. In both situations, it was state parties making the decisions on where primaries or caucuses in the Palmetto and Silver states ended up on the calendar. South Carolina obviously remains the same as it was in 2008 (with respect to the decision makers). That is part of the reason South Carolina Democrats got the nod to go first for 2024 in the Democratic process. Meanwhile, Nevada, under Democratic control in 2021, shifted from party-run caucuses to a state-run presidential primary. That move mirrors a push by the national party away from caucuses and toward state-run primaries. 

But while the national party has advocated for more state-run processes in order to maximize participation, that has limited the DNC's options in terms changing its calendar without potentially creating problems for Republicans in their process. Those problems are best highlighted by the Democrats' insertion of Michigan into the pre-window, an act that puts Michigan Republicans in the crosshairs of the RNC rules. Granted, this is a two-way street. The RNC decision to stick with the traditional Iowa-New Hampshire-South Carolina-Nevada lead off has impacted Democrats. It has created potential problems in Iowa and New Hampshire with both state parties, leaning on existing state, signaling they are likely to go rogue and hold contests concurrent with the Republican in their respective states. And unless the DNC tweaks its approach to Georgia, the Peach state primary will not be a part of the pre-window at all. Georgia definitely will not go on February 13 as planned.  

Another part of the 2024 picture that differs from 2008 comes from who is doing the rules tinkering. It is unusual for an in-party to so fundamentally reshape a seemingly ingrained part of the process. But what that points to is how much sway the incumbent president tends to hold over the system that will renominate him or her. Typically an incumbent is content to move forward with a nomination system that largely mimics the one that got him or her to the White House in the first place. That may produce changes from a nomination cycle to the renomination cycle, but they usually are not big changes. 

But what if they were? The 2024 cycle is testing that. It is the incumbent president who is testing that. Indeed, without the input of the president on the 2024 primary calendar, the DNCRBC seemed to be heading in the direction of something that would have knocked Iowa out altogether, bumped the other three early states up a notch (maybe with some additional shuffling) and added Michigan to the end of the pre-window as a midwestern replacement for the caucuses in the Hawkeye state. President Biden had something else in mind and the DNCRCB and ultimately the full DNC fell in line. 

And that has implications for both parties' calendars. More importantly, that has implications for how orderly those calendars are in coming together. Questions remain on both sides. 

Finally, while all of the above seemingly points the finger squarely at the Democrats as instigators in all of this, Republicans have played a role as well. Necessity is the mother of invention and, in fact, brought the national parties together in the time after the chaos of the 2008 calendar. Both saw value in not starting the process in January (or for not allowing states other than the first four to conduct contests in February). And they informally brokered a deal. FHQ often cites that and uses the "informally brokered" language, but here is what that meant in the rules. 

In the amended rules for the 2012 cycle, the RNC added language that created a specific carve out in Rule 15(b)(1) for Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina. In the previous cycle (2008), only New Hampshire and South Carolina had those exemptions. [Iowa and Nevada did not need them. Neither allocated any national convention delegates to the national convention in their precinct caucuses.] That aligned the Republicans with the Democratic pre-window calendar for the most part. Again, recall the South Carolina/Nevada flip-flop between the parties.

Moreover, the RNC added one other rule, Rule 15(b)(3):

If the Democratic National Committee fails to adhere to a presidential primary schedule with the dates set forth in Rule 15(b)(1) of these Rules (February 1 and first Tuesday in March), then Rule 15(b) shall revert to the Rules as adopted by the 2008 Republican National Convention.

It is not common for one party's nomination rules to cite the other party. But for 2012, the basic outline of the Republican calendar hinged on what national Democrats did. Basically, if the DNC did not adopt rules that called for a February 1 start to the calendar for the early states and a first Tuesday in March start for every other state, then the RNC would revert to the rules it used in 2008. That would have snapped back to the RNC using a calendar that allowed all but the exempt states to start in February pushing Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada into January. Yes, that happened anyway because Florida broke the rules again in 2012. But that was not a function of this brokered deal between the parties. It was because the RNC penalties were not severe enough.

However, once the RNC got their penalties right in 2016 with the addition of the super penalty, that was it. That was the high-water mark for cooperation between the parties. And the agreement held through the 2020 cycle or until the Democrats walked away for 2024. 

The break was about more than just the Democrats going their own way with a fundamentally different early calendar lineup for 2024. The truth is there was not much for them to walk away from. The dialog that had developed out of that deal brokered fifteen years ago gradually declined over time. It happens. And it happened because the players involved changed. Leadership on the RNC Rules Committee changed again in 2017 and interest on the Republican side mostly died with it. There was still Republican interest in the dialog but it was no longer coming from players who were directly involved on the RNC Rules Committee. 

And that lack of communication was something DNCRBC co-Chair Jim Roosevelt noted in the December meeting when the 2024 calendar plan was initially adopted by the panel. In responding to concerns from Scott Brennan, Iowa DNC and DNCRBC member, about the potential for a split between the two national parties on Iowa's calendar position leading to chaos, Roosevelt said that the Republicans were not open to coordinating this time. And that has been true for the last two cycles.

