Why Can't Nevada Just Replicate New Hampshire's Calendar Strategy?

Just 1 amendment added. The same one NH has. Must be 7 days before another state with a similar contest. 🤷‍♂️

What’s so complicated.

— Adam Shepherd (@IgiesZ) February 17, 2021

What's so complicated? 

That was the question that FHQ got in response to our recent rundown of the problems inherent in the Nevada bill introduced this week to challenge New Hampshire's (and Iowa's) entrenched primacy at the front of the queue on the presidential primary calendar.

And it is not an unreasonable proposition: amend the currently flawed bill that schedules the would-be newly established Nevada presidential primary for the next to last Tuesday in January, leaving the state vulnerable to a New Hampshire leapfrog with no recourse for the Silver state. That is indeed a simple addendum. And while it replicates part of the mechanism that New Hampshire has utilized with success over the years to protect its first in the nation status, it leaves in this case some unanswered questions in the Nevada context.

Let's assume for a moment that Nevada lawmakers do, in fact, amend AB 126, adding a provision like New Hampshire's that requires the Silver state presidential primary to be seven days before any other similar contest. Who or what makes that happen? Who implements that provision? In New Hampshire, that decision has been left to the discretion of the secretary of state since 1976. And Bill Gardner, the secretary of state in the Granite state during the whole interim period has proven adept at waiting other states out and then scheduling the state's presidential primary. That one person has that decision-making authority (and has protected New Hampshire's first-in-the-nation status so successfully time after time) is no small thing. As I discussed in my dissertation research, states may have the willingness to move a primary (or in this case challenge for first-in-the-nation status), but do they have the ability. New Hampshire has with its system. Nevada may if the legislature cedes the date-setting authority to its secretary of state. 

The state legislative route has proven a less fruitful path throughout the post-reform era. If the Nevada legislature retained the authority to set the date then it might run the risk in 2023 -- after a 2022 midterm election, for example -- of getting bogged down in a partisan clash over calendar positioning. That could even occur within any Democratic majority that may survive the midterms intact. And furthermore, it could be constrained by the time in which the legislature is in session. This is why states like Georgia and Colorado moved to empower their secretary of state or governor, respectively, to make the decision on where on the calendar the states' presidential primaries will be scheduled. 

So that question presents one complicating factor. 

Note that the above only considers an interstate conflict between Nevada and New Hampshire; one that includes both state governments and state parties as stakeholders. But those are not the exclusive stakeholders in the "who goes first?" conundrum. The national parties also have some say in this. And sure, folks in the Granite state will argue that no matter what the national parties dictate, New Hampshire is going to follow state law and set its primary -- compliant with national party rules or not -- at the beginning of the calendar. That has worked in the past even before the time in which the Iowa and New Hampshire were codified into the national parties' rules. New Hampshire would basically blackmail candidates, daring them to campaign in other rogue states encroaching on New Hampshire's position. Prospectively being dead in New Hampshire at the outset of a long and arduous campaign through a three to five month calendar of contests was enough to keep most candidates in line and protect New Hampshire. 

But times and conditions have changed. The national parties have only gotten more hands-on in their approach to the nominating process as it has increasingly nationalized and pushed more meaningfully into the invisible primary. New Hampshire may also dare the national parties to sanction them, but there really has not been a valid test of the hypothesis that New Hampshire has those national party penalties levied against the state. We do not know how candidates would react to that, especially in the context of a disputed claim to first-in-the-nation status. 

And Nevada may be in the process of laying a claim to that status. However, it is a somewhat ham-handed attempt. And would be even with a provision added to mimic the "seven days before any other similar contest" line in the New Hampshire law. FHQ says this because the bill is clearly intended as a provocation:

“It would not be ideal to just have a back-and-forth and just have a leapfrog exercise,” he [Nevada Assembly Speaker Jason Frierson (D)] said, “so the hope is that we can coordinate with the national party as well as our states, and work something out.” Frierson said he “certainly [is] not trying to start some dispute between states,” adding that “this is the beginning of the conversation.”

It is not clear that this starting point to the conversation is one that the Democratic National Committee endorses. Yes, the national party may want a change at the beginning of the calendar to demographically diversify the kickoff event so that it better aligns with the Democratic primary electorate, but it may want a more deft handling of the approach than the shot across the bow that Nevada has offered to this point. 

As an aside, I can still hear members of the DNC complaining about both Democratic legislators in Florida who voted for the bill to move the Sunshine state presidential primary into January for 2008 and even more about how "whiny" the state party was when the DNC sanctioned them and offered to help organize later caucuses that would be compliant. And those comments were four years later. 

By provoking a clash, Nevada Democrats in the state party and the state legislature may be inviting the ire of the DNC in a way that ultimately gets both Nevada and New Hampshire penalized and another state elevated to the first primary position (whether either state has a "seven days before any other similar contest" provision or not).

And it is not that Nevada has this completely wrong. The impulse to shift from a caucus to a primary is a shrewd one, one that potentially brings the state into the good graces of the national party at a time when the DNC seems more inclined than at almost any other point in the post-reform era make a change to the start of the calendar. But by predetermining the primary date and opening up a conflict with New Hampshire and breaking the unwritten compact between the carve-out states, Nevada may dash its own hopes before it even gives itself a chance to be considered for the top honor. 

The better approach is to switch to a primary and leave the date unsettled for now. [That is not unprecedented. Utah funded its new 2020 presidential primary in 2018 but did not set the date until 2019. But, of course, Utah did not do that as a means of making a claim on the first-in-the-nation primary.] That puts Nevada in a prime position to pitch itself to the DNC as a possible alternative to New Hampshire (and/or Iowa) before the national party finalizes its delegate selection rules next year. "Ready, willing, able and more diverse" is a better pitch than "Here we are. Deal with our provocation."

In the end, adding a replicating passage from New Hampshire law may get the ball rolling for Nevada, but there are other complications to consider. And they are complexities that involve other stakeholders in the process. And it is those stakeholders that make this a more delicate dance for Nevada than is often appreciated.

Recent posts: 

A Glance at Where the 2024 Republican Delegate Selection Rules Stand

Nevada Legislation Would Establish January Presidential Primary, but it's Flawed

Former DNC Chair Perez Calls the Calendar Status Quo "Unacceptable"

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See more on our political/electoral consulting venture at FHQ Strategies.   

Nevada Legislation Would Establish January Presidential Primary, but it's Flawed

Often there are few secrets in politics. And at least a couple of things are quite clear in the Democratic maneuvering in the midst of the evolving 2024 invisible primary. 

