Invisible Primary: Visible -- Presidential Primary Runoffs?

Thoughts on the invisible primary and links to the goings on of the moment as 2024 approaches...

My former UGA colleagues, Charles Bullock and Loch Johnson, have an interesting take on the presidential nomination process up over at The Bulwark. Runoffs in Georgia are out of vogue these days after two consecutive electoral cycles with high profile Senate overtime elections, but that has not stopped Bullock and Johnson from suggesting that adding runoff elections to the presidential nomination process might help to provide some guardrails against novice and/or extremist candidates. Maybe. 

But the whole concept is premised on the idea that the Republican presidential nomination process is winner-take-all; that a candidate can win a mere plurality by just one vote and still win all of the delegates from a state. It is not. There were 19 truly winner-take-all contests in the 2020 Republican presidential nomination process, meaning that 37 other primaries, caucuses and conventions had some other form of delegate allocation rules. And sure, Bullock and Johnson discussed all of this in the context of Trump's 2016 victory, not 2020. But there were ten fewer truly winner-take-all contests then. 

Look, there may be something to requiring a candidate to win a majority in a primary or caucus in order to win delegates (not to mention broaden a candidate's appeal). But a separate runoff is not necessary in order to accomplish that. In fact, there are already rules on the Republican National Committee (RNC) books that do that and have been in place since the 2012 cycle. Under the rules, states can circumvent the ban on truly winner-take-all rules before March 15 by using a baseline proportional allocation method with a winner-take-all trigger. Candidates have to hit 50 percent of the vote statewide in order to activate that trigger. There were 17 such proportional states in 2020 before and after March 15.

What's more Bullock and Johnson suggest ranked choice voting (RCV) as a means of avoiding the administrative and financial strain a subsequent presidential primary runoff election may place on states. The irony, of course, is that the RCV alternative they propose is the same one that Republican state legislators across the country are considering banning during this current state legislative season. [FHQ really needs to update the 2023 RCV legislation post. But it is the ban legislation that is actually moving through legislatures rather than the bills to institute RCV.]

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Republican county chairs prefer DeSantis over Trump. This piece was built on survey work that Seth Masket has been doing this cycle. Masket undertook a similar endeavor four years ago in the midst of the Democratic process. His work continues to be invaluable. 

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Governor Glenn Youngkin (R-VA) doing a CNN town hall will do little to quell the presidential chatter that has quietly operated on the fringes of the Republican invisible primary for some time. That said, some donors have not viewed him as an "all-in candidate" in recent days. That is not to say that the governor cannot rev things up in the money primary at some point, but he would likely have to make that transition to "all-in" first. ...at the very least in the eyes of the donors.

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On this date...

...in 1992, it was Super Tuesday, but a less super Super Tuesday than the Southern Super Tuesday of the 1988 cycle. Much of the southern states held together again in 1992, but Georgia moved earlier (as allowed under DNC rules that cycle) and states like Alabama, Arkansas and North Carolina moved back to consolidated dates later in the process.

...in 2000, a western subregional primary of sorts was held. Rare Friday primaries in Colorado and Utah and Republican caucuses in Wyoming occurred on March 10. 

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Recent posts:

Maryland Bills Would Resolve Presidential Primary Conflict with Passover...

Invisible Primary: Visible -- Doing the things that prospective candidates do

Invisible Primary: Visible -- Winner-take-most, please

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See more on our political/electoral consulting venture at FHQ Strategies. 

Rules Tweak Alters How Republican Delegates Will Be Bound in 2024

Veterans of the primary wars will recall how Florida and Michigan jumped the queue and held unsanctioned presidential primaries outside of the national party rules during the 2008 cycle. Following that incursion into the early window, both national parties sought to change their respective rules in an attempt to rein in would-be rogue states in future cycles. 

But it didn't take. ...not immediately, anyway.

Despite an informal agreement between the national parties to dial back the beginning of primary season for 2012, it happened again. Florida and Michigan once more held contests before Super Tuesday and were joined by Arizona as well. The start point for all of the states except the earliest four was moved back a month from the first Tuesday in February to the first Tuesday in March, but the penalties -- especially on the Republican side -- remained the same in 2012 as they were in 2008.

It was not until the 2016 cycle when the Republican National Committee (RNC) bifurcated its penalty structure, creating a super penalty for timing violations and a separate 50 percent penalty for those states that broke the allocation rules, that the previously rogue states were finally kept in check.

That offers a cautionary tale for national parties crafting rules to elicit corrective behavior from actors on the state level. Often it can take more than one round -- one cycle -- to get right. 

And so it is in another problem area in the Republican delegate selection process. After all, it was not just Arizona, Florida and Michigan that caused the RNC headaches during the 2012 cycle. There were also a series of states that held non-binding preference votes at precinct caucuses, most of them early in the sequence, that sent roughly 15 percent of the total number of Republican delegates at stake to the 2012 convention in Tampa. But the early timing of most of those "beauty contests" was rather minor. The problem was that preference votes were taken, but had no bearing on the ultimate delegate allocation and selection. 

There could, for example, be a battle between Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum about who won the 2012 Iowa caucuses on the night of the contest, but that had little influence on a delegate selection process that saw Ron Paul out-organize both in subsequent rounds of the caucus-convention process and take more (Paul-aligned but technically unbound) delegates to the convention. 

Two problems emerged from that 2012 experience for Republicans. The first was that states could skirt the timing rules by holding events -- caucuses or conventions -- early. States could gain candidate and media attention and potentially influence the sequential nomination process with nothing, or comparatively little, on the line. That was not against the rules, but it was counter to the spirit of the rules. 

Second, it left any delegates that came out of such processes on the state level technically unbound heading into the national convention; free agents of a sort. This left the door open to a factional candidate possibly outflanking a frontrunner, or even a presumptive nominee, in the delegate selection process and gobbling up, again, technically unbound, delegate slots to the national convention. Done properly, such a candidate could have his or her name placed in nomination and have aligned delegates in positions to fight for rules changes and/or platform additions. 

Ron Paul test drove this tactic in 2008, honed it in 2012 and left lingering whether it would be of consequence for his son in a wide open 2016 Republican nomination race. That, too, may not have been against the rules, but it was still, perhaps, counter to the spirit of the rules.

Of course, one of the controversial rules changes that came out of the rules fights at the 2012 Republican National Convention was one adding new language directly dealing with binding and allocation. It was an attempt at closing the unbound delegate selection event loophole; one intended to solve both problems above. And just as was the case in the transition from 2008 to 2012, when the calendar start point was dialed back, it worked to push most states in line. Notably, Iowa, for example switched from a non-binding caucus in 2012 to one that proportionally allocated delegates based on the statewide results to the precinct caucuses in 2016.