That matters. It is a part of the fuller picture. And as long as there is no (even informal) coordination on the matter between the two national parties, the more there are going to be rogue state situations like the ones that are likely to mark the 2024 cycle in Iowa, Michigan and New Hampshire (if not Georgia).

But what even is a rogue state?

If Iowa or Michigan or New Hampshire are rogue in 2024 in one party's process or another, then that is different from the calendar rogues of the recent past. Those three states are unlike Florida and Michigan in 2008 and unlike Arizona, Florida and Michigan in 2012. State actors in Arizona, Florida and Michigan made decisions to break the rules. State laws were changed ahead of 2008 to push Florida and Michigan into noncompliance, and they were not changed before 2012 to comply with the new (and later) calendar start codified in both parties' rules for that cycle. 

Contrast that with the situations in Iowa, Michigan and New Hampshire for 2024. Republicans in Iowa and New Hampshire and Democrats in Michigan all have the blessings of their national parties to conduct early contests next year. Their counterparts across the aisle do not. And in the case of Michigan Republicans and New Hampshire Democrats, they have no real recourse if they want to use the state-run primary. If partisans on the other side move or keep the primaries where they are under state law, they are stuck to a large degree. 

That is a different kind of rogue. That is a rogue that is created by the discrepancy between the two national parties' presidential primary calendars. It forces the state parties in that situation to either take the penalties or to pay for their own party-run process (which is a penalty in its own right). But as long as the calendar divide exists -- and especially if Democrats continue to reexamine and reshuffle their early calendar lineup -- then this type of rogue state is likely to continue to cause problems on one side or the other. And that says nothing of the possibility of Republicans following suit and shuffling their early calendar in cycles to come. 

As of now, there is little evidence that there is any movement from other states to go rogue in the old fashion. In West Virginia, there are bills to create a separate presidential primary and schedule it for February, out of compliance with both parties' rules. But that is it. There is no concerted effort to rush the gates and go early against the rules. However, just because there is no conventional rogue activity now, or even in this cycle, it does not mean that states will not try to exploit the calendar differences between the two national parties in the futures should they persist. 

It is that sort of unraveling of the steady state informally coordinated between the national parties a decade and a half ago that should trouble decision makers on the national level.

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Michigan Republicans and 2024. It was a mess before the chair vote.

Michigan Republicans have elected a new chairperson to lead the state party.

Add another variable to caldron already frothing at the brim on a low boil in one of 2024's biggest battlegrounds. Great Lakes state Republicans have answered the question of who will lead them into the next election cycle -- Kristina Karamo -- but that does little to answer a number of other questions that hover over the party with respect to Michigan's place in the 2024 Republican presidential nomination process.

What do Michigan Republicans do? How does the party approach 2024?

The presidential primary route

National Democrats, of course, recently elevated Michigan into the pre-window period on the 2024 primary calendar for a nomination process that will likely see an incumbent president run with only nominal competition. And Michigan Democrats, in unified control of state government after the 2022 elections, complied with the national party's proposed exemption for an early presidential primary, moving the primary with Republicans in the state legislature unified in opposition. 

And it is not that Republicans in the Michigan legislature (or outside of it) necessarily oppose an earlier presidential primary. It was a Republican, after all, who introduced legislation in late 2022 to move the Michigan presidential primary into February, and in passing it through the Republican-controlled state Senate, all but one member of the caucus backed the change. That bill failed, a casualty of the end of the legislative session. But the Republican support for it then, and subsequent flip to opposition in 2023 when Democrats controlled the state government, highlight both a Republican desire to hold an earlier presidential primary and a fear of having the Republican National Committee (RNC) levy the super penalty against state Republicans in 2024n as a consequence of going too early.

However, that does not mean that the door is closed on a Republican presidential primary in February. First, the presidential primary date change may not even take effect in time for the 2024 cycle. Without Republican support for the legislation that shifted the primary into February, the bill was denied the supermajority it needed to take immediate effect. Unless Democrats wrap up their legislative business for the year and adjourn the 2023 session before December, then the change would not take place until after the proposed February 27 primary date. The primary would take place on March 12 -- the second Tuesday in March -- and Republicans in the state could have a compliant presidential primary.

Second, even if Democrats in the legislature complete the session 90 days before the proposed February primary in order for the new act to take effect in 2024, it is not clear that Republicans could not have a penalty-free primary at that time. If that is what Great Lakes state Republicans want. Granted, that decision does not come down to simply what Michigan Republicans want.  

Here is how that would work. 

Unless, in the unlikely event that, Michigan Democrats in the legislature work with Republicans to create a second and compliant Republican presidential primary, then there will be just one presidential primary in Michigan in 2024. Assuming the primary date change does take place for 2024, then the election would fall on February 27. That is before March 1 and would, thus, conflict with RNC rules on the timing of delegate selection events. In turn, that would seemingly trigger the super penalty and cost Michigan Republicans more than three-quarters of their national convention delegates, a fact Republican legislators have offered as justification for their opposition to the date change.  