1. Within the broader Democratic Party coalition there is some dissatisfaction with Iowa and New Hampshire continuing to lead off the presidential primary calendar. How large that faction is and the level of pressure it can bring on decision makers over the next year and a half remains to be seen. But it is a position that was recently given voice (again) by former DNC Chair Tom Perez.
2. Nevada -- both Democratic lawmakers and the state Democratic Party -- have made no secret that they will challenge the calendar status quo. 

Those two realities may or may not ever converge, but the latter took some shape yesterday with the introduction of the legislation in the Nevada Assembly -- the Silver state's lower chamber -- to create a separate presidential primary election and schedule it for the Tuesday before the last Tuesday in January of a presidential election year. [In 2024, that would fall on January 23.]

But here is the thing: AB 126 is a retread for the most part. It resurrects -- at least with respect to the scheduling aspects of the bill -- Republican-sponsored bills from the 2013 and 2015 state legislative sessions that went nowhere. And they went nowhere because both were materially the same and were equally as flawed. 

One could ask, "Flawed how?" But before diving in to that question, it is appropriate to explore what the goals are with each bill. The previous Republican bills that sought to create a January presidential primary for the 2016 cycle did not aim to be first on the calendar per se, but to be first in the West. The aim of the Democratic sponsors -- Assembly Speaker Jason Frierson (D-8th, Clark), Assemblywoman Teresa Benitez-Thompson (D-27th, Washoe) and Assemblywoman Brittney Miller (D-5th, Clark) -- in 2021 is different. This latest attempt to jump into January is an attempt at being first, not first-in-the-West but first-in-the-nation.

That goal and this bill are not well aligned. 

As written, this bill certainly protects Nevada as the first state to hold a delegate selection event in the West. It even empowers the secretary of state to reschedule the newly established presidential primary for an even earlier date than the Tuesday preceding the last Tuesday in January if another western state plans to hold an event earlier than that. [The secretary of state in consultation with the Legislative Council could schedule the presidential primary for as early as January 2.] But that list of states does not include New Hampshire (or Iowa for that matter). 

If left unamended, this bill (if it becomes law) would leave the state of Nevada impotent in dealing with New Hampshire, impotent in its challenge to first-in-the-nation status. Yes, folks in the Granite state will raise the state law that requires the New Hampshire primary to be at least seven days before any other similar contest. But that requirement is next to useless without empowering an actor who can pull the trigger on a scheduling decision on a moment's notice. New Hampshire has been adept at staying first because the secretary of state makes the scheduling decision and not a state legislature. Bill Gardner, the New Hampshire secretary of state, can do what he always does with states seeking to threaten New Hampshire's status: Wait them out and schedule the New Hampshire primary at time when state legislatures often are not in session and late enough to make it difficult for said legislature to respond quickly enough and still manage a presidential primary election effectively. 

Gardner would have no problem waiting until mid- to late November 2023 to leapfrog Nevada into mid-January, all the while knowing the Nevada legislature would have no real recourse.

The other problem with this bill is likely its specificity in view of the national parties and their rules on delegate selection. Nevada holds a privileged position on the primary calendar, codified in both national parties' sets of delegate selection rules. This bill as currently written would violate those rules. No, neither party has finalized their rules for the 2024 nomination process, but a January primary set this early on runs the risk of drawing the ire of the national parties as they are in the process of settling on those rules. Setting a date for late January is a provocation. On the Democratic side would cost the Nevada Democratic Party half of its delegation and candidates who campaign there any share of those reduced delegates they have won in the rogue primary. In the Republican process, the Nevada Republican Party would be subject to the super penalty if it opted into a January presidential primary. That would reduce the Nevada Republican delegation to just six delegates.

But again, those national rules are not set yet. However, by forcing the issue and scheduling a January primary now (as this bill would do), any goodwill Nevada may have in either party may dissipate; any desire to change course at the front of the calendar may not disappear, but it may no longer include Nevada. 

Then what recourse does an aspiring first-in-the-nation state like Nevada have? 

Well, bear in mind that AB 126 is just the introduced version of this legislation. It can be amended. And if the state is going to successfully challenge New Hampshire for first-in-the-nation status it will have to be. 

First, it would likely prove fruitful in dealing with New Hampshire and the national parties to leave the date of the newly created primary unsettled for now. This is something FHQ raised in a recent piece. In other words, create the presidential primary, but do not set a date. At least on the Democratic side, that gets Nevada even further in the good graces of a national party that more and more values primaries over caucuses. But by not setting a date for the election, it also does not agitate the decision-makers in the national party as they are determining the rules for the next nomination process. Such a move demonstrates that the state is serious about a defining principle within the party now -- increased participation -- while also making it known that it may be a preferable first state. 

Second, in dealing with New Hampshire specifically, not setting a date is just common sense. If the legislature sets a date now, then New Hampshire is just going to jump that later at a time that is maximally convenient for the preservation of its own first-in-the-nation status. Ideally, Nevada would want to replicate what New Hampshire does: cede the date-setting authority to one actor who can more quickly and nimbly decide on a date for the presidential primary. Furthermore, if by that point in 2023, Nevada has the backing of the DNC to be the first state -- no sure thing -- then the secretary of state or whichever actor has been empowered by the hypothetical new law can set the date for the first position without fear of sanction from the national party. Those sights may at that time be turned on New Hampshire. 

Granted, there are a lot of ifs built into that timeline but it is by far a better course of action in challenging New Hampshire and making a case to be first-in-the-nation than this bill that the Assembly rolled out in Carson City a day ago. 

If you come for the king, you best not miss. And AB 126 misses as currently written. It comes nowhere close to meeting the goals that either the bill or the Democratic Party in Nevada has laid out.

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A link to this legislation has been added to the 2024 FHQ presidential primary calendar.

Recent posts: 

Former DNC Chair Perez Calls the Calendar Status Quo "Unacceptable"

#InvisiblePrimary: Visible -- Nikki Haley and 2024

Arizona Bill Would End Presidential Primary

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See more on our political/electoral consulting venture at FHQ Strategies.  

Are the Parties Taking Different Paths on the 2024 Primary Calendar?

"Two roads diverged in a yellow wood..."

    -- Robert Frost (opening line from "The Road Not Taken")

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Since the inauguration the other week FHQ has devoted considerable (virtual) ink to the 2024 presidential primary that is coming into shape, even two years before the first serious/viable candidates are likely to throw their respective hats in the ring. 