But just like Arizona, Florida and Michigan and those timing rules of 2012, there were some states that once again sought to circumvent the new national party rules on binding for 2016 and stick with their more traditional unbound formulas. It was a smaller pool of potential delegates -- down to just under 5 percent total in 2016 from 15 percent in 2012 -- but it was still a pool of delegates allocated and selected in a manner that did not completely square with the intent of the rules changes. 

The RNC did more or less navigate through this issue during 2016. The party interpreted the rules to include any pledges that delegate candidates made to presidential candidates when filing to run in states like Colorado and Wyoming. Only North Dakota's Republican process among the states ultimately avoided making any real changes and maintained a fully unbound delegation. None had preference votes for presidential candidates, but some delegates were bound due to those pledges (Colorado and Wyoming) while others were not (North Dakota).

However, the 2016 Republican nomination process offered one other wrinkle to this rules saga as it played out. The process pointed out that, while a candidate could be allocated delegate slots and have those slots bound to them and their potential nomination, those delegates -- the people who filled the allocated slots -- may not actually be aligned with that particular candidate. One could see Trump-allocated delegates who were actually aligned with Ted Cruz, for instance. In turn, that raised the specter that if there were enough Trump-bound, but Cruz (or whomever)-aligned delegates at the convention, then mischief could occur. Changes could be made to the rules package on which the convention would eventually vote that could swing the nomination away from the plurality (vote) winner/majority (delegates) winner from primary season, Trump. 

And, indeed, this was a topic of conversation after Donald Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee after the Indiana primary in early May 2016 when all of his main competitors withdrew from the race. A contentious pre-convention meeting of the (convention) Rules Committee seemingly put the matter to rest, ending the talk of releasing 2016 delegates aligned with other candidates and clearing the path for Trump to be nominated in Cleveland.

Yet, that merely resolved the binding issue for 2016. And a rules tweak on the matter for 2020 was less than necessary with an incumbent president seeking renomination/reelection. The party simply carried over its 2016 rules to the 2020 cycle. But for Republican rules makers looking ahead to 2024, further clarifying the rule could close the loophole exploited by states and candidates from 2008-2016.

The same rules that governed both the 2016 and 2020 processes emerged from the 2020 convention in Charlotte. But under its Rule 12 powers, the RNC adopted a series of amendments to the 2024 rules in April 2022. It brought back the debates committee and adjusted the end of the primary calendar. And it also augmented its rules on binding 2024 delegates. 

Here is the language of Rule 16(a)(1) that came out of the Tampa convention in 2012 and was used in 2016, carried over to 2020 and came out of the Charlotte convention in 2020:

Any statewide presidential preference vote that permits a choice among candidates for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in a primary, caucuses, or a state convention must be used to allocate and bind the state’s delegation to the national convention in either a proportional or winner-take-all manner, except for delegates and alternate delegates who appear on a ballot in a statewide election and are elected directly by primary voters.

And here is how the RNC tweaked it in April 2022 [changes marked in bold italics]: 

Any statewide presidential preference vote that permits a choice among candidates for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in a primary, caucuses, or a state convention must be used to allocate and bind the state’s delegation to the national convention in either a proportional or winner-take-all manner for at least one round of balloting, except for delegates and alternate delegates who appear on a ballot in a statewide election and are elected directly by primary voters or delegates bound to a candidate that withdraws from the presidential race. States wishing to unbind delegates pursuant to this rule must specify the criteria for doing so in the filing submitted to the Republican National Committee in accordance with paragraph (f)(1) of this rule. 

Much of the language is the same, but it importantly requires state parties to bind delegates for at least one round of balloting at the national convention. And it has been since the 1950s that a convention has gone beyond one roll call ballot. The rule further buttresses that mandate by requiring states to specify the process by which delegates would become unbound. In other words, the delegate selection plans state parties must submit to the RNC under Rule 16(f)(1) must lay out at what point -- after how many roll call ballots -- delegates become free agents (in the off-hand chance it goes beyond that point). 

And honestly, most state parties were already doing this. Look at the third column from the right in the chart here. Most states have been doing this, but the change above forces the handful of laggards in line. Those changes tighten up the rules and leave a lot less room to maneuver toward the types of mischief that have occurred in recent cycles. 

Caucus states can still go the North Dakota route in 2024, but it would be difficult to justify in light of the above rules and the fact that most states had a statewide preference vote and/or had delegate candidates pledge to particular presidential candidates in the immediately preceding cycles, competitive or otherwise.

And yes, the national convention remains the highest authority in these matters. A convention could adopt rules counter to the intent of the above, but would only do so after primary season has played out in all 56 states and territories under those rules. That is easy to say, even easier to consider, but hard to pull off in real time after voters have voted and indicated a winner (even if by plurality).

Is that binding loophole completely closed now? No, but it is a much tighter one after these changes than it was. Rules matter. 

...even after seemingly small changes.

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Recent posts:

The Republican Rules for 2024 Present Some Calendar Opportunities

New Hampshire Senate Advances Resolution Affirming FITN Support

Ohio Secretary of State's Office Dismisses Need to Move Presidential Primary to May

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See more on our political/electoral consulting venture at FHQ Strategies.

Primary Movement Starts with the State Legislatures (2023)

The National Conference of State Legislatures has this calendar as well, but in alphabetical order. FHQ is more concerned with sequence. Which state legislatures convene first (1), when do their sessions end (2) and how does this impact the scheduling of presidential primaries (3)? 

[Much more below the calendar.]