Michigan Republicans begin to resemble New Hampshire Democrats in that scenario: a party stuck between a primary scheduled by the opposing party and national party rules that would penalize them for utilizing the only option available to it. But those same RNC rules that would penalize a party for using a rogue primary also provide state parties conflicted in such ways with an out. 

Under RNC Rule 16(a)(1), "[a]ny statewide presidential preference vote that permits a choice among candidates for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in a primary, caucuses, or a state convention must be used to allocate and bind the state’s delegation to the national convention..."

This was the provision added to the RNC rules ahead of the 2016 cycle to tamp down on the number of states that in 2012 had either non-binding caucuses or beauty contest primaries that preceded caucuses that were then used to allocate national convention delegates in the presidential nomination race. All states and territories have complied with that rule since it was added. This Michigan situation would be the first to test it if the state party was forced to hold caucuses to avoid national party penalties. But holding caucuses would necessarily have to fall after the point on the calendar where the Michigan presidential primary would be scheduled in order to comply with the RNC rules on timing. Yet, statewide votes on presidential preference must be used to bind and allocate delegates. 

See the conundrum? 

Michigan Republicans would end up stuck in sort of feedback loop: forced to use a primary's statewide presidential preference vote to allocate and bind delegates, but one scheduled by Democrats in the state at a point on the calendar that would dock Michigan Republicans some of those delegates for violating RNC rules on timing. Of course, there is a rule for that, Rule 16(f)(4): 

The Republican National Committee may grant a waiver to a state Republican Party from the provisions of Rule Nos. 16(a)(1) and (2) where compliance is impossible and the Republican National Committee determines that granting such waiver is in the best interests of the Republican Party.

So, if Michigan Republicans wanted to use the February 27 primary and the RNC determined that that was in the best interests of the party, then a waiver could be granted. And it could be in the best interests of the party for there to be a primary in a battleground state that would likely draw more interest from and energize more voters than any alternative caucus/convention process. That is part of the same rationale that led the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee to reconsider the early primary calendar lineup for the 2024 cycle. 

That is noteworthy. 

Michigan Republicans could potentially use a February 27 presidential primary and NOT be penalized by the RNC. Republicans in state government have done everything in their power so far to prevent majority Democrats from making the change to the presidential primary date and have lobbied to no avail (to this point) for a second, compliant presidential primary for Republicans. Compliance, if the primary is the preferred allocation route for Michigan Republicans, is impossible. A waiver to avoid penalties is not.

The caucuses route

But what if Michigan Republicans determine that they do not want to use the primary? What if, despite everything described above, the Michigan Republican Party prefers to utilize a caucus/convention system as its means of allocating and binding delegates to the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee? 

There is no direct opt-out for state parties in the Michigan law regarding the presidential primary. Otherwise, state Republicans may have been inclined to opt out of the primary in 2020 as a number of other states did when President Trump sought reelection. Arizona, for example, added an opt-out for state Republicans under that same rationale.

But again, that option is not directly available in Michigan. What is available to party chairs is the ability to influence which candidates are on the primary ballot. There is a filing process for candidates who want to participate in a Michigan presidential primary, but it is an atypical one. That is because the secretary of state holds the power to determine who has access to the ballot based on who is mentioned in news media. State party chairs, under the same provision, add their input on the matter as well, augmenting the secretary's list of candidates with a list of their own. Any other candidates who does not end up on either of those lists can file in a manner that is more consistent with the processes in other states.

The chair's list is the mechanism Michigan Republicans could use to try to informally opt-out of the presidential primary. However, it is not clear that the state party chair merely providing no list or even suggesting to the secretary of state that there is no need for a list (because of the party using caucuses) can effectively opt Michigan Republicans out of the primary. Section 3 of the main presidential primary law says that a "statewide presidential primary shall be conducted..." That provides little wiggle room for the state party. 

Barring that or the addition of an opt-out (from majority Democrats in the state legislature who may not be interested in providing one), the courts may be the only clear path toward a caucus for the Michigan Republican Party. While the courts do not provide parties with full and unfettered power to determine the processes by which they nominate candidates, the do often provide very wide latitude to the parties when conflicts arise with state law. 

But why go to the courts at all? After all, the Republican National Committee determines the rules and processes that guide their presidential nomination process. But it is the conflict in those rules -- again, that feedback loop mentioned above -- that theoretically would push the Michigan Republican Party to turn to the courts in order to get out of the presidential primary and avoid a violation to Rule 16(a)(1) of the Rules of the Republican Party. It is that statewide presidential preference vote in the presidential primary, one mandated by Michigan state law, falling before any compliant caucus on or after March 1 that gums up the works. 

Part of the intention of the addition of Rule 16(a)(1) was geared toward preventing states from doing what Missouri accidentally did in 2012: hold a non-binding and noncompliant primary in February with compliant caucuses to allocate and select delegates in March. Michigan Republicans would fall into that very same trap. Only, in 2024 there is a rule in place preventing that, unlike in 2012. 

The RNC cannot change that rule now. But it could grant Michigan Republicans a waiver under Rule 16(f)(4) to hold caucuses in much the same way that they could to exempt a February primary from sanctions. ...as long as it is, by rule, in the best interests of the party.