Look, it is early. But already there are some important stories about the 2024 nomination processes and particular focus has been placed on the order of the earliest states on the primary calendar. Iowa had problems with its caucuses in 2020. Nevada is considering a switch to a primary, and further may opt to challenge Iowa and New Hampshire in so doing. And New Hampshire is New Hampshire: free to allow an empowered secretary of state to simply wait things out (and hope the national parties do not turn their penalties on the Granite state to enforce a new order).

All of this -- even among a small group of states -- highlights the overlapping interests and incentives involved in both maintaining and reforming (or often merely tweaking) the rules that govern how both national parties select and allocate the delegates that ultimately nominate their presidential candidates. 

The national parties on some level enjoy the stability/certainty of an early calendar order that persists across cycles. No, it may not be perfect for one or both parties, but the devil one knows is often preferable to the unknown one that may bring with it unintended consequences that leave a system worse off than the status quo ante. And that is often true even in the face of (legitimate) pressure to make changes from groups within the broader party coalition. 

The states and state parties offer at least two other sets of interests and incentives and they two do not always work in concert with one another (and sometimes that goes beyond just simple partisan differences between the governing party in a state legislature -- if there is a unified one -- and an opposition state party). 

Take the delicate dance now starting in Nevada. Democrats control not only the state legislature, but the state government. Between the legislative and executive branches, there is unified Democratic control. Both seeing an opening in the wake of Iowa's 2020 issues and responding to pressure within the Democratic party coalition, the state government seems poised to move away from caucuses as the means of allocating national convention delegates to a state-run presidential primary. And Republicans in the state -- both in the legislature and within the formal state party apparatus -- are not opposed to that change.  And that is a reflection of the different incentives on the Republican side within the party coalition and ahead of a likely open and competitive presidential nomination race in 2024. 

Those realities make it less likely that Nevada Republicans will have any desire to rock the boat. And that shows, particularly when it comes to any effort to move any hypothetical Nevada presidential primary to the first position on the primary calendar. Silver state Republicans very simply do not want to jeopardize their current position in the order. 

And that is a concern of sorts on the Democratic side as well. The forthcoming primary bill's sponsor, Nevada Assembly Speaker Jason Frierson (D), told the Las Vegas Review-Journal:

“We will have to work through (the bill’s) language and work with the national parties — both Democrats and Republicans — and convince them of Nevada’s importance in the West.”

DNC member from Nevada, Allison Stephens, in the same story added:

“We don’t want to compromise our position as No. 3 in the nation. We can not fall below third. If changing to a primary would jeopardize our early state status, I would be concerned. We do have to work within the parameters of the party.”

But although the interests and incentives may be similar, the actions to this point in the cycle across the two parties are noteworthy. This primary effort may go forward with bipartisan support in the Nevada legislature, but both sides on the state level are cognizant of the stakes there and on the national party level. And so far the two parties have diverged in important ways. 

On the Republican side, there has been a concerted effort among carve-out state members of the Republican National Committee to band together in order to protect the status quo. That is why Nevada Republican Party chair, Michael McDonald acknowledged a desire in the state to be first but also noted that:

"We're united with the RNC to make that happen. We have a great working relationship with the four carve-out states and a great working relationship with the RNC. We respect each other and we don't intend to move anything. We respect each other's position."

Democrats in Nevada and nationally are performing a similar dance, but the one big thing to this point in how the calendar in particular is coming together for 2024 is that the same carve-out state coalition to protect the status quo start to the primary calendar has not yet materialized among the national party membership from those states. That is not to suggest that that will not happen. But it has not to this point, in stark contrast to how carve-out state Republicans are approaching the cycle. 

This may in retrospect months from now be much ado about nothing. But it could also be that once again there is a different approach to this across parties. And importantly that says something about the stability of the system long term. Changes tend to last when both parties agree to them, whether formally or informally. And there is a divergence between the two parties at this early juncture. 

Recent posts: 

Where Does New Hampshire Fit into All the Early 2024 Calendar Jockeying?

Montana Bill Would Shift Presidential Primary to March

Nevada's Willing, but Will the Stars Align for a Push to an Earlier Point on the 2024 Calendar?

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See more on our political/electoral consulting venture at FHQ Strategies.

Nevada's Willing, but Will the Stars Align for a Push to an Earlier Point on the 2024 Calendar?

Nevada pushed back into the news again yesterday. Michelle L. Price at the Associated Press reported that movers and shakers in the Silver state are attempting to position a potential new presidential primary there as the first-in-the-nation contest for the 2024 cycle. That is nothing new. In fact, FHQ just last week discussed the contours of such a shift in the context of a January Washington Post article on the matter. 

But there were some other interesting nuggets in that story worth reflecting on that are new. Last week, FHQ was more abstract and speculative when talking about the possibility of a Nevada presidential primary. Then, the idea of a state legislative push to establish a presidential primary election was definitely that: speculative. However, Price reported that legislation (with supposed bipartisan support) is likely for a legislature that just gaveled in for the session on February 1. There is no bill yet.

And that seemingly settles (or at least starts to settle) a question FHQ posed in the previous post: which route will Nevada decision-makers take? The state parties could seize this one by the reins and hold a party-run primary, but appears that there is support across party lines in the state legislature to create a state-run/state-funded presidential primary option. 

Of course, that leaves some of the previous questions from last week unanswered. Establishing a primary election is one thing, but scheduling it is another. How will any forthcoming legislation deal with that question (especially in light of the fact that neither national party has finalized much less really started finalizing their respective 2024 delegate selection rules)? Will legislators punt on that decision and pass a later bill scheduling the 2024 contest? Will they follow the lead of both New Hampshire and Georgia and leave the date unset, ceding the date-setting authority to, say, the secretary of state? The latter would potentially maximize the Nevada's ability to move on the fly and respond to any potential move by New Hampshire's secretary of state to stay first. [For the record, Bill Gardner, the secretary of state in the Granite state nonchalantly responded to the Nevada speculation in the AP story by suggesting that it would all settle out in good time.]

Furthermore, it should be noted that Nevada is no stranger to these sorts of attempted maneuvers. A 2013 bill, one that ended up going nowhere, sought not only establish a primary in late January, but allowed the secretary of state to change that date to an even earlier position should one or more of a list of western states tried to move in on Nevada's first-in-the-west position carved out by the national parties. This bill was resurrected (but mostly as a placeholder) in 2015. That bill was ultimately significantly amended and became the legislation that died at the end of the legislative session (in part because Harry Reid intervened).