2023 State Legislative Session Calendar (sequential)
Date (Convene)	States	Date (Adjourn)
January 2, 2023	Montana1 Ohio1	May 111 year-round2
January 3	Kentucky1 Minnesota1 Mississippi1 North Dakota1 Pennsylvania1 Rhode Island1 Washington, DC1 Wisconsin1	April 131 May 221 April 3n1 April 281 year-round2 year-round2 year-round2 year-round2
January 4	California3 Connecticut1 Maine4 Massachusetts1 Missouri1 Nebraska1 New Hampshire1 New York1 Vermont1	year-round2 June 71 June 211 year-round2 May 301 May 261 January 3, 20241 year-round2 May 91
January 9	American Samoa1 Arizona1 Arkansas1 Colorado1 Guam1 Georgia1 Idaho1 Indiana1 Iowa1 Kansas1 Puerto Rico1 Virgin Islands1 Washington1	--1 April 221 March 101 May 91 December 311 March 301 April 81 February 81 May 171 May 121 --1 year-round2 April 291
January 10	Delaware1 South Carolina1 South Dakota1 Tennessee1 Texas1 Wyoming1	January 9, 20241 year-round2 March 271 May 61 May 291 March 31
January 11	Illinois1 Maryland1 Michigan1 New Jersey1 North Carolina1 Virginia1 West Virginia1	year round2 April 101 year round2 year round2 July 281 February 251 March 111
January 17	Alaska1 New Mexico1 Oregon1 Utah1	April 171 March 181 June 261 March 31
January 18	Hawaii1	May 4
February 6	Nevada Oklahoma	June 5 May 26
March 7	Alabama Florida	June 8 May 5
April 10	Louisiana	June 8
Notes: 1 States in italics are caucus states. State parties and not state legislatures control the scheduling of those contests. 2 State legislatures whose session calendars have them meeting throughout the year. 3 Technically, California opened its 2023 legislative session with an organizational session on December 5, 2022. That counted as the first legislative day of the session, but the legislature was in recess thereafter until January 4, 2023. 4 Technically, Maine opened its 2023 legislative session with an organizational session on December 7, 2022. That counted as the first legislative day of the session, but the legislature was in recess thereafter until January 4, 2023.

2023 in the state legislatures
The table answers the first two of the three questions posed above. However, with the schedule of state legislative sessions down, what impact will that have on the formation of the 2024 presidential primary calendar? The biggest thing is that 2024 is not 2020. The partisan tables are turned with the Republican Party gearing up for an active and competitive nomination race while Democrats are less likely at this time to have one with an incumbent in the White House. Most recently the topline conditions that match best are from the last time a Democratic incumbent sought renomination, 2012. But that was a completely different environment with respect to the emerging primary calendar.

For starters, both parties allowed states to conduct February contests in 2008. Yet, given the flirting that early states like Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina did with the idea of late 2007 primaries or caucuses, both national parties made rules changes for 2012 intended to push back the start of primary season. And those changes meant that entering this period in the 2012 cycle -- early 2011 -- there were roughly 20 states with laws on the books that scheduled primaries that were not in compliance with the new national party rules. In other words, there was a tension at this point in the 2012 cycle that does not exist today. There was built-in and expected primary movement then that is not present in 2023 (or at least not present at near the same level). 

However, the backwards movement that characterized a lot of calendar movement for 2012 continued in 2013-14. And importantly for 2016, past rogue states like Florida, Michigan and Arizona moved back from the brink. But the 2020 cycle saw California move all of its delegates from June all the way back up to Super Tuesday in March, further concentrating just how many delegates were at stake so early in the process. What 2016 and 2020 demonstrated was that the national parties had -- at least for those two cycles -- devised a workable mix of penalties and bonuses to keep states in line.

Will that hold in 2024? The early indications are less clear than they have been in recent cycles, but 2023 will settle that score.

Here are a few things to look out for as state legislative session progress (mostly) over the first half of  2023 and into the latter half of the year.


1. Primary movement or primary movement?
There are at least a couple of different categories of primary movement. One is the movement of existing primaries from one spot on the calendar to another. The late 2022 attempt to shift the Michigan presidential primary from March to February is one such example. With Michigan factoring into the Democratic National Committee pre-window plans, one can expect further action on this front in the Great Lakes state in the coming months.  

The other type of primary movement concerns changes to the mode of delegate selection: primary or caucus. Every cycle there is at least some movement from primary to caucus or from caucus to primary. There has been a push in the Democratic process since 2016 to move away from caucuses in favor of primaries, whether state government- or state party-run. Democratic-controlled states on the whole shifted to state government-run contests for 2020 while the most of the rest adopted delegate selection plans with state party-run primaries. Only Iowa, Nevada and Wyoming kept caucuses intact. And the Covid-19 pandemic claimed the Wyoming caucuses, forcing the state party to use a mail-in process that more closely resembled a primary. In the intervening time, the Nevada legislature passed a bill establishing a presidential primary that was signed into law in 2021. And Iowa Democrats pledged during their pitch to the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) to protect their early calendar position to adopt a mail-in process that makes the Democratic caucuses there caucuses-in-name-only. 

Primary to caucus movement or vice versa will likely be more mixed on the Republican side of the ledger. A number of state Republican parties scaled down their operations for 2020 with an incumbent seeking renomination. A handful of primary states shifted to caucuses and a fair number of caucus states cancelled those contests in favor of other means of delegate selection. [Democrats on the state level followed much the same route in a number of states in 2012 when the party was last defending the White House.] But those Republican moves for 2020 will likely reverse to some extent for 2024. Yet, at least one Republican-controlled state, Missouri, has already eliminated its primary for 2024. Although there is an effort to reestablish it. Of course, with a competitive nomination race, there could be movement in one or both directions as state Republican parties potentially consider which mode -- primary or caucus -- helps one candidate or type of candidate over others. 

2. Likely Movers
As noted above, the impetus to move for 2024 is different than it was in the recent past. Democrats are idle at this time, so the motivation is less pronounced for states to move their contests around because of an active nomination race. Granted, the calendar proposal adopted by the DNCRBC will trigger some activity. Michigan fits in there as may some other states. But are there some states more likely to move than others?

When one thinks about that, there are a few factors for which to account. FHQ will not be exhaustive here, but only point toward the most likely factors motivating primary movement. One is where the contests are currently scheduled. The movement seen so far for the 2024 cycle has been focused more on states switching modes rather than switching positions on the calendar. But later states are more likely to be motivated to move up on the calendar than early states are to move back. Yes, the Louisiana primary shifted to a later date for 2024 in 2021, but that was due to a non-compliance issue. There are a handful of other states that face non-compliance issues as well, but that is because of a change in Republican National Committee (RNC) rules and they are at the end of the calendar.

But second, look to the partisan alignment of state legislatures. That has not been a significant factor in past iterations of my research, but in an increasingly polarized environment, may be becoming a more significant one now. Republican-controlled states, then, might be more inclined to seek out earlier dates. Look, in particular and as noted above, at the Republican-controlled group of states with early June primary dates as of now. Also states like Florida and Ohio with mid-March primaries may be motivated to move to even earlier dates. A wide open Republican race (not to mention favorite son candidates in Florida's case) may draw them to earlier dates for 2024.

Contrast that with the Democratic-controlled state governments across the country. Their motivation is different. Diversify the beginning of the calendar? Protect the president and/or create a smoother path to renomination? Affect the Republican process? Any movement among Democratic states is likely to be if not minimal, then narrow and particularized. 