But what is in the best interests of the party in this instance? It seems likely that the RNC will have to grant a waiver in the Michigan case regardless. But is one way -- the caucus or the primary -- more clearly in the best interests of the party than the other? The traditional approach of the Republican National Committee over time has been to provide state parties with as much latitude as possible in determining the process by which they allocate and select delegates. As one RNC member once told FHQ, "Let them [the state parties] deal with it." But that has changed. In recent cycles the national party has moved to codify rules that restrict certain methods of delegate allocation during particular times on the primary calendar or to bind them at the convention.

So the RNC has shown some propensity to wade into that thicket if only on a limited scale. But is the party willing to force the hand of Michigan Republicans one way or the other? Toward or away from a primary or caucus? Does it have a need to? 

On the one hand, the RNC, like the Democratic National Committee (DNC), likely sees some value in the more participatory nature of the primary process. More voters drawn to participate in a competitive Republican presidential primary produces more voters energized to come back and pull the lever for Republicans in the general election. Motivating Democratic voters in battleground state primaries was, again, part of what prompted the DNC to push not only primaries over caucuses but to push battleground states into the early window of the presidential primary calendar as well. And Michigan fits the bill on that front for Republicans as well.

Yet, on the other hand, does the RNC want to be or appear heavy-handed on the matter with a state party that may or may not want to allocate, select and bind delegates through a caucus/convention process instead of a primary? There was talk among Republicans in 2018 of an incentive to nudge states away from caucuses and toward primaries. Nothing came of it but the idea was out there at the national party level. Incentives, however, are different from granting a waiver to a state party based on which method of delegate allocation the national party deems in its best interests. 

And that is where the election of a new Republican state party chair in Michigan comes into the picture.

A new state party chair and Michigan in 2024

What does the Michigan Republican Party under Kristina Karamo want to do with respect to the 2024 presidential nomination process in the Great Lakes state? How does the party want to allocate and select delegates? Where any delegate selection event ends up on the calendar will potentially limit the possibilities -- true winner-take-all allocation schemes are banned before March 15 under RNC rules -- but beyond that is what mode of allocation the state party prefers. Primary or caucus? 

Given that the Michigan Republican Party advanced two chair candidates -- Karamo and Matthew DePerno -- who both ran and lost statewide in 2022 and questioned those results, the party may have a preference to avoid a state-run primary contest in 2024, especially one run by Democrats at the top. The ledger is stacked on that one side:

• state-run primary, the results of which could be called into question by Republicans -- X
• a process run by Democrats at the top -- X
• a contest too early under RNC rules that will draw severe penalties -- X

That is a strong case for Michigan Republicans opting out of a noncompliant primary and choose to select and allocate national convention delegates based on a caucus/convention system in 2024. 

Obviously, however, it is more complicated than merely opting out of the primary, as has been highlighted above. 

And again, is opting out something that is in the best interests of the Republican Party (as determined by the national party)? Recall also that either way -- primary or caucus -- it is likely that the RNC will have to issue a waiver.

Even that RNC waiver decision is fraught with complexities. Think about the decision-making environment in that scenario. For staters, the RNC has once again publicly stated that it intends to remain neutral in the 2024 presidential nomination race. But any decision in this Michigan situation could be viewed as putting a thumb on the scales. The argument is out there that a caucus would potentially help Trump. Maybe, but the former president's endorsement failed to carry DePerno over the finish line in the race for chair. Perhaps, then, Trump's reach is less than it once was. 

Still, perception may become reality in this case. If the RNC actively grants a waiver for Michigan Republicans to hold caucuses, then that could be viewed as helping Trump, as not being neutral. And that may even be true in the event that the RNC passively stands by and allows the Michigan Republican Party to fight it out -- potentially in court -- with the state to opt out of the primary. The no waiver path. 

The flip side carries problems of its own. If the caucuses are viewed as helping Trump, does the national party nudging Michigan Republicans toward using the primary (via a waiver) instead end up being viewed as hurting Trump? It is not clear that that would necessarily be the case, but a candidate Trump attempting to (re)burnish his antiestablishment credibility may be inclined to raise the issue. 

From the RNC's perspective, there are some additional downstream considerations now that a new chair is in place for the state party in Michigan. Again, there are those participatory aspects in a general election battleground that may motivate the national party to advocate for the primary; to issue a waiver in the case of the primary only. 

That may be a route that saves the state party from itself. Under Karamo, the party may wish to circumvent a state-run process, one run by Democrats, but a caucus/convention process -- or even a party-run primary, if the state party were to go down that road -- would cost the party money. That is money that could be better spent building the state party and laying the groundwork for a fall general election. That may or may not outweigh any misgivings about election integrity from Republicans in the state. Additionally, the state party chair vote was not exactly a smooth one. Now, that does not mean that it was a sign of things to come in any future caucuses with presidential delegates on the line, but it does not, perhaps, inspire confidence at the national party level. 

The case of 1988 (or was that 1986?)

It is not as if Michigan Republicans have not been down this road before. 