That intervention is an important sidebar. Nevada's position as a carve-out state on the Democratic side has it codified in national party rules as a caucus state. Switching to a primary could have in 2015 jeopardized the Silver state's early position in future cycles. However, in the time since, the terrain has shifted away from caucuses on the Democratic side. The combination of Nevada's willingness to adopt a presidential primary as the means of allocating national convention delegates and Iowa Democrats' problematic implementation of their 2020 caucuses may play to Nevada's advantage during the 2024 cycle. But part of that willingness -- at least this early -- is about making the change to a primary and likely not yet selecting the date on which it will occur. That remains to be seen as one awaits any legislation to be introduced on the subject in the coming days and weeks. 

Keeping the date as an unknown not only likely helps grease the wheels with the national party, but would also aid the state in any prospective calendar battle with New Hampshire (and maybe Iowa) in 2023.

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Speaking of Iowa, the other tidbit worth flagging in Price's reporting for this story comes from the Hawkeye state. Earlier this week, FHQ wrote some about the standard operating procedure in Iowa with respect to protecting the caucuses' position. Typically, that means both state parties acting in concert with one another, banding together in defense of the caucuses. In the past that has worked. But there are signs of vulnerability on that front for the 2024 cycle. Republicans are there and so, too, is the newly elected Iowa Democratic Party chair. 

But there is dissension in the ranks of the Iowa Democratic state central committee about the prudence of protecting the caucuses this time around. After 2020, some on the committee view keeping the caucuses as an "uphill battle." And some in that camp see moving to a primary and focusing on "winning elections" in a state that became a deeper shade of red in the Trump era as a better path to take than clinging to the caucuses. 

That there is any division on the Democratic state committee on the matter of the caucuses is noteworthy. That division ultimately poses some trouble not only for Iowa Democrats in search of another cycle at the front of the primary calendar queue but potentially for Republicans as well. The interesting thing may be how carve-out state members of both the DNC and DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee work together (or if they do). Republicans from those states on the RNC are unified. Democrats may not be. And that speaks to the different priorities and incentives in both parties when it comes to the early 2024 calendar line up.

Recent posts: 

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See more on our political/electoral consulting venture at FHQ Strategies.

A Presidential Primary in Lieu of Caucuses in Nevada?

Circling back to this from Michael Scherer at the Washington Post nearly two weeks ago. 

The prospect of a presidential primary in Nevada is nothing new. That was true before 2008 when the Silver state was added to the early state line up on the presidential primary calendar. Nevada was a primary state, after all, when it sought to encroach on New Hampshire's privileged position in the first post-reform cycle. It is true even in the window of time since Nevada was added to the group of carve-out states. Efforts to establish a Nevada presidential primary were derailed in part by Harry Reid at the end of the 2015 state legislative session. 

The common thread across those two actions separated by nearly 50 years was Reid. And after Iowa's caucus snafu in 2020, Reid was not shy about promoting the virtues of Nevada as an alternative first-in-the-nation option. And the former Senate majority leader reiterated the proposal as 2020 came to a close.

But such a change is easier said than done. 

Political actors on the state level in Nevada are likely to wait for cover from the national parties first (which is to say after the national parties set their 2024 rules next year). Party leaders in the Silver state may have, as WaPo reported, "taken steps to shift to a presidential primary in 2024," but the full contours of finalizing such a decision may have the party out in front of its skis a bit. A full-on switch from a caucus system to a primary may correctly anticipate a change that may come down from the DNC anyway: a mandate (or close to it) for state parties to utilize primaries rather than caucuses to select and allocate national convention delegates in the next cycle. 

Yet, that raises some additional questions. First, through what means will Nevada Democrats attempt to make the caucus-to-primary shift? Does the state party unilaterally make the decision and opt for a party-run process? Or does the party lean on the state legislature to establish a state-funded, state-run primary option? The former may provide the party with some latitude in dealing with New Hampshire in a prospective calendar race while the latter may not remain in Democratic control after the 2022 midterms. [Silver state Republicans may not be as receptive to a primary after then as they were in 2015.] 

And there may or may not be a fight with New Hampshire depending on what rules the DNC drafts for 2024 (especially if that includes a primary mandate and/or resets the early primary calendar order).

That brings this around to the second question. Assuming there will be a Nevada presidential primary in some form or another in 2024, where will that primary fall on the calendar? The shift to a primary is something that can be done legislatively or through the state party before the national party rules are set. [The Nevada legislature is due to gavel in on February 1, but no legislation has been filed in advance to shift to a presidential primary.] But timing that contest is trickier. Again, it is here where national party cover may come in handy. If one or both of the national parties rejiggers the beginning of the calendar and Nevada claims that spot, then either the state party or the state government can move to schedule the contest early (or earlier than New Hampshire).

What is clear is that there is a sequence to all of this. Nevada Democrats could shift to a primary early on with or without any mandate from the national party. In fact, Silver state Democrats could use that as an argument to the DNC as to why they are prepared and ready to move into a bigger/earlier spot in the limelight. But only after having made that switch can (or will) the party move to schedule the contest. If both happen simultaneously, then it will all happen in 2023. But Nevada -- either the state legislature or state parties -- could act now to shift to a primary only to schedule it later when effective penalties are in place to deal with any rogue states (Iowa and/or New Hampshire).

All of this is speculative at this point in any event. The regular rhythm to this sequence is for the national parties to spend the year and a half after the presidential election year retrospectively considering the pros and cons of the previous cycle's primary season and making rules for the next cycle. Only then, in the year following the midterm elections, do state parties and state governments react and make their plans for the cycle in view of those rules/rules changes. There are exceptions to those rules, but they are rare. 

But this "which early states?" question will come up in the coming weeks and months. And Nevada will likely be a part of the discussion. 

Recent posts: 

Iowa, Democrats and 2024

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#InvisiblePrimary: Visible -- Anxious in Iowa and New Hampshire?

Thoughts on the invisible primary and links to the movements during the day that was...

If it is the year before a presidential election, then it is time once again for folks to wonder aloud about the role of Iowa and New Hampshire in the presidential nomination process.

No, this is not the strain that asks, and often too late, why are Iowa and New Hampshire first on the presidential primary calendar. The national party rules are set there and there are no direct threats to any of the four carve-out states at this time. Sure there are those who have raised the early voting window in California (and others who have urged caution there), but no state as of early 2019 is plotting to schedule a primary or caucus right on top of one or both of the two earliest states in the queue.

No, this is not about that.

Instead, it is another variant of the quadrennial strain of the Iowa and New Hampshire discussion, the one where some will wonder aloud whether this is the cycle that some candidate or group of candidates strategically looks beyond those states to other potentially more fertile electoral opportunities.