3. Regional primaries
Part of what drove the mid-Atlantic/northeastern states back in 2012 and kept them there for 2016 and 2020 was the allure of a regional primary clustering bonus provided for in the rules of the Democratic National Committee. Neighboring states that hold their primaries together and late enough on the calendar are rewarded with additional delegates; more activists they can take to the convention. That is no small thing for a small state. While a later contest date potentially means a lesser voice for a given state in the primary process, it means a greater voice at the convention.

And that bonus may hold more sway this time around without an active nomination race than it has in the most recent cycles. Of course, this would mainly be a Democratic phenomenon and one that may be more active in the likely absence of a competitive nomination race if states opt to collectively chase the bonuses with less on the line (and less need to hold early contests).

4. Priorities for election legislation at the state level

This is a factor that has weighed on me since the 2020 election in trying to handicap what we may witness in 2023 with respect to presidential primary movement. Republican state legislatures have moved in that time to protect what the party collectively views as threats to election integrity while Democrats on the state level have focused on combatting what they see as voter suppression. Yes, state legislators can walk and chew gum at the same time, so it is possible to both fight the above fights and also move primaries around for 2024. 

Inevitably, there will be legislation proposed across the country to move primaries to varying points on the calendar, but does such legislation take a backseat in the legislative process to potentially higher priorities on electoral matters? That strikes FHQ as a big question heading into 2023. Yes, rules changes in both national parties will affect some change at the margins, and although there may be some fallout from and noise about the Democrats' proposed changes to the beginning of the calendar, this may -- MAY -- be a quiet year overall for calendar movement.¹ And what is likely to keep things quiet-ish is that the parties have a pretty good mix of rules and penalties in place to deal with most rogue states not named Iowa and New Hampshire. And honestly, those rules and penalties have not been tested on the traditionally earliest pair of states.

Anyway, as state legislatures begin to convene as they have over the last week, they will be considering any number of things. Undoubtedly though, that will include primary calendar movement if not caucus to primary movement.

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¹ Even with the proposed changes, one can map out the range in which most states are likely to fall on the calendar at this point. 

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Recent posts:

"It will be a state-sponsored public opinion poll"

It Isn't Just the Democrats Who Are Shaking up the 2024 Presidential Primary Calendar

New Hampshire Democrats' Lose-Lose Predicament

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See more on our political/electoral consulting venture at FHQ Strategies.   

Why Can't Nevada Just Replicate New Hampshire's Calendar Strategy?

Just 1 amendment added. The same one NH has. Must be 7 days before another state with a similar contest. 🤷‍♂️

What’s so complicated.

— Adam Shepherd (@IgiesZ) February 17, 2021

What's so complicated? 

That was the question that FHQ got in response to our recent rundown of the problems inherent in the Nevada bill introduced this week to challenge New Hampshire's (and Iowa's) entrenched primacy at the front of the queue on the presidential primary calendar.

And it is not an unreasonable proposition: amend the currently flawed bill that schedules the would-be newly established Nevada presidential primary for the next to last Tuesday in January, leaving the state vulnerable to a New Hampshire leapfrog with no recourse for the Silver state. That is indeed a simple addendum. And while it replicates part of the mechanism that New Hampshire has utilized with success over the years to protect its first in the nation status, it leaves in this case some unanswered questions in the Nevada context.

Let's assume for a moment that Nevada lawmakers do, in fact, amend AB 126, adding a provision like New Hampshire's that requires the Silver state presidential primary to be seven days before any other similar contest. Who or what makes that happen? Who implements that provision? In New Hampshire, that decision has been left to the discretion of the secretary of state since 1976. And Bill Gardner, the secretary of state in the Granite state during the whole interim period has proven adept at waiting other states out and then scheduling the state's presidential primary. That one person has that decision-making authority (and has protected New Hampshire's first-in-the-nation status so successfully time after time) is no small thing. As I discussed in my dissertation research, states may have the willingness to move a primary (or in this case challenge for first-in-the-nation status), but do they have the ability. New Hampshire has with its system. Nevada may if the legislature cedes the date-setting authority to its secretary of state. 

The state legislative route has proven a less fruitful path throughout the post-reform era. If the Nevada legislature retained the authority to set the date then it might run the risk in 2023 -- after a 2022 midterm election, for example -- of getting bogged down in a partisan clash over calendar positioning. That could even occur within any Democratic majority that may survive the midterms intact. And furthermore, it could be constrained by the time in which the legislature is in session. This is why states like Georgia and Colorado moved to empower their secretary of state or governor, respectively, to make the decision on where on the calendar the states' presidential primaries will be scheduled. 

So that question presents one complicating factor. 

Note that the above only considers an interstate conflict between Nevada and New Hampshire; one that includes both state governments and state parties as stakeholders. But those are not the exclusive stakeholders in the "who goes first?" conundrum. The national parties also have some say in this. And sure, folks in the Granite state will argue that no matter what the national parties dictate, New Hampshire is going to follow state law and set its primary -- compliant with national party rules or not -- at the beginning of the calendar. That has worked in the past even before the time in which the Iowa and New Hampshire were codified into the national parties' rules. New Hampshire would basically blackmail candidates, daring them to campaign in other rogue states encroaching on New Hampshire's position. Prospectively being dead in New Hampshire at the outset of a long and arduous campaign through a three to five month calendar of contests was enough to keep most candidates in line and protect New Hampshire. 

But times and conditions have changed. The national parties have only gotten more hands-on in their approach to the nominating process as it has increasingly nationalized and pushed more meaningfully into the invisible primary. New Hampshire may also dare the national parties to sanction them, but there really has not been a valid test of the hypothesis that New Hampshire has those national party penalties levied against the state. We do not know how candidates would react to that, especially in the context of a disputed claim to first-in-the-nation status. 

And Nevada may be in the process of laying a claim to that status. However, it is a somewhat ham-handed attempt. And would be even with a provision added to mimic the "seven days before any other similar contest" line in the New Hampshire law. FHQ says this because the bill is clearly intended as a provocation:

“It would not be ideal to just have a back-and-forth and just have a leapfrog exercise,” he [Nevada Assembly Speaker Jason Frierson (D)] said, “so the hope is that we can coordinate with the national party as well as our states, and work something out.” Frierson said he “certainly [is] not trying to start some dispute between states,” adding that “this is the beginning of the conversation.”

It is not clear that this starting point to the conversation is one that the Democratic National Committee endorses. Yes, the national party may want a change at the beginning of the calendar to demographically diversify the kickoff event so that it better aligns with the Democratic primary electorate, but it may want a more deft handling of the approach than the shot across the bow that Nevada has offered to this point. 