For the 1988 cycle, the state party was inventive in how it selected and allocated delegates in the presidential nomination contest. Then as now, the name of the game on the state level was trying to draw candidate and media attention and impact the course of the presidential nomination race. Only, instead of trying to establish and move around a presidential primary, the party chose instead to conduct a long caucus/convention process that began in the late summer of 1986. 

Yes, precinct caucuses in August 1986 -- before the midterms! -- chose 9000 precinct officers who also doubled as delegates to county caucuses in January 1988. It was from that pool of 9000 precinct officers at the county caucuses that delegates were chosen to attend the state convention at the end of January. And that January state convention subsequently chose delegates from the narrowed pool of precinct officers to attend the national convention. 

It was the ultimate insiders game, and that battle among Bush, Kemp and Robertson delegates happened prior to the Iowa caucuses in 1988. 

That system also backfired to some degree, creating a schism in the state party. A schism that at the time featured extensive credentials fights and spurred a rump state convention. And that divide haunted the state party thereafter. 

To be clear, it is not assured that a 2024 caucus/convention process would follow that same route. At the very least, the dividing lines are not so clearly demarcated now as then when establishment forces were aligned against the upstart ideological push from Robertson and the Christian Coalition. As the recent chair's election showcased, the battle in the Michigan Republican Party was among a cadre of candidates who were all firmly in the Trump wing of the party. But are there divides therein? In the broader party, perhaps. There is already an effort among Republican legislators to draft Ron DeSantis. 

But look, none of that means that history will repeat itself in Michigan in 2024. But if one is in the RNC, a group who may have to have a hand in the primary or caucus decision in Michigan, then a broader vote in a primary may be a safer route than allowing the flames of division to be stoked in the crucible of a state party-run caucus/convention system. That waiver decision, if it is for a primary, is not one without costs for the RNC, but it may be in the best interests of the party in a likely 2024 general election battleground.

--

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Rules Tweak Alters How Republican Delegates Will Be Bound in 2024

Veterans of the primary wars will recall how Florida and Michigan jumped the queue and held unsanctioned presidential primaries outside of the national party rules during the 2008 cycle. Following that incursion into the early window, both national parties sought to change their respective rules in an attempt to rein in would-be rogue states in future cycles. 

But it didn't take. ...not immediately, anyway.

Despite an informal agreement between the national parties to dial back the beginning of primary season for 2012, it happened again. Florida and Michigan once more held contests before Super Tuesday and were joined by Arizona as well. The start point for all of the states except the earliest four was moved back a month from the first Tuesday in February to the first Tuesday in March, but the penalties -- especially on the Republican side -- remained the same in 2012 as they were in 2008.

It was not until the 2016 cycle when the Republican National Committee (RNC) bifurcated its penalty structure, creating a super penalty for timing violations and a separate 50 percent penalty for those states that broke the allocation rules, that the previously rogue states were finally kept in check.

That offers a cautionary tale for national parties crafting rules to elicit corrective behavior from actors on the state level. Often it can take more than one round -- one cycle -- to get right. 

And so it is in another problem area in the Republican delegate selection process. After all, it was not just Arizona, Florida and Michigan that caused the RNC headaches during the 2012 cycle. There were also a series of states that held non-binding preference votes at precinct caucuses, most of them early in the sequence, that sent roughly 15 percent of the total number of Republican delegates at stake to the 2012 convention in Tampa. But the early timing of most of those "beauty contests" was rather minor. The problem was that preference votes were taken, but had no bearing on the ultimate delegate allocation and selection. 

There could, for example, be a battle between Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum about who won the 2012 Iowa caucuses on the night of the contest, but that had little influence on a delegate selection process that saw Ron Paul out-organize both in subsequent rounds of the caucus-convention process and take more (Paul-aligned but technically unbound) delegates to the convention. 

Two problems emerged from that 2012 experience for Republicans. The first was that states could skirt the timing rules by holding events -- caucuses or conventions -- early. States could gain candidate and media attention and potentially influence the sequential nomination process with nothing, or comparatively little, on the line. That was not against the rules, but it was counter to the spirit of the rules. 

Second, it left any delegates that came out of such processes on the state level technically unbound heading into the national convention; free agents of a sort. This left the door open to a factional candidate possibly outflanking a frontrunner, or even a presumptive nominee, in the delegate selection process and gobbling up, again, technically unbound, delegate slots to the national convention. Done properly, such a candidate could have his or her name placed in nomination and have aligned delegates in positions to fight for rules changes and/or platform additions. 

Ron Paul test drove this tactic in 2008, honed it in 2012 and left lingering whether it would be of consequence for his son in a wide open 2016 Republican nomination race. That, too, may not have been against the rules, but it was still, perhaps, counter to the spirit of the rules.

Of course, one of the controversial rules changes that came out of the rules fights at the 2012 Republican National Convention was one adding new language directly dealing with binding and allocation. It was an attempt at closing the unbound delegate selection event loophole; one intended to solve both problems above. And just as was the case in the transition from 2008 to 2012, when the calendar start point was dialed back, it worked to push most states in line. Notably, Iowa, for example switched from a non-binding caucus in 2012 to one that proportionally allocated delegates based on the statewide results to the precinct caucuses in 2016.