The New York Times' Jonathan Martin set off such a thread yesterday with this tweet:

The other big q looming over ‘20, that @LeahDaughtry gets at: will some (or 1) of candidates have a lighter footprint in heavily-white Iowa/NH, go harder Nev/SC before Super Tues? @KamalaHarris coming first to SC to speak to her fellow @akasorority1908 is no scheduling quirk

— Jonathan Martin (@jmartNYT) January 22, 2019

That, in turn, prompted New York Magazine's Gabriel Debenedetti cite worries in the Granite state...

there's real sensitivity to this already in NH, at least. The grumbling class operatives there are already lifting eyebrows at even the idea that there *might* be a perception that NH is at all sail-thru-able. https://t.co/NPkyV0ALV2

— Gabriel Debenedetti (@gdebenedetti) January 22, 2019

And The Guardian's Ben Jacobs to echo the same observation from the Hawkeye state.

Can confirm similar attitudes in Iowa https://t.co/9v5pkQilfo

— Ben Jacobs (@Bencjacobs) January 22, 2019

And FHQ is not here to dispute any of those observations. But I would say that none of that anxiety is particularly abnormal in either Iowa and New Hampshire. In fact, one could even argue that it is somewhat natural reaction for Democrats and Democratic activists in those states on the heels of a contest in 2016 that had a limited field and to be followed by a cycle that is shaping up to have no lack of candidates (in 2019 anyway). In other words, it has been since 2008 there has been as wide open a field of candidates on the Democratic side.

Expectations, then, are fairly high for visits and lots of them.

And those visits are likely to come, but in combinations that may differ from the expectations. Look, candidates are not going to skip Iowa or New Hampshire. They may adopt a strategy similar to Mitt Romney's in 2012 and emphasize one over the other -- New Hampshire over Iowa in Romney's case -- but they are not going to skip either one entirely to focus on some state deeper into the calendar. That has very simply been too big a strategic risk in the post-reform era. Players just do not successfully skip steps in a sequential game. It runs the risk of empowering other opposing players; not all of them, but some of them.

And that brings this back to Leah Daughtry's point in that Martin tweet above, the part about a "lighter footprint" in Iowa and New Hampshire to focus elsewhere. While the perception may exist in each of those states that they may be missing out in some way, there is not a lot of evidence to back it up at this point. Yes, a lot of candidates are heading to South Carolina, but they are heading to Iowa and New Hampshire in droves as well.

Among the announced candidates alone, their early itineraries included the earliest two states. Warren spent her first weekend post-rollout in Iowa and then spent the next two in New Hampshire. Castro hit Iowa and Nevada before his announcement and New Hampshire after it. Gillibrand did Colbert, ventured back to New York and then headed to the Hawkeye state. And Harris may be going to South Carolina first and then California, but ends up in Iowa.

Perhaps a "lighter footprint" strategy will develop in some campaign or campaigns as 2019 progresses, but the early signs are not exactly pointing in that direction. Iowa and New Hampshire remain winnowing contests for the candidate who are further down the list and opportunities for those most viable candidates. The strategies of that latter group will reflect that, and that will become clearer the closer 2020 gets.


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Elsewhere in the invisible primary...

1. South Bend mayor, Pete Buttigieg, is exploring a run.

2. Warren stops by Puerto Rico, which allocates delegates next year too.

3. New California governor, Gavin Newsom, has been testing digital messages outside of the Golden state in presidential general election battlegrounds.

4. The Harris campaign adding a number of former Clinton operatives is a noteworthy series of hires.

5. Klobuchar is reaching out to folks in New Hampshire to set up a potential visit.

6. Speaking of the Granite state, California congressman, Adam Schiff, has plans to head north.

7. Sherrod Brown is paying New Hampshire a visit as well, and his PAC has hired a former Sanders staffer.

8. One name to potentially strike -- perhaps in pencil -- from the list of those running for 2020 is Connecticut senator, Chris Murphy. He does not sound as if he is going to mount a bid.

9. Having stumped in Iowa already, Kirstin Gillibrand is taking the tour to South Carolina in the coming days.

10. Finally, Hickenlooper will rejoin the traveling party and trek back to Iowa.


Has FHQ missed something you feel should be included? Drop us a line or a comment and we'll make room for it.

DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee to Fix "Mistake" in Pre-Window Calendar

John DiStaso from WMUR in New Hampshire:

Democratic National Committeewoman Kathy Sullivan said she expects a correction will soon be made to the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee’s proposed 2020 schedule of early caucus and primary states to ensure no conflicts are on the horizon.

...

Sullivan said that due to a clerical error, the draft discussed at the meeting two weeks ago set up a potential conflict between New Hampshire and Nevada – not unlike a major controversy that erupted on the Republican side in the fall of 2011 prior to the 2012 primaries and caucuses.

...

“It was a mistake,” she said after conferring with DNC officials. “Everyone now understands and it was the intention that the calendar should be the same as it was in 2016.” In that year, the New Hampshire Primary was held on Feb. 9 and Nevada followed until 11 days later, Feb. 20.

Placing Nevada just four days after New Hampshire in the proposed Rule 12.A was something FHQ raised in the aftermath of the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee meeting in early May where the group adopted a framework for delegate selection rules in 2020. The fix is likely to occur when the RBC reconvenes in early June to finalize recommendations for changes to the delegate selection rules and call for the convention.

Democrats Chart Out 2020 Pre-Window Primary Calendar in Draft Delegate Rules

Update (5/24/18): The Rules and Bylaws Committee appears poised to alter the proposed rules change to bring the timing of the early states roughly in line with the calendar from 2016.

This past week as the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (RBC) reconvened to begin adopting a draft of the 2020 delegate selection rules, it quietly tackled the basic structure of the primary calendar. Seemingly, nothing out of the ordinary occurred. Even at the time the RBC was considering Rule 12 (Timing of the Delegate Selection Process), FHQ remarked on how the privileged positions of the carve-out states, a controversial topic at RBC meetings in past cycles, took a backseat to a proposed amendment to another section of the rule.

After a reading of the full text of the short rule, then, the committee moved into a discussion that had little to do with Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina. But the language of the adopted Rule 12.A is worth some time.