As an aside, I can still hear members of the DNC complaining about both Democratic legislators in Florida who voted for the bill to move the Sunshine state presidential primary into January for 2008 and even more about how "whiny" the state party was when the DNC sanctioned them and offered to help organize later caucuses that would be compliant. And those comments were four years later. 

By provoking a clash, Nevada Democrats in the state party and the state legislature may be inviting the ire of the DNC in a way that ultimately gets both Nevada and New Hampshire penalized and another state elevated to the first primary position (whether either state has a "seven days before any other similar contest" provision or not).

And it is not that Nevada has this completely wrong. The impulse to shift from a caucus to a primary is a shrewd one, one that potentially brings the state into the good graces of the national party at a time when the DNC seems more inclined than at almost any other point in the post-reform era make a change to the start of the calendar. But by predetermining the primary date and opening up a conflict with New Hampshire and breaking the unwritten compact between the carve-out states, Nevada may dash its own hopes before it even gives itself a chance to be considered for the top honor. 

The better approach is to switch to a primary and leave the date unsettled for now. [That is not unprecedented. Utah funded its new 2020 presidential primary in 2018 but did not set the date until 2019. But, of course, Utah did not do that as a means of making a claim on the first-in-the-nation primary.] That puts Nevada in a prime position to pitch itself to the DNC as a possible alternative to New Hampshire (and/or Iowa) before the national party finalizes its delegate selection rules next year. "Ready, willing, able and more diverse" is a better pitch than "Here we are. Deal with our provocation."

In the end, adding a replicating passage from New Hampshire law may get the ball rolling for Nevada, but there are other complications to consider. And they are complexities that involve other stakeholders in the process. And it is those stakeholders that make this a more delicate dance for Nevada than is often appreciated.

Recent posts: 

A Glance at Where the 2024 Republican Delegate Selection Rules Stand

Nevada Legislation Would Establish January Presidential Primary, but it's Flawed

Former DNC Chair Perez Calls the Calendar Status Quo "Unacceptable"

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See more on our political/electoral consulting venture at FHQ Strategies.   

The Electoral College Map (11/3/20) -- Election Day

Update for November 3. 

[Updating throughout the day. Scroll down for final margins in states as they go final]

Final FHQ Margins -- 11/3/20 (*flip from 2016)
State	Margin	Rating
Alabama	+20.07	Strong Trump
Alaska	+6.40	Lean Trump
Arizona*	+2.86	Toss Up Biden
Arkansas	+25.63	Strong Trump
California	+29.26	Strong Biden
Colorado	+12.83	Strong Biden
Connecticut	+24.59	Strong Biden
Delaware	+26.48	Strong Biden
Florida*	+2.94	Toss Up Biden
Georgia*	+0.47	Toss Up Biden
Hawaii	+30.77	Strong Biden
Idaho	+22.58	Strong Trump
Illinois	+16.98	Strong Biden
Indiana	+11.31	Strong Trump
Iowa	+0.79	Toss Up Trump
Kansas	+9.75	Lean Trump
Kentucky	+13.52	Strong Trump
Louisiana	+18.61	Strong Trump
Maine	+13.36	Strong Biden
Maine CD1	+22.75	Strong Biden
Maine CD2*	+1.73	Toss Up Biden
Maryland	+31.54	Strong Biden
Massachusetts	+36.76	Strong Biden
Michigan*	+7.25	Lean Biden
Minnesota	+8.72	Lean Biden
Mississippi	+16.26	Strong Trump
Missouri	+7.14	Lean Trump
Montana	+7.53	Lean Trump
Nebraska	+11.65	Strong Trump
Nebraska CD2*	+6.06	Lean Biden
Nevada	+4.26	Toss Up Biden
New Hampshire	+10.61	Strong Biden
New Jersey	+19.86	Strong Biden
New Mexico	+11.04	Strong Biden
New York	+29.24	Strong Biden
North Carolina*	+1.85	Toss Up Biden
North Dakota	+25.20	Strong Trump
Ohio	+1.26	Toss Up Trump
Oklahoma	+25.05	Strong Trump
Oregon	+20.05	Strong Biden
Pennsylvania*	+5.14	Lean Biden
Rhode Island	+21.79	Strong Biden
South Carolina	+6.83	Lean Trump
South Dakota	+19.75	Strong Trump
Tennessee	+16.62	Strong Trump
Texas	+1.49	Toss Up Trump
Utah	+13.10	Strong Trump
Vermont	+38.27	Strong Biden
Virginia	+12.08	Strong Biden
Washington	+24.18	Strong Biden
Washington, DC	+78.25	Strong Biden
West Virginia	+27.32	Strong Trump
Wisconsin*	+6.69	Lean Biden
Wyoming	+38.22	Strong Trump

The Electoral College Map (11/1/20)

Update for November 1.

Well, if Saturday was a break from what have often been quiet weekends on the polling front in the 2020 presidential race, then Sunday was a decibel-filled cacophony. There were new data from 57 polls in 16 states -- plus surveys that covered both congressional districts in Maine and the second in Nebraska -- and it was all concentrated in the 13 states from New Mexico on the left to Texas on the right in the heart of the Electoral College Spectrum order. 

What was unique about this batch of new surveys was that a raft of them came from right-leaning pollsters. And across the states that count -- those six core battlegrounds of Arizona, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin -- the margins all decreased, benefiting President Trump. However, there are two sizable caveats to that. First, despite the decreases, the map and projection remained unchanged after the introduction of those polls. That means that none of those battlegrounds changed categories. But second, in drilling down just a smidgen, there was either no movement or movement toward Biden since the last polls in the majority of surveys in those series. 

They may have -- and may yet on Monday -- flood the zone with new polls, but those data from right-leaning pollsters are unlikely to change anything around here before tomorrow. Even Georgia, which has lately been precariously perched on either side of the partisan line has shifted enough into the Biden column at this point, that it, too, is likely locked in there. Again, this has been a steady race, and while these polls may have brought down the average margins some in states where Biden has been ahead throughout, in the end it is but a small sliver of a change.

On to the polls...

Polling Quick Hits:

Arizona

(Trump 50, Biden 48 via AtlasIntel | Biden 48, Trump 46 via Emerson | Biden 49, Trump 43 via Siena/NYT Upshot | Biden 50, Trump 46 via CNN | Biden 50, Trump 47 via Y2 Analytics)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +2.89] 

No previous AtlasIntel poll

Emerson: Biden 53, Trump 47 in August poll

Siena: Biden 49, Trump 41 in early October poll

CNN: Biden 49, Trump 45 in July poll

No previous Y2 Analytics poll

FHQ will start each of these polling vignettes today with the current FHQ average in each state. In Arizona, Biden's (rounded) advantage is 48-45. Of the day's polls in the Grand Canyon state, Emerson, CNN and Y2 Analytics most fall in line with that long established state of affairs in Arizona. It is and has been close, but it has also, more often than not been tipped in the former vice president's direction in individual polls. There is some narrowing across a few of these from their last iterations, but it is not to the level of tightening that the president is going to need to pull out wins in some of these states below. 