But just like Arizona, Florida and Michigan and those timing rules of 2012, there were some states that once again sought to circumvent the new national party rules on binding for 2016 and stick with their more traditional unbound formulas. It was a smaller pool of potential delegates -- down to just under 5 percent total in 2016 from 15 percent in 2012 -- but it was still a pool of delegates allocated and selected in a manner that did not completely square with the intent of the rules changes. 

The RNC did more or less navigate through this issue during 2016. The party interpreted the rules to include any pledges that delegate candidates made to presidential candidates when filing to run in states like Colorado and Wyoming. Only North Dakota's Republican process among the states ultimately avoided making any real changes and maintained a fully unbound delegation. None had preference votes for presidential candidates, but some delegates were bound due to those pledges (Colorado and Wyoming) while others were not (North Dakota).

However, the 2016 Republican nomination process offered one other wrinkle to this rules saga as it played out. The process pointed out that, while a candidate could be allocated delegate slots and have those slots bound to them and their potential nomination, those delegates -- the people who filled the allocated slots -- may not actually be aligned with that particular candidate. One could see Trump-allocated delegates who were actually aligned with Ted Cruz, for instance. In turn, that raised the specter that if there were enough Trump-bound, but Cruz (or whomever)-aligned delegates at the convention, then mischief could occur. Changes could be made to the rules package on which the convention would eventually vote that could swing the nomination away from the plurality (vote) winner/majority (delegates) winner from primary season, Trump. 

And, indeed, this was a topic of conversation after Donald Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee after the Indiana primary in early May 2016 when all of his main competitors withdrew from the race. A contentious pre-convention meeting of the (convention) Rules Committee seemingly put the matter to rest, ending the talk of releasing 2016 delegates aligned with other candidates and clearing the path for Trump to be nominated in Cleveland.

Yet, that merely resolved the binding issue for 2016. And a rules tweak on the matter for 2020 was less than necessary with an incumbent president seeking renomination/reelection. The party simply carried over its 2016 rules to the 2020 cycle. But for Republican rules makers looking ahead to 2024, further clarifying the rule could close the loophole exploited by states and candidates from 2008-2016.

The same rules that governed both the 2016 and 2020 processes emerged from the 2020 convention in Charlotte. But under its Rule 12 powers, the RNC adopted a series of amendments to the 2024 rules in April 2022. It brought back the debates committee and adjusted the end of the primary calendar. And it also augmented its rules on binding 2024 delegates. 

Here is the language of Rule 16(a)(1) that came out of the Tampa convention in 2012 and was used in 2016, carried over to 2020 and came out of the Charlotte convention in 2020:

Any statewide presidential preference vote that permits a choice among candidates for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in a primary, caucuses, or a state convention must be used to allocate and bind the state’s delegation to the national convention in either a proportional or winner-take-all manner, except for delegates and alternate delegates who appear on a ballot in a statewide election and are elected directly by primary voters.

And here is how the RNC tweaked it in April 2022 [changes marked in bold italics]: 

Any statewide presidential preference vote that permits a choice among candidates for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in a primary, caucuses, or a state convention must be used to allocate and bind the state’s delegation to the national convention in either a proportional or winner-take-all manner for at least one round of balloting, except for delegates and alternate delegates who appear on a ballot in a statewide election and are elected directly by primary voters or delegates bound to a candidate that withdraws from the presidential race. States wishing to unbind delegates pursuant to this rule must specify the criteria for doing so in the filing submitted to the Republican National Committee in accordance with paragraph (f)(1) of this rule. 

Much of the language is the same, but it importantly requires state parties to bind delegates for at least one round of balloting at the national convention. And it has been since the 1950s that a convention has gone beyond one roll call ballot. The rule further buttresses that mandate by requiring states to specify the process by which delegates would become unbound. In other words, the delegate selection plans state parties must submit to the RNC under Rule 16(f)(1) must lay out at what point -- after how many roll call ballots -- delegates become free agents (in the off-hand chance it goes beyond that point). 

And honestly, most state parties were already doing this. Look at the third column from the right in the chart here. Most states have been doing this, but the change above forces the handful of laggards in line. Those changes tighten up the rules and leave a lot less room to maneuver toward the types of mischief that have occurred in recent cycles. 

Caucus states can still go the North Dakota route in 2024, but it would be difficult to justify in light of the above rules and the fact that most states had a statewide preference vote and/or had delegate candidates pledge to particular presidential candidates in the immediately preceding cycles, competitive or otherwise.

And yes, the national convention remains the highest authority in these matters. A convention could adopt rules counter to the intent of the above, but would only do so after primary season has played out in all 56 states and territories under those rules. That is easy to say, even easier to consider, but hard to pull off in real time after voters have voted and indicated a winner (even if by plurality).

Is that binding loophole completely closed now? No, but it is a much tighter one after these changes than it was. Rules matter. 

...even after seemingly small changes.

--

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The Republican Rules for 2024 Present Some Calendar Opportunities

Understandably, there has been a lot of talk surrounding the changes to the Democratic Party presidential primary calendar for 2024. 