The calendar above depicts this, but here is the text of the draft Rule 12.A:

No meetings, caucuses, conventions or primaries which constitute the first determining stage in the presidential nomination process (the date of the primary in primary states, and the date of the first tier caucus in caucus states) may be held prior to the first Tuesday in March or after the second Tuesday in June in the calendar year of the national convention. Provided, however, that the Iowa precinct caucuses may be held no earlier than 29 days before the first Tuesday in March; that the New Hampshire primary may be held no earlier than 21 days before the first Tuesday in March; that the Nevada first-tier caucuses may be held no earlier than 17 days before the first Tuesday in March; and that the South Carolina primary may be held no earlier than 10 days before the first Tuesday in March.

There are a few things of note here:

1. First, if you are from New Hampshire, then you probably picked up on this when you saw the calendar at the top. A Nevada caucus just four days after the New Hampshire primary -- if Nevada Democrats opt to hold their precinct caucuses as early as the rule allows -- is a potential violation of the New Hampshire law requiring the Granite state primary to be at least seven days before any similar contest.

Now, I hear you. Who cares about New Hampshire's state law? Well, Granite state residents in general and Secretary of State Bill Gardner in particular care.¹ And the latter would likely act in accordance with the law to protect the seven or more day buffer between New Hampshire and any other state (with a similar contest).

That is what Secretary Gardner has done since the primary scheduling responsibility was granted to the New Hampshire secretary of state's office in 1976.


2. While any looming New Hampshire versus Nevada showdown over 2020 primary and caucus scheduling gives FHQ flashbacks to October 2011 -- the last gasp of 2012 calendar chaos -- it does not mean a similar fracas will break out in 2019.

At this point it all hinges on at least a couple of different inputs; one similar to the 2012 cycle and one different.

The similar condition is that one phrase tucked away in the operative clause in the New Hampshire state law:

The presidential primary election shall be held on the second Tuesday in March or on a date selected by the secretary of state which is 7 days or more immediately preceding the date on which any other state shall hold a similar election, whichever is earlier...

While there were efforts to further clarify the similar election phrase back in 2010, they did not go anywhere in the legislature. And that left in place a law that affords the secretary of state some latitude in defining and determining what a similar contest is. Is a caucus a similar election? Technically, yes, but over the years some distinction has been made about delegate selection. In fact, the proposed change to the law in 2010 defined that distinction, exempting from inclusion as a similar contest any caucus or contest that (directly) selects delegates to the national convention.

But that only gives some insight into the thinking of some in the Granite state, not where it matters. The secretary of state ultimately makes that determination, and Gardner has always played it close to the vest where the primary date is concerned. Was Nevada a similar contest in 2012? The secretary certainly implied as much in the game of brinksmanship with the Nevada GOP.

But Gardner was taking advantage of a power almost unique to New Hampshire. There is one decision maker behind the primary date, and he or she can wait and has waited longer than any other state to settle on a date when conflicts arise with other states. Gardner knows this. The national parties know this. That was part of the reason why it was the Nevada Republican Party that got pressure from the Republican National Committee to back down from the the 2011 fight and opt for a date not just four days after the New Hampshire primary.

Note, however, that in the 2020 context, it is the Democratic National Committee and not Nevada Democrats potentially behind any such conflict between New Hampshire and Nevada. The national party is the actor setting the parameters for contest date selection.

Of course, the DNC has clearly regarded Nevada as a dissimilar contest to the New Hampshire primary all along. For 2008, the cycle in which Nevada and South Carolina were added to the pre-window period in the Democratic process, the similar section of the then-Rule 11 placed the Nevada caucuses before New Hampshire. The Democratic calendar that year was supposed to look like this according to the rule:

Monday, January 14, 2008: Iowa caucuses
Saturday, January 19, 2008: Nevada caucuses
Tuesday, January 22, 2008: New Hampshire primary
Tuesday, January 29, 2008: South Carolina primary

In the dust-up with Florida and Michigan that cycle, New Hampshire pushed up more than Nevada did to defend its first-in-the-nation turf. Nevada Democrats were not willing to move up and actually followed the Rule 11. Of the four carve-out states, Nevada was the only one on the list that ended up on the date described in the rules-based calendar outline above.

Four years later, the DNC made adjustments to that calendar outline. Not only did the party push back the pre-window portion of the calendar from January to February, but also flipped Nevada and New Hampshire in the 2012 version of the then-Rule 11 relative to 2008.

Monday, February 6, 2012: Iowa caucuses
Tuesday, February 14, 2012: New Hampshire primary
Saturday, February 18, 2012: Nevada caucuses
Tuesday, February 28, 2012: South Carolina primary

That calendar should look familiar. Other than the South Carolina part, this is the exact spacing between the first three contests as is proposed for 2020. Nevada was supposed to have been just four days after the New Hampshire primary. Again, however, Florida, as it had in 2008, upset the applecart for 2012. When the Sunshine state scheduled its primary for January 31 that did not leave enough calendar space in which to schedule all four carve-out state contests 1) with the spacing state actors in those states preferred, 2) on the preferred days those four state customary hold contests, or 3) in line with the DNC calendar rubric above.

But what 2012 did produce was a rough model for the DNC to follow for 2016.² Basically, Iowa, then New Hampshire eight days later (as prescribed by Iowa law), followed by Nevada on a Saturday outside of New Hampshire's seven day buffer (again as prescribed by New Hampshire law) and with South Carolina bringing up the rear a week later than Nevada, also on its typical Saturday.


3. So what is driving the change to that 2016 model for 2020? What changed? Why change anything if the spacing is just right for the carve-out states?

The short answer is that that spacing is not just right for the four carve-out states.

To explain this scroll back up to the adopted Rule 12.A above and give it another glance.

Got it?

The DNC, then,  codifies the positions of the pre-window states by tethering them to the point on the calendar when the window opens; the earliest point when all the other states can begin holding their primaries and caucuses. First is Iowa, 29 days before the first Tuesday in March. That is unchanged relative to 2016. New Hampshire is next, allowed to hold its primary no earlier than 21 days before the first Tuesday in March. That, too, is the same as it was in 2016.

But while Iowa and New Hampshire retain the same positions on the 2020 calendar relative to both the (same) opening of the window and 2016, Nevada and South Carolina do not. Both of the other two carve-out states saw their positions relative to those two points -- the (same) opening of the window and 2016 -- move up by a week. Rather than holding its caucuses ten days prior to the first Tuesday in March (as was true in 2016), Nevada can now schedule its first determining step as early as 17 days before that point on the 2020 calendar.

Similarly, South Carolina in 2016 was allowed to schedule its primary up to three days before the first Tuesday in March. But for 2020, Democrats in the Palmetto state can hold its primary up to ten days before that point on the calendar.