Colorado

(Biden 53, Trump 41 via Keating Research)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +12.82] 

Keating: Biden 54, Trump 39 in mid-October poll

Currently, the averages in this former perennial battleground has Biden out to a 53-40 (rounded) lead. Colorado simply has not been close in 2020 and is not still in an update that falls right on the candidates' averages here.

Florida

(Trump 47, Biden 46 via Susquehanna | Biden 48, Trump 47 via Pulse Opinion Research | Biden 47, Trump 44 via Siena/NYT Upshot | Biden 49, Trump 48 via St. Pete Polls | Biden 52, Trump 46 via Emerson | Biden 51, Trump 47 via RMG Research | Trump 50, Biden 48 via ABC/WaPo | Biden 49, Trump 47 via YouGov/CCES)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +2.88] 

Susquehanna: Trump 49, Biden 44 in poll last week

Pulse Opinion Research: Trump 50, Biden 46 in mid-October poll

Siena: Biden 47, Trump 42 in early October poll

St. Pete Polls: Biden 49, Trump 47 in mid-October poll

Emerson: Biden 51, Trump 48 in mid-October poll

RMG Research: Biden 50, Trump 48 in mid-October poll

ABC/WaPo: Trump 51, Biden 47 in September poll

No previous YouGov/CCES poll

In the Sunshine state, Trump lags Biden by a 49-46 (rounded) margin, and most of the eight new polls out of Florida today fit right in that general range. There are some exceptions like Susquehanna, but it remains a steady picture in this case. Like Arizona, it has been close in Florida almost all along. There was a brief five day period in late July when the Sunshine state drifted over into Lean Biden territory, but that moment was fleeting. Yet, the fact remains that as close as Florida has been, it has been consistently tipped toward the former vice president throughout much of 2020. The addition of these polls does not alter that. Even the polls that had Trump ahead -- Susquehanna, RMG and WaPo -- all either saw no shift since the last polls in the series or tightening that benefited Biden. And surveys that moved toward Trump tended to bring them in line with the prevailing average in the state at FHQ.

Georgia

(Trump 48, Biden 46 via Insider Advantage | Biden 49, Trump 49 via Emerson | Biden 48, Trump 47 via YouGov/CCES)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +0.36] 

No previous Insider Advantage poll

Emerson: Trump 48, Biden 47 in mid-October poll

No previous YouGov/CCES poll

In the Peach state, once the average shares of both candidates are rounded, the count comes to a 47-47 tie. And again, the new surveys are largely in line with that. Only the Emerson poll offered a comparison to an earlier poll, and even there, the change was minimal. Georgia is close, the closest state on the board at the moment. 

Iowa

(Trump 49, Biden 48 via Civiqs | Trump 49, Biden 47 via Emerson | Trump 48, Biden 46 via Insider Advantage | Trump 48, Biden 41 via Selzer)

[Current FHQ margin: Trump +0.89] 

Civiqs: Biden 48, Trump 47 in early October poll

Emerson: Trump 48, Biden 48 in mid-October poll

Insider Advantage: Trump 45, Biden 45 in mid-October poll

Selzer: Trump 49, Biden 47 in September poll

Speaking of the closest states on the board, Iowa also fits that bill with Trump maintaining a narrow 47-46 (rounded) edge in the FHQ averages. Again, as in Georgia above, most of the new polls today are consistent with that established average. However, the one that stands out is the one that is often called he gold standard of polling in the Hawkeye state. And in that Selzer poll, the president stayed in the upper 40s like the last survey in September but Biden trailed off, dropping in to the low 40s. What is different from that last poll to the latest update is that five percent of the respondents refused to say who they were supporting in the new one. That was a segment of the electorate that was not accounted for in the previous poll. The crosstabs on that subsample of around 40 respondents in that poll would have been interesting to look at; not necessarily representative, but interesting. 

Maine

(Biden 54, Trump 43 via Emerson

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +13.40] 

Maine CD1

(Biden 58, Trump 39 via Emerson

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +22.92] 

Maine CD2

(Biden 50, Trump 47 via Emerson

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +1.88] 

No previous Emerson poll

FHQ will keep the focus in Maine on the second congressional district where the competition is. There has been no previous Emerson poll of the Pine Tree state, so there is no natural comparison, but Biden's lead in the averages there has stabilized around 47-45 (rounded). That is behind this poll of the district, yet not exactly inconsistent with it. Although there have been just 14 surveys in the field in ME CD2, 11 of them have favored the former vice president. Like the rest of those other toss ups close to the partisan line on the Biden side, the second is and has been close throughout, but consistently tilted toward the Democratic nominee. 

Michigan

(Biden 53, Trump 45 via Ipsos | Biden 49, Trump 47 via Insider Advantage | Biden 52, Trump 46 via Emerson | Biden 53, Trump 41 via CNN | Biden 52, Trump 45 via Mitchell Research | Biden 48, Trump 41 via EPIC-MRA)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +7.31] 

Ipsos: Biden 53, Trump 43 in poll last week

No previous Insider Advantage poll

Emerson: Biden 54, Trump 43 in early October poll

CNN: Biden 52, Trump 40 in July poll

Mitchell: Biden 52, Trump 42 in poll last week

EPIC-MRA: Biden 48, Trump 39 in mid-October poll

 

Here is the deal in the Great Lakes state: Biden is already averaging over a 50 percent share of support there. Despite the fact that each of these polls today -- those with a predecessor in the series anyway -- show some narrowing, it is almost all on the Trump side of the equation. The former vice president is still stable and at or over the majority mark in each of these updates. The president may or may not close the gap some on election day, but if Biden is over 50 percent, it will not matter. 

Minnesota

(Biden 54, Trump 39 via St. Cloud State

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +8.52] 
No previous St. Cloud State poll

This St. Cloud State survey of the North Star state may be on the high side of the range for Biden and low side for Trump, but it remains in line with the 51-42 (rounded) average the race is currently at under the FHQ methodology. And as was said in Saturday's update, other than the Survey USA series, the majority of pollsters have generally found a race with Biden over 50 percent and Trump stuck in the low 40s, the latter of which is in the range of the president's overall job approval numbers nationally. 