However, comparatively little attention has been paid to the calendar on the Republican side. That disconnect is, perhaps, even more unusual and interesting considering that the Republican presidential nomination process is the one where most of the action will be in 2023-24. Theirs is the more competitive of the ongoing nomination battles. But much of the relative quiet on the Republican calendar front is owed to the fact that the early calendar has been locked in since the Republican National Committee (RNC) adopted its rules for 2024 in April 2022. Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada will be the first states. One may not yet know where exactly on the calendar each will fall, but they can fall, by rule, "no earlier than one month before the next earliest state."

Yet, thus far in 2023, there is little evidence that primary and caucus placement for the remainder of the states is a top priority for Republicans in state legislatures across the country. There is no rush, for example, to schedule primaries for a spot that represents "the next earliest state." And there is room to maneuver for that title. 

Here is how:

Beginning in the 2016 cycle, the RNC made a small change to its rules that in subsequent cycles has created a divide between the Republican and Democratic parties' presidential primary calendars. In 2012, both parties allowed all contests that were not Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina to conduct primaries and caucuses as early as the first Tuesday in March. The Democratic Party continues to use that language. That is the point at which "the window" opens for non-exempt states to conduct contests.

But on the Republican side, the language changed. Instead of the first Tuesday in March it became March 1 during the 2016 cycle and it has stayed March 1 in the rules ever since. That mattered little in 2016 because March 1 was the first Tuesday in March. However, while the Democrats' first Tuesday in March position has remained anchored in place, the March 1 of the Republican rules shifts around from cycle to cycle. That was less consequential in 2020 when there was no sustained challenge to President Trump's hold on the Republican nomination.

However, in 2024, March 1 falls on a Friday, the Friday before what at this point looks to be Super Tuesday on March 5, 2024. That is the point on the calendar where the most states' primaries and caucuses are congregated and the date that is the most delegate-rich date on the calendar (at this time). That divide between the two parties' calendars presents an opportunity for states to potentially shift into a more advantageous position without penalty. 

Yet, again, there has been no effort undertaken thus far by Republican state legislators in particular to exploit that calendar divide between the parties. FHQ has raised the possibility of Democrats in Georgia and nationally offering a Saturday, March 2 spot as a compromise position to a Republican secretary of state who has to this point resisted efforts to move the Peach state primary deeper into February because of the prospect of national party penalties. Nothing, however, prevents other states from shifting into that same position or up to a day earlier to Friday, March 1. 

Part of the issue here is that the RNC rules stray not just from those of national Democrats but from how primary date scheduling laws are crafted on the state level. In the vast majority of cases, presidential primaries are affixed to a day on the calendar and not a particular date. State laws call for an election to take place on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November or the first Tuesday in March and not March 1, for instance. The latter moves around from cycle to cycle and could potentially sow voter confusion when a March 1 primary would be on a Friday in 2024 and then a Wednesday in 2028. 

That, however, is a thinking that hews closely to tradition, but not one that cannot be overcome. A state law that gets changed in, say, Oklahoma from the first Tuesday in March to simply March 1 uproots the contest from a typical Tuesday, but aligns the primary with RNC rules (as they exist now). And that change offers the benefit of being ahead of the first Tuesday in March where other states' contests have clustered. A modest benefit in 2024 would be a bigger bonus four years later when a March 1 primary would be nearly a week before the usual Super Tuesday.

Of course, that may benefit Republicans in Oklahoma, but would put Democrats in the Sooner state in much the same situation in which Michigan Republicans currently find themselves. That is, stuck in a noncompliant primary they are powerless to change in a state legislature controlled by the opposing party. That would create some headaches, but not for the party in power. 

But this is the sort of instability that is manifest when the national parties are not on the same page. They do not have to formally broker any sort of agreed upon point on the calendar at which non-exempt states can start holding primaries and caucuses, but it is clearly in both national parties' interests to have a uniform start time to "the window." It would cut down on these sorts of cross-party scheduling snafus that present problems from time to time, an issue similar to the divide that now exists in the early calendar lineup. In the end, state actors will be attracted to opportunities that allow their state to be showcased away from the rest of the pack. And states can play that against national parties that do not present a united front in return.

--

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The RNC Presidential Primary Debates Committee is Back for 2024

Lost in all the recent talk of the Republican National Committee (RNC) reaching out to a diversity of networks during the planning stages for presidential debates to come later this year was the fact that behind it all is a national party committee. 

The on-again-off-again presidential primary debates committee is back on again for the 2024 cycle. First written into RNC rules in 2014 for the 2016 cycle as the Standing Committee on Presidential Primary Debates, the rule and the committee were scrapped for 2020. And both moves made sense at the times those decisions were made. With a wide open and competitive nomination race to replace a term-limited (Democratic) president on the horizon, it was sensible and shrewd for the RNC in 2014 to devise formal rules to dictate the direction of its primary debates, an increasingly visible if not important component of the invisible primary, for the 2016 cycle. But with an incumbent president seeking renomination in 2020, the standing committee became less necessary with only token opposition lining up to contest President Trump's grip on the nomination.