What gives?

Before looking at it too closely, FHQ just assumed that the change was based on a different combination of days and dates in 2020. But that was not it. There are four Tuesdays and four Saturdays in February; enough to allow a repeat in the spacing from 2016. That was not the driving force in the change, and that means that there was an active push within the RBC to make a change.

To sandwich all four carve-out states into February and give each of the four the space they prefer from each other, one then ends up with something like 2016. But that clearly was not satisfactory to all those involved. While the four early states were provided enough of a buffer between themselves, the last contest -- South Carolina -- was not getting much space between it and the next round of contests; typically a big cluster at the point on the calendar where the window opens.

And this point has been clearly, although implicitly, made throughout the RBC meetings this year. Former DNC chair and South Carolina member on the RBC, Don Fowler, has raised the California primary moving from June to March at nearly every RBC meeting in 2018. And typically Mr. Fowler's comments have hinted at doing something about that; about California (and all of its delegates) being so early. And California is not alone on that date. This is not the first time that California will have been so early on the calendar, but it will be the first time that the primary in the largest state in the country has coincided with the primary in the second largest state Texas. The list does not stop there either. Already there are eight states with contests on March 3, 2020 and with the two most delegate-rich states among them, that group is likely to expand.

If you are an actor at the state level who wants your early contest to have maximum impact, then having a contest just three days prior to a likely huge cluster of contests is no way to do it. That is a good position if you want candidates to spend little time and even less money in your state before running for the nearest airport to jet off to some other state with more delegates at stake. That is why New Hampshire insists on the seven days between it and the next contest (not the preceding one): to maximize the impact of the contest on the shape of the race, but also to ensure that the candidates and their campaigns are not tempted to skip (or more likely minimize) the Granite state primary in favor of greener more delegate-rich pastures.

However, in giving South Carolina its own buffer, the DNC is potentially encroaching on another state's insulation. Nevada has gotten pushed into New Hampshire's territory on the calendar, and the question remains, do actors in the Granite state -- specifically the secretary of state there -- see Nevada in that position as a similar contest?

The DNC clearly does not see Nevada as a similar election. But if 2011 is any guide, then New Hampshire secretary of state Gardner is likely to see things differently than the DNC. Although, what is likely to be different in 2019 than it was in 2011 is that the calendar is unlikely to see any states outside of the four carve-out states force those states into January, much less close to pushing into late 2019. That potentially greatly reduces the pressure at the beginning of the calendar. New Hampshire may not threaten a move into 2019 in its own defense -- it would not have to -- but it could move up a week to give itself the at least seven days state law requires or two or three weeks if Iowa has already laid the groundwork for February 3 caucuses.

Regardless, this general outline of a calendar from the DNC puts all eyes squarely on New Hampshire. What else is new?

--
FHQ's 2020 presidential primary calendar has been updated to account for this proposed calendar. Tentative dates have been added for the four early states.


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¹ Yes, Gardner is facing a challenge in his bid to retain the secretary of state position this year, but Gardner or not in 2019, whoever is in that position is likely to do the same thing: keep the primary at least seven days ahead of the next contest.

² FHQ says rough because Iowa was pushed to a Tuesday caucus in 2012 since it was forced up against the New Year's holiday. That meant Iowa was just a week before New Hampshire rather than the eight days it has preferred.

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: SOUTH CAROLINA

This is part three of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

SOUTH CAROLINA

Election type: primary
Date: February 20 
Number of delegates: 50 [26 at-large, 21 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: winner-take-most/winner-take-all by congressional district
Threshold to qualify for delegates: n/a
2012: winner-take-most/winner-take-all by congressional district

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South Carolina is unique among its carve-out state brethren. Sure, the presidential primary in the Palmetto state is First in the South, but the South Carolina primary represents the lone exception to the proportional delegate allocation that the other three states -- Iowa, New Hampshire and Nevada -- use. Actually, that distinction means South Carolina is the only non-proportional state (at least by the Republican National Committee's standards) before March 15 opens the post-proportionlity period of the 2016 presidential primary calendar.

The other three carve-out states utilize an allocation system that proportionally allocates their respective shares of delegates based on the statewide result of the primary/caucus. South Carolina, on the other hand, is a state where the distinction between at-large and congressional district delegates matters. The key here is that in Iowa, New Hampshire and Nevada, the statewide vote affects a pool of delegates that includes at-large, congressional district and sometimes automatic delegates. In South Carolina the pool is separated. The statewide vote dictates who wins the 29 at-large and automatic delegates, and the results in the state's seven congressional districts directs the allocation of each district's respective three delegates.

If a candidate wins the statewide vote, that candidate claims all 29 delegates. If a candidate receives a plurality in one of the seven congressional districts, that candidate is awarded all three delegates from that district.

A statewide win means that the resulting allocation of delegates is weighted in favor of the winner. Said candidate would not only claim over half of the available delegates (29 out of 50), but would also be well-positioned on the congressional district level as well. Winning statewide tends to but does not necessarily mean doing well in the congressional district vote. While Newt Gingrich won South Carolina in 2012, he lost one congressional district and its two delegates to Mitt Romney. Similarly, John McCain won South Carolina in 2008, but split the then six congressional district with Mike Huckabee, yielding the former Arkansas governor 6 delegates.

In both cases, the winner left the South Carolina primary with at least a three to one delegate advantage over the next closest competitor. And in Gingrich's case, it was more than 10:1.

The South Carolina Republican allocation method, then, is built to advantage the winner more than a strictly proportional method of allocation, but less than a strictly winner-take-all scheme. It should be noted however, if a candidate wins statewide and in each of the seven congressional districts, then South Carolina essentially becomes a winner-take-all state.

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One additional area where there is some observed variation between states concerns how and how long delegates are bound to particular candidates at the national convention. The South Carolina Republican version of this has the delegates voting for the statewide winner or the winner of the congressional district on the first ballot only. If that candidate/those candidates is/are not nominated then those delegates are bound to the second or third place finisher statewide or at the congressional district level. If none of those three are nominated, then the delegates are unbound.

Presumably, the system works the same way for candidates who may have won South Carolina delegates, but who subsequently withdraw from the race. Those candidates are less likely -- obviously -- to have their name placed in nomination at the convention in Cleveland. But should a winning candidate withdraw, then their delegates are then bound to the second place finisher. If that candidate drops out, then the delegates go to the third top vote-getter. In both cases, that delegate transference is dependent upon the candidate ultimately being nominated. If not, then those delegates will be unbound free agents.

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State allocation rules are archived here.

