A November Surprise Scenario

Over this past weekend we had a discussion going about the effect the presence of early voting in a state would have on the McCain campaign's home-stretch strategy. The basic hypothesis was that states with early voting -- where Barack Obama would have some votes in the bank heading into election day based on the advantage the Illinois senator has enjoyed in early voting -- would not be focused on as heavily as states where early voting and absentee voting were minimized. In other words, if something were to happen to change people's minds in some way, you'd get more bang for your buck if you were campaigning the hardest in states with as little early voting as possible. States like Pennsylvania and Virginia.

But we can push this concept a little further. And, in fact, SarahLawrenceScott has done just that. If we were to look at the early voting information we have access to so far in this cycle and gauge whether that looks like it is on track to surpass the numbers from 2004, we can then make some basic assumptions that may give us a better idea of why the McCain folks are focusing where they are focusing.

First, let's look at the assumptions Scott has put together:

1. Assume something triggers a 4% loss for Obama (this was roughly the size of the Rev. Wright/McCain clinches drop, the Palin drop, and Obama's "soft" support in current polls) whether an Obama revelation or some geopolitical. We'll call it a November surprise.
   
   
2. Assume a 2.5% overperformance for Obama in early voting. In other words it is not that a greater proportion of his supporters vote early, but rather that GOTV would push his numbers up in a state that had 100% early voting.
   
   
3. Assume 50% of undecideds who vote early go for Obama.
   
   
4. Assume that after the surprise, just 20% of election day undecideds go for Obama.

If you start off with the Pollster averages for each state and combine that with the above assumptions you end up with something like this:


If we take these new, post-November surprise state margins and apply the three-category thresholds that FHQ employs -- >7% = strong, 3-7% = lean, <3% = toss up -- we end up with a map that has toss ups that look an awful lot like the targets the McCain campaign has.

[Click Map to Enlarge]

Virginia would flip back to McCain. Pennsylvania would be much more competitive than what the polls show, as would Ohio. And Florida and Wisconsin would look like dead heats. It could be argued that, well, those are the toss ups anyway. Well yeah, except Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin don't really fit the bill according to recent polling in each of those states. However, the goal is to consider not only the potential effect early voting has, but to ascertain whether strategically, the McCain campaign is hedging its bets, hoping for something akin to the George W. Bush drunk-driving revelation (Though, perhaps it would have to be bigger) that broke during the final weekend of the 2000 race, happening in this race. Maybe, maybe not, but the decision to focus resources on the three states I just brought up looks more rational in this light than it does on the surface.

NOTE: I want to thank Scott for putting this material together and sharing it will me. It really adds to the earlier early voting discussion we had.


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Early Voting and McCain's Home-Stretch Strategy

In the comments section this morning, SarahLawrenceScott brought up what I think is a major reason or why we are seeing what we are seeing from the McCain campaign from a strategic standpoint lately. Why let it come out that you are potentially pulling out of Colorado? Well, for starters, it telegraphs where they are focusing, or have to focus: Pennsylvania. But why target Pennsylvania instead of Colorado? The latter looks closer now than the former -- at least by FHQ's measure.

Well, here's what Scott had to say:

"I just came up with what I think may be the explanation for a lot of what seems to be irrational behavior by the McCain campaign in their choice of states to allocate resources to.

Think, for a moment, what is the most likely victory scenario for McCain in terms of electoral votes. Just move up the Electoral College Spectrum until you get to 270?

No. The problem is that some of those states have already voted in large numbers. For McCain to win, he has to have the state of the race change nationally. But if that change occurs late (say, something equivalent to the Bin Laden tape of 2004 the weekend before the election), then its effect is tempered in early voting states.

Here's the map of states with early voting:

[Click Map to Enlarge]

McCain's best chance of winning is to get some of the states on Obama's side of the partisan line that don't have early voting.

Those are:

MN, WI, VA, MI, DE, PA, NY, CT, RI, MA, and NH.

Start by throwing out the deepest of the blue states. Now we've got, in reverse order of their position on the spectrum,

VA, NH, MI, PA, WI, and MN.

Looks an awful lot like where McCain is concentrating his resources, doesn't it?

The one exception there is Michigan. And if they're actually thinking things through (which I admit doesn't seem to be the case), then in the event of one more game-changer they can sweep into Michigan and try to launch a surprise attack of sorts. McCain has enough resources to do that in one largish state, and in the mean time he can save money and resources by leaving it off the list.

The other mystery is why he seems so fixated on Iowa. That I can't understand.

But at least this explains why the interest in Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and even Ohio seems a little tepid. McCain needs to defend his states up through Florida, early voting or no (and thus we do see plenty of activity in North Carolina and Florida). That brings him to 227. Assume a major game-changer in the last week. He now adds the non-early-voting states of Virginia, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. He's at 265. McCain now wins if he can somehow pick off Nevada or Ohio (early voting, but pretty close), or Michigan (no early voting, but would need a last minute blitz).