 

Yet, with the conditions of 2024 more likely to resemble those of 2016 than 2020, the necessity of a debates committee became apparent once again. There were not many changes to the rules adopted by the 2020 Republican National Committee before Rule 12 cut off the ability to amend them before last September. There were some. And one of them was to bring back the presidential primary debates committee for 2024. 

...with some important differences from the previous iteration. 

Here is a look at both rules side by side (from the Rules of the Republican Party):

2016 

[originally Rule 10(h), but later reordered as Rule 10(a)(10) for 2020 before being eliminated]

There shall be a Standing Committee on Presidential Primary Debates, which shall be composed of thirteen (13) members of the Republican National Committee, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and each of the four (4) regions shall elect two (2) members, one man and one woman, at its regional caucus at the RNC Summer Meeting in each even-numbered year in which no Presidential election is held. The chairman of the Republican National Committee shall appoint the chairman of the Standing Committee on Presidential Primary Debates from among the members thereof. The Standing Committee on Presidential Primary Debates shall have the authority to sanction debates on behalf of the Republican National Committee based on input from presidential campaigns and criteria which may include but are not limited to considerations of timing, frequency, format, media outlet, and the best interests of the Republican Party. Each debate sanctioned by the Standing Committee on Presidential Primary Debates shall be known as a “Sanctioned Debate.” Any presidential candidate who participates in any debate that is not a Sanctioned Debate shall not be eligible to participate in any further Sanctioned Debates.

2024

[the new Rule 10(a)(11)]

If appointed pursuant to subsection (c) of this Rule, the Temporary Committee on Presidential Debates shall have the authority to sanction debates on behalf of the Republican National Committee based on input from presidential campaigns and criteria which may include but are not limited to considerations of timing, frequency, format, media outlet, candidate qualifications, and the best interest of the Republican Party. Each debate sanctioned by the Temporary Committee on Presidential Debates shall be known as a “Sanctioned Debate.” All presidential primary candidates shall also agree in writing to appear in only sanctioned Primary and General Election debates. Any presidential primary candidate who does not agree in writing or who participates in any debate that is not a Sanctioned Debate shall not be eligible to participate in any further Sanctioned Debates. 

[emphasis FHQ's]

[1] The subsection (c) clause that now begins the rule refers to the RNC chair's power to form committees. That is a significant substitution because it rids the national party of the need to constantly tweak the rules every cycle dependent upon whether an incumbent Republican president is seeking reelection. If the chair has the discretion to create committees, then there is no need to continually craft and re-craft rules to deal with what will inevitably be a recurring issue. To wit...

[2] In addition, the committee in future versions will be temporary (if formed under the chair's discretion at all) and not a standing committee as it was in its previous iteration during the 2016 cycle. There is no need for a standing committee, but there is some regular and recurring need for a committee to deal with this subject.

[3] The next difference between the 2016 and 2024 versions of the rule is notable. The list of criteria the committee will consider before finalizing rules governing the presidential primary debates process has been enhanced to include candidate qualifications. While a polling threshold was used in 2016 to differentiate between those candidates who qualified for the main event debate and those relegated to the secondary debate, that was something that was not a formal part of the rule for the 2016 cycle. The standing committee (and the RNC itself) at the time filled in that detail. However, by formally adding candidate qualifications to the calculus, the RNC process comes more in line with how the Democratic National Committee (DNC) handled things under competitive conditions for the 2020 cycle. Granted, what constitutes "candidate qualifications" remains undefined as of now (and will remain so in the rules), but the temporary committee will no doubt again fill in that detail.

[4] Another facet of the 2024 rule that is new also borrows from the 2020 DNC process. Only, the Republican rule for 2024 takes it a step further. Republican candidates, by rule, will have to sign a pledge to participate in only debates "sanctioned" by the committee. Like the 2020 DNC process, that applies to presidential primary debates. Unlike the Democrats four years ago -- or Republicans eight years ago, for that matter -- that pledge will also apply to the eventual nominee and his or her participation in general election debates. Following the RNC's 2022 split with the Commission on Presidential Debates, there is some question as to whether the party will, absent some negotiation, participate in general election presidential debates. The temporary committee now has the power to sanction (or not) those debates. And candidates who sign the aforementioned pledge will presumably have to abide by that in the fall of 2024. Of course, the eventual nominee will likely have some significant say in whether he or she participates in those debates in the same way that a presumptive nominee has a say in his or her convention. 

[5] Finally, there is a whole section on selection of the committee in the 2016 version of the debates committee rule that has been stricken from the 2024 version. Ultimately, the chair has discretion over the creation of the committee, but under the current rule, there are no clear parameters concerning the size and selection of the membership of the temporary committee. In 2016, the RNC chair had five selections of thirteen with the remaining eight given to the four regions into which the RNC divides states and territories. Now, not only does the chair have the power to form the committee, but also has the ability to select its entire membership. This likely means little for the remainder of the 2024 cycle. The committee has already been chosen and has begun acting, reaching out to media outlets and considering borrowing DNC-type thresholds. Of course, there could be a new RNC chair after the 2023 RNC winter meeting, but it is unlikely that a new chair would disband the current panel and re-form it with the new chair's stamp. It would be unlikely but not impossible since the rule is silent on any transition to a new chair. 

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