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2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: IOWA

2016 Republican Delegate Allocation Rules by State

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2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: NEW HAMPSHIRE

UPDATED 2/9/16

This is part two of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Election type: primary
Date: presumably February 9 [not officially set yet]
Number of delegates: 23 [14 at-large, 6 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional based on statewide results
Threshold to qualify for delegates: 10%
2012: proportional primary

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The more things change, the more they stay the same.

While the presidential primary calendar and the position of New Hampshire primary specifically have changed over the years, the Granite state has always maintained its position as the first presidential primary in the queue and has had the same method of allocating national convention delegates for the majority of the post-reform era. That is to say, New Hampshire has been first and has allocated a share of its apportioned delegates to candidates based on their statewide performance in the presidential primary.

There is a 10% threshold set by state law that candidates must reach or surpass in order to qualify for delegates, but New Hampshire, with so few delegates traditionally, is customarily less about the delegate score than it is about winning, placing or showing (as compared to expectations). Winning some small fraction of just 23 delegates means less, in other words, than punching one of the limited number of tickets out of the Granite state. It is the result that tends to winnow the field rather than the delegate haul.

Still, since FHQ is here to discuss delegate allocation, let's do so fully. The one caveat to all of this is that fractional delegates round to the nearest whole number. Any leftovers -- unallocated delegates -- are awarded to the top vote-getter. 2012 offers a nice example of this practice. Mitt Romney won just under 40% of the vote. That cleared the 10% threshold and meant he was awarded a 39.3% share of the 12 delegates that were available in New Hampshire (post-penalty). The former Massachusetts governor and eventual nominee received 5 delegates, Ron Paul netted 3 and Jon Huntsman got 2.¹ The two remaining unallocated delegates -- again, out of 12 -- were allocated to Romney, the winner of the statewide vote. Romney, then, received less than half of the statewide vote, but got more than half of the available Granite state delegates.

There is, then, a little boost that is provided to the winner in the event that there are unallocated delegates. That advantage may be enhanced even more depending on which candidates in a large field clear the 10% threshold. If many candidates qualify for delegates, the winner's cushion will be minimal, but if just a handful of candidates meet the vote share requirement, the number of unallocated delegates to be awarded to the winner will increase.

If we were to use the Huffington Post Pollster average (as of 2/9/15) in the New Hampshire polls here is who would qualify for delegates:

Trump -- 31.0% -- 7 delegates  

Rubio -- 14.7% -- 3 delegates 

Kasich -- 14.1% -- 3 delegates 

Cruz -- 11.9% -- 3 delegates 

Bush -- 10.2% -- 2 delegates

That leaves 5 unallocated delegates; all of which would go to Trump. No, 12 total delegates is not that big of a deal in the grand scheme of things. However, 1) that is a victory with a nice resultant delegate advantage and 2) means that the winner -- Trump in this case -- would leave the Granite state with over half the delegates from a proportional primary. That latter fact is more significant in the race to secure majority control of at least 8 state delegations to be placed in nomination at the convention. That is an important point in the face of the arguments that proportional allocation in states will make getting to majority control in eight states more difficult. Yes, but it is more nuanced than that.

Finally, should a candidate who has won New Hampshire delegates withdraw from the nomination race, that candidate's delegates are released and free to support a candidate of their choosing.

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State allocation rules are archived here.


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¹ It is important to note that the denominator in determining the percentage is the total statewide vote and not the total of just the candidates over 10%. That, along with the number of candidates over the threshold, has big implications for how many unallocated delegates there will be.

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2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: IOWA

This is part one of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable. 

IOWA

Election type: caucus
Date: February 1
Number of delegates: 30 [15 at-large, 12 congressional district, 3 automatic]
Allocation method: proportional based on statewide results
Threshold to qualify for delegates: Somewhere between some small fraction of the vote above 0 and 1.67%.¹
2012: non-binding caucus

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Back in the summer, FHQ discussed how Iowa Republicans could respond to the new-for-2016 RNC requirement that states bind their delegates to candidates based on the results of the preference vote in primaries and caucuses. As first in the primary calendar queue, the Republican Party of Iowa has a bit of a balancing act to pull off and with a number of options to boot. On the one hand, the party could have chosen to hold winner-take-all caucuses (Carve-out states do not fall under the proportionality requirement.). And while that would have had Iowa giving a candidate a sizable delegate boost right out of the gates, going that route is not all that consistent with how the national party views Iowa's and the other carve-out states' role in the process; as part of the "on-ramp".² Iowa also has some interest in retaining its first-in-the-nation status. Acting counter to the intent of the national party is not in the the way to achieve that outcome.

Instead, Iowa Republicans opted to comply with the new binding requirement by adopting a strictly proportional method of allocating its 30 delegates to the national convention in Cleveland.³ And they did so in the simplest terms, tying the delegate allocation to the statewide vote in the February 1 caucuses (rather than splitting it up based on the statewide and congressional district results). Candidates, then, will win delegates approximately in proportion to their vote in the caucuses assuming they receive at least a 3.33% share of the vote to mathematically qualify for delegates.

The caucus/convention process will then proceed as it always has. The difference in 2016 will be that delegate slots will be bound to candidates based on the collective precinct caucus results. Those slots will be filled in subsequent steps of the process. That is the big change for Iowa and the majority of other non-binding caucus states from 2012.⁴

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State allocation rules are archived here.


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¹ If n-1 candidates all receive a share of the vote that rounds their share of delegates awarded up, and if there is still an unallocated delegate, then that last candidate would be granted that delegate by virtue of being "closest to the rounding threshold". This is technically true even if that candidate -- the last remaining candidate -- receives just one vote. Now, this is unlikely to happen, but does give us some indication that, depending on how the vote breaks, Iowa could allocate delegates to some candidate with virtually no threshold.

² Roughly, that "on-ramp" is a sequential retail politics environment that gives voters in smaller states the opportunity to meet and hear from the candidates face-to-face. By extension that levels the playing field by not forcing candidates, their campaigns and attendant super PACs to immediately prepare for a multi-state fight waged over the airwaves. In other words, the on-ramp is intended to nurture competition and potentially create momentum behind any candidate, regardless of resources.

³ Here is the relevant section from Article VIII of the Bylaws of the Republican Party of Iowa:

⁴ Importantly, if only one candidate is placed in nomination at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, then the entire Iowa delegation is bound to vote for that candidate.

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2016 Republican Delegate Allocation Rules by State

North Carolina Presidential Primary Shifts to March 15 After McCrory Signature

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