Nebraska CD2

(Biden 50, Trump 48 via Emerson)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +6.69] 

No previous Emerson poll

The difference between this latest poll and the FHQ averages for NE CD2 are fairly stark. As of now, Biden holds a 51-44 (rounded) lead that looks a lot like the early polls out of the district over the summer. But that discrepancy likely has more to do with the general lack of polling activity in the Omaha area this year. The big polling issue on the state level in 2016 was that there were not a lot of polls in the field in the days before the election. Now, the swing is much less likely to be as large this time around -- there are fewer undecideds after all -- but the same sort of thing could be happening Nebraska's second as election day nears and partisans/partisan leaners come home. Regardless, Biden has been at or over 50 percent in all but one of the (yes, just) six public polls conducted in the district in 2020.

Nevada

(Biden 49, Trump 47 via Emerson)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +4.34] 
No previous Emerson poll

 

Nevada is another jurisdiction where polling has been lacking all year, but where Biden has trailed only once. This Emerson poll hits the vice president's average FHQ share but has Trump running about three points ahead of his average share of support. That tighter margin may be partisans coming home to the president, Biden struggling with Latinos in the state and/or signs of the vaunted Harry Reid turnout machine faltering in the midst of a global pandemic. But the Silver state is another state where it is striking how close the Democratic nominee is to 50 percent. He is not there in this case, but Biden is approaching it in a way that neither Clinton nor Trump did four years ago. 

New Mexico

(Biden 54, Trump 42 via Research & Polling Inc.)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +10.64] 
Research & Polling: Biden 54, Trump 39 in September poll

In the Land of Enchantment, the FHQ averages have the race for the state's five electoral votes at 53-42 (rounded) in favor of the former vice president. This poll is evidence of the race coming in line with that more than it is about Trump gaining ground. This may have been a flip opportunity -- or a state that was eyed as one by the president's campaign operation -- but that has not panned out in any of the New Mexico polling in 2020.  

North Carolina

(Trump 50, Biden 48 via AtlasIntel | Trump 48, Biden 44 via Insider Advantage | Biden 47, Trump 47 via Emerson | Biden 51, Trump 45 via CNN | Trump 49, Biden 47 via Trafalgar Group | Biden 49, Trump 45 via YouGov/CCES)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +1.77] 

No previous AtlasIntel poll

No previous Insider Advantage poll

Emerson: Biden 49, Trump 49 in mid-October poll

CNN: Biden 49, Trump 46 in September poll

Trafalgar: Trump 49, Biden 46 in poll last week

No previous YouGov/CCES poll

Only half of the polls out today in North Carolina had a previous survey to which to compare, and two of those had Trump uncharacteristically ahead in a state where Biden has carried a narrow but consistent lead in the FHQ averages for much of the year. Currently, Biden is up 48-46 (rounded) and most of the surveys today are consistent with that. Some, like the CNN poll have Biden running toward the top end of this range while others like AtlasIntel have the president outperforming his average. The margin may have inched down a tick, but it remains tipped in Biden's direction in the Tar Heel state. 

Ohio

(Trump 49, Biden 48 via Civiqs | Biden 50, Trump 49 via Emerson)

[Current FHQ margin: Trump +0.95] 

Civiqs: Trump 50, Biden 47 in mid-October poll

Emerson: Trump 51, Biden 49 in May poll

One could make a mountain out of a molehill and suggest that the gap narrowed in both Buckeye state polls released today, but the truth is that both maintain an established status quo Trump lead in Ohio. With election day in sight, the president's 47-46 (rounded) advantage in the FHQ averages of Ohio are reflected in both surveys. But the key is less about who leads than how much Ohio has swung toward the Democrats since 2016. The shift there is in line with the seven point average swing across the whole country in 2020 polls. That Ohio is close at all is the story here. Whether Biden can flip it or Trump narrowly defend it is mostly immaterial to the quest for 270 electoral votes (especially in the winning Biden scenarios). 

Pennsylvania

(Biden 52, Trump 46 via Ipsos | Trump 49, Biden 47 via Insider Advantage | Biden 49, Trump 43 via Siena/NYT Upshot | Biden 52, Trump 47 via Emerson | Trump 50, Biden 49 via AtlasIntel | Biden 51, Trump 44 via ABC/WaPo | Biden 52, Trump 44 via YouGov/CCES)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +5.28] 

Ipsos: Biden 51, Trump 44 in poll last week

Insider Advantage: Trump 48, Biden 46 in poll last week

Siena: Biden 49, Trump 42 in early October poll

Emerson: Biden 51, Trump 47 in early October poll

No previous AtlasIntel poll

ABC/WaPo: Biden 54, Trump 45 in September poll

No previous YouGov/CCES poll

There is a prevailing take home that has emerged in the most frequently surveyed state in the 2020 presidential race. The first point on the checklist is always to ask whether Biden is around 50 percent and if Trump is in the mid-40s. This batch of polls checks that box for the most part. Those that do not, like the Emerson survey show no real movement poll-to-poll from the last update, have Biden over the majority mark (ABC/WaPo) or have the president ahead in a state where polls have shown that less than a tenth of the time. But that 50-44 (rounded) edge the former vice president has had has been among the most consistent realities of this race for months. That consistency has kept the Keystone state firmly lodged in the tipping point position well inside Biden's coalition of states.

Texas

(Trump 50, Biden 49 via Emerson | Trump 50, Biden 45 via Gravis Marketing | Trump 49, Biden 47 via YouGov/CCES)

[Current FHQ margin: Trump +1.45] 

Emerson: Trump 52, Biden 48 in May poll

Gravis: Trump 46, Biden 44 in July poll

No previous YouGov/CCES poll

Like Iowa and Ohio, Texas has been a state that has swung toward the Democrats since 2016, but shifted in a manner that is in line with the average change across the country. That has made the Lone Star state look much more competitive in 2020, but it continues to be basically the North Carolina of the Trump side of the partisan line. The president has led throughout, but has maintained a narrow -- and at this point 48-46 (rounded) -- edge in the FHQ averages. The newly added surveys do little to disrupt that general outlook in Texas. 

Utah

(Trump 51, Biden 44 via Y2 Analytics)

[Current FHQ margin: Trump +13.44] 

Y2 Analytics: Trump 50, Biden 40 in early October poll

Look, this is among the rosiest polls a Democrat will likely ever get in the Beehive state. But then, the Y2 Analytics series of polls this year in Utah, has been that way for Joe Biden. But the fact remains that no Democrat has cleared 40 percent in Utah since Johnson carried the state in 1964. Obama came closest in 2008 with 35 percent there, but this series polls stands out in a state where the FHQ average has settled in at 52-39 (rounded) with Trump out in front.