It's a long shot, but that's the point. To win, McCain has to assume something crazy goes his way, and then be ready to capitalize on it if it does. Going after Pennsylvania, rather than the western states, is the best way to do that.

So the football analogy is no longer the hail Mary pass. Now it's down by 16 with under a minute to go and no time outs. If you can score a touchdown, the plan is clearly to go for a two point conversion. Not because that's the high percentage play--in fact, it's likely to make the defeat worse in point terms. But because if lightning strikes (in the analogy, recovering an onside kick), then at least you're poised to take advantage of it.

That's hypothesis one. Hypothesis two is that they're just clueless."

This is the exact same conclusion we came to yesterday in our weekly campaign discussion group meeting. I absolutely reject the notion that the typically top-notch campaign strategists the GOP has in its fold are clueless. They just don't have a favorable political climate in which to operate and that makes message consistency that much more difficult. We have to look no further than four years ago to see a similar contrast in message consistency. John Kerry never to did find the proper balance on how to deal with the Iraq war just as McCain has been back-peddling since the economic crisis hit. As Scott says, an early voting strategy is a long shot, but if the polls we have seen lately are accurate, then that is all the McCain campaign really has.

Good stuff, Scott. Thanks. I should also extend a thank you to Rich Clark who brought this to my attention yesterday.

Credit where credit is due: The map comes to us courtesy of Wikipedia (plus some FHQ alterations).


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Rules Matter...but Luck Does Too

The Providence Journal's, Froma Harrop, ran a column of Clinton talking points this morning. In all the talk (both from her and separately from the Clinton campaign) of all the different metrics of nomination success, Florida and Michigan voter disenfranchisement and the undemocratic nature of caucuses, one thing continues to be underdiscussed in this Democratic nomination battle.

The bottom line is that RULES MATTER. We see the effects of those rules in a close race, but also see how adaptable each candidate's campaign is to those rules. Obama's campaign was better at foreseeing how the race would progress. PERIOD. Was that by design? Yes, but to a large degree there is some luck involved there. He had to have all the chips fall in just the right place for that plan to work. So while there may have been discussions within an Obama campaign still in its infancy then about a caucus strategy as early as last summer, they still needed Iowa or New Hampshire or Nevada or South Carolina to help even get his campaign to that point (the caucus phase between Super Tuesday and Wyoming a month later on March 8). Those Obama successes in Iowa, Nevada and South Carolina were anything but given even at the outset of the 2008 calendar year.

Foresight and luck are the marks of a long shot winning the nomination. Arguably Obama is not, in 2008, the long shot that Jimmy Carter was in 1976. Both, however, were effective at navigating through the rules of the game. And things worked out the way both campaigns expected; both by design and through some luck. Carter needed early success in Iowa and New Hampshire to set him up for an elimination contest against George Wallace in Florida. He needed that elimination to claim the mantle as the southern (albeit more moderate) candidate in the race for the Democratic nomination.

In 2008, Obama needed a win, any win, among the early states to be seen as viable in the overall contest and heading into Super Tuesday on February 5. That he got a win in mostly white Iowa was certainly better than having broken through in South Carolina, where African Americans made up over half of the primary electorate. But his win in Iowa signaled to African Americans that he was viable to an audience broader than simply African Americans. Without that signal, the race may not have played out the way it did in South Carolina. The polls in the state prior to Obama's Iowa win showed a tight race between Clinton and Obama. And even then the endorsement of the influential, Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-SC), was still sought after by Clinton, Edwards and Obama to put any one of them over the top. But it was just before It wasn't until after South Carolina that the strained relations between the Clintons and the black community began to appear. Obama's campaign emerged from both state victorious and proved their knowledge of the rules by gaining one more delegate than Clinton in Nevada, despite losing the popular vote (That knowledge of the rules extended to subsequent steps in the Nevada process as well.). Obama's path, then, was not necessarily a clear one.

On the other hand, at the outset of the contests, Clinton's path to the nomination was the clearer one. But luck runs both ways and Clinton had some bad luck. Her campaign leaned way too heavily on the approaches to the presidential primary process of the past. But we all did. Why wouldn't both parties' nominations be settled by Super Tuesday? That's the way it had been in most nomination contests since 1988. [Of course, the Clinton campaign didn't fall back on those approaches enough to take her name off the ballot in Michigan for that state's non-sanctioned primary. That decision was curious at the time given her status as front-runner.] The Super Tuesday or bust strategy was fine, in and of itself, but they never had a Plan B in place if the states that held contests on February 5 didn't hand her enough delegates for the nomination. And they certainly didn't foresee Obama building a firewall in caucus states.

The message, as always, is that rules matter. And if your knowledge of them is anything less than full, then you are vulnerable to defeat. The discussion, then, is not one of whether caucuses are democratic, or popular votes should be the metric by which a nominee is determined, or of Florida or Michigan. That's a discussion that can be had by both parties when and if they seek to reform the process between now and 2012. The discussion is about a campaign that thought primary season would go one way and later discovered (the hard way) that they had guessed wrong.



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