Wisconsin

(Biden 51, Trump 47 via Civiqs | Biden 53, Trump 45 via Ipsos | Biden 51, Trump 49 via AtlasIntel | Biden 53, Trump 45 via Emerson | Biden 49, Trump 46 via Susquehanna | Biden 52, Trump 41 via Siena/NYT Upshot | Trump 52, Biden 44 via CNN)

[Current FHQ margin: Biden +6.39] 

Civiqs: Biden 53, Trump 45 in mid-October poll

Ipsos: Biden 53, Trump 44 in poll last week

No previous AtlasIntel poll

Emerson: Biden 52, Trump 45 in September poll

Susquehanna: Biden 46, Trump 45 in mid-October poll

Siena: Trump 51, Biden 41 in mid-October poll

CNN: Biden 52, Trump 42 in September poll

There just is not that much different from one poll to the latest in this group of new surveys out of the Badger state. And two of the three polls that find a greater than one point change increase the former vice president's advantage there. But the bigger thing in Wisconsin is that Biden's average FHQ share has now, as in Michigan, surpassed the 50 percent threshold, a point he passes in six of the seven new polls today. Trump does not need Wisconsin, but with Biden north of 50 percent at FHQ in both Michigan and Wisconsin now, the president's margin for error is quite low. Without those two, Trump absolutely has to run the table through the Biden toss ups and claim the one remaining blue wall state he flipped (and where Biden is barely below 50 percent at FHQ), Pennsylvania. 

NOTE: 

A description of the methodology behind the graduated weighted average of 2020 state-level polling that FHQ uses for these projections can be found here.

The Electoral College Spectrum1
DC-3 VT-3 (6)2	NJ-14 (156)	NE CD2-1 WI-10 (253)	AK-3 (125)	TN-11 (60)
MA-11 (17)	OR-7 (163)	PA-203 (273 | 285)	MO-10 (122)	KY-8 (49)
MD-10 (27)	IL-20 (183)	NV-6 (279 | 265)	SC -9 (112)	SD-3 (41)
HI-4 (31)	ME-2 (185)	AZ-11 (290 | 259)	MT-3 NE CD1-1 (103)	AL-9 (38)
NY-29 (60)	CO-9 (194)	FL-29 (319 | 248)	KS-6 (99)	ID-4 (29)
CA-55 (115)	VA-13 (207)	ME CD2-1 NC-15 (335 | 219)	IN-11 (93)	AR-6 (25)
DE-3 (118)	NH-4 (211)	GA-16 (351 | 203)	NE-2 (82)	OK-7 (19)
WA-12 (130)	NM-5 (216)	IA-6 (187)	UT-6 (80)	ND-3 (12)
CT-7 ME CD1-1 (138)	MN-10 (226)	OH-18 (181)	MS-6 (74)	WV-5 (9)
RI-4 (142)	MI-16 (242)	TX-38 (163)	LA-8 (68)	WY-3 NE CD3-1 (4)
1 Follow the link for a detailed explanation on how to read the Electoral College Spectrum. 2 The numbers in the parentheses refer to the number of electoral votes a candidate would have if he or she won all the states ranked prior to that state. If, for example, Trump won all the states up to and including Pennsylvania (Biden's toss up states plus the Pennsylvania), he would have 285 electoral votes. Trump's numbers are only totaled through the states he would need in order to get to 270. In those cases, Biden's number is on the left and Trump's is on the right in bold italics. 3 Pennsylvania is the state where Biden crosses the 270 electoral vote threshold to win the presidential election, the tipping point state. The tipping point cell is shaded in yellow to denote that and the font color is adjusted to attempt to reflect the category in which the state is.

57 new polls from 16 states and another poll out of the second district in Nebraska led to the following changes:

• Nebraska CD2 moves into the middle column at the very top, a once cell shift toward the partisan line.
• Arizona and Florida traded spots on the Electoral College Spectrum with the Sunshine state moving closer the partisan line. 
• Speaking of the partisan line, Maine CD2 moved away from it and to the other side of North Carolina in the order. 
• Wisconsin saw Joe Biden's share of support push across the 50 percent barrier there. 

2 days to go.

Where things stood at FHQ two days before election day (or close to it) in...
2016
2012
2008


--
NOTE: Distinctions are made between states based on how much they favor one candidate or another. States with a margin greater than 10 percent between Biden and Trump are "Strong" states. Those with a margin of 5 to 10 percent "Lean" toward one of the two (presumptive) nominees. Finally, states with a spread in the graduated weighted averages of both the candidates' shares of polling support less than 5 percent are "Toss Up" states. The darker a state is shaded in any of the figures here, the more strongly it is aligned with one of the candidates. Not all states along or near the boundaries between categories are close to pushing over into a neighboring group. Those most likely to switch -- those within a percentage point of the various lines of demarcation -- are included on the Watch List below.

The Watch List1
State	Potential Switch
Georgia	from Toss Up Biden	to Toss Up Trump
Iowa	from Toss Up Trump	to Toss Up Biden
Kansas	from Lean Trump	to Strong Trump
Nevada	from Toss Up Biden	to Lean Biden
New Hampshire	from Strong Biden	to Lean Biden
New Mexico	from Strong Biden	to Lean Biden
Ohio	from Toss Up Trump	to Toss Up Biden
Pennsylvania	from Lean Biden	to Toss Up Biden
1 Graduated weighted average margin within a fraction of a point of changing categories.

--
Methodological Note: In past years, FHQ has tried some different ways of dealing with states with no polls or just one poll in the early rounds of these projections. It does help that the least polled states are often the least competitive. The only shortcoming is that those states may be a little off in the order in the Spectrum. In earlier cycles, a simple average of the state's three previous cycles has been used. But in 2016, FHQ strayed from that and constructed an average swing from 2012 to 2016 that was applied to states. That method, however, did little to prevent anomalies like the Kansas poll that had Clinton ahead from biasing the averages. In 2016, the early average swing in the aggregate was  too small to make much difference anyway. For 2020, FHQ has utilized an average swing among states that were around a little polled state in the rank ordering on election day in 2016. If there is just one poll in Delaware in 2020, for example, then maybe it is reasonable to account for what the comparatively greater amount of polling tells us about the changes in Connecticut, New Jersey and New Mexico. Or perhaps the polling in Iowa, Mississippi and South Carolina so far tells us a bit about what may be happening in Alaska where no public polling has been released. That will hopefully work a bit better than the overall average that may end up a bit more muted.


--
Recent posts:

Happy Halloween, 2020

The Electoral College Map (10/31/20)

The Electoral College Map (10/30/20